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and Practical Solutions does not represent an official position of the
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with the understanding that the author and publisher are not rendering
legal, accounting, or other professional services in this publication. If
ethics, legal or other expert assistance is required, the services of a com-
petent professional should be sought.
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PREFACE
Financial managers and accountants are today faced with increasing
responsibility for compliance with all manner of financial reporting
requirements. As the number of financial restatements has grown and
questions about management integrity have shaken investor confidence,
the roles of financial managers and accountants have taken on both more
importance and greater risk. Investors have come to the realization that
financial decision making is rarely a simple black or white choice; rather,
they now understand that the variety of ways in which a complex transac-
tion can be structured may dictate the accounting result. For this reason,
many institutional investors are now more concerned with the personal
values and integrity of financial managers and accountants than with
other, more traditional investment criteria. At the same time that financial
managers and accountants have assumed a more prominent position in the
management hierarchy, exposure to liability for financial decision making
is at an all-time high. Civil litigation can no longer be counted on as the
last word in liability for deficient financial reporting, and the search for
more sources of recovery means that financial managers and accountants
are more likely than ever to become targets in legal and regulatory actions,
regardless of their culpability. Against this backdrop, financial managers
and accountants must maintain and enhance their decision-making skills
within a values-driven environment or may suffer the consequences of
their failure to do so.
This book is designed to provide the reader a series of case studies that
illustrate real world ethical dilemmas and application of values consistent
with the high standards of the profession. The case studies:
• are drawn in most instances from facts reported in actual court cases
and disciplinary proceedings that involve financial managers and
accountants; 
• put the reader in the central decision-making role using You Are the
CFO and You Are the Audit Partner hypotheticals; 
• include analyses that consider various outcomes and a discussion of why
the financial manager or accountant should choose or avoid particular
courses of action; 
xi
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• are accompanied by focus points discussing essential professional values
and their application; and 
• reference the implementation and design of a corporate ethics program
in Appendixes A and B, to these materials. 
The case studies include ethics topics encompassed by professional
ethics codes issued by state accounting societies and accountancy boards,
and topics addressed in the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, such as: 
• independence; 
• integrity and objectivity; 
• confidentiality;
• contingent fees, including commissions and referral fees; 
• compliance with audit, consulting and other standards; 
• client records; 
• offering services over the Internet; 
• internal accounting controls, procedures and records; 
• procedures concerning identification, reporting and investigation of
accounting irregularities; and
• the importance of on-going ethics training and education, including
maintaining an effective compliance program for liability protection.   
In addition to the ethical subject matter, the reader must analyze the
fact scenarios and determine how to apply accounting pronouncements and
policy statements covering many of today’s most important accounting and
audit issues, including: 
• revenue recognition;
• critical accounting policies; 
• consolidation of variable interest entities (VIEs) [Note: With the release
of FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest
Entities, the term “special purpose entities” (SPEs) was changed to vari-
able interest entities as it applies to the Interpretation’s guidance.];
• disclosure in management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A); 
• market risk; 
• pro forma earnings; 
• transfer payments; 
• loan loss reserves; 
• materiality; 
• related party transactions; and 
• insider trading.
xii
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In this regard, the reader can expect to encounter issues within this
book that are addressed in recent Staff Accounting Bulletins, Financial
Reporting Releases, SEC Statements and Cautionary Advice, Rule 102(e)
of the SEC’s Rules of Practice, various provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and newly enacted
industry legislation. 
Some of the cases have been prepared using fact patterns and ques-
tions that will prompt the reader to consider how disclosure or regulatory
filings might have been prepared that are (i) compliant with both the let-
ter and spirit of the disclosure requirements, (ii) more effective, and (iii)
more likely to reduce the risk of legal or regulatory action. Consistent with
the shift to a principles-based accounting environment, the reader is
encouraged to analyze financial and accounting issues within an ethical
framework that places a premium on exercise of sound judgment, not sim-
ply mere compliance with applicable standards.
Chapter 1, “Case 1—Superlative Software Corp.: You Are the CFO,” is
a role play where the reader assumes the position of a newly hired CFO of
a software company who discovers revenue recognition issues when
preparing for the annual audit. More digging reveals a variety of possible
revenue acceleration issues. The practices appear to have originated on the
prior CFO’s watch, but it’s not clear whether the CEO or others might have
been involved in what appear to be improper practices. The outside audit
firm does not appear to be aware of the possible irregularities. As CFO, the
reader is called upon to decide how to deal with these issues and to whom
to report. This case raises issues related to establishing and assessing
internal controls, proper reporting procedures, and compliance with
accounting and auditing standards.
In Chapter 2, “Case 2—Pointer Electronics, Inc.: You Are the Audit
Partner,” the reader is placed in the position of being a concurring partner
on an audit that is nearing its completion. You have identified certain
excess reserves that do not appear to be presented in accordance with
GAAP and have discussed these concerns with the engagement partner.
The engagement partner has not proposed adjustments to eliminate the
excess reserves. The company has received an unqualified audit opinion in
the past and it appears that the reserves may have been an issue in prior
years’ audits, although the work papers evidence no disagreements and
there is no indication that the prior concurring partner was focused on the
reserve issue. As the concurring partner, you must decide how to approach
this issue, consider whether the audit firm has conducted the audit in
accordance with GAAS, and what recommendations you will make to your
firm. Issues raised by this case include integrity and objectivity, compli-
ance with auditing standards and accounting principles, and procedures
for investigating and reporting irregularities. 
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Chapter 3’s “Case 3—BAN&K Advisory Services LLC: You Are the
Audit Partner,” is one in which the reader is employed as the managing
partner of an audit firm affiliate that offers advisory services to small busi-
nesses interested in selling themselves. An audit client approached the
firm recently and asked the firm to provide advice about a possible sale
transaction. The client wishes the audit firm to be compensated with a con-
tingent fee if the sale transaction closes. You are concerned about the
potential buyer’s reliance on financial statements audited by your firm,
what happens if the sale doesn’t occur, and the implications of the contin-
gent fee. This case features issues including independence, integrity and
objectivity, and contingent fees. 
Chapter 4, “Case 4—Forensic Review Services LLC: You Are the
Forensic Auditor,” posits a situation where you are a forensic auditor who
has been called in to assist counsel in conducting an internal investigation
of a private company. The chief financial officer has uncovered evidence
that certain members of management may have used company assets to
pay personal expenses. The officers are protesting bitterly that at least
some of the expenses were approved by members of the board, but the
board has suspended the officers (with pay, for the time being) while the
investigation proceeds. The private company’s audit firm has indicated it
had no evidence of any diversion of corporate assets, and it issued a clean
opinion on the two prior years’ financial statements. You have been asked
by the audit firm that you discuss with them any questionable entries in
the company’s books, but access to their work papers is not yet assured. In
undertaking the investigation, management interviews reveal facts that
cause you to question whether someone at the audit firm might have
known of diversion of corporate assets. This case focuses on integrity and
objectivity, confidentiality, client records, compliance with auditing stan-
dards, and investigation and reporting procedures.  
In Chapter 5, “Case 5—Department of Enforcement: You Are the
Accounting Investigator,” you are asked to approach a group of ethical
issues from a different vantage point: you are employed by a government
regulatory agency as an accounting investigator and are being asked to
evaluate if the agency should institute proceedings against the CFO of a
public company. The company filed a quarterly financial statement that
included a reference to an off-balance sheet financing that was undertak-
en using a variable interest entity (VIE). Expanded disclosure provided
after the filing of the 10-Q indicates that the company may be contingent-
ly liable for a portion of the VIE’s obligations. You have been asked by your
supervisor to take the CFO’s testimony in an upcoming deposition. Not
only do you have to develop questions that will elicit information about the
extent of the public company’s exposure to the VIE’s obligations, you need
to determine who else may have information relevant to your inquiry. You
must also recommend if the government should institute any disciplinary
xiv
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proceedings against the CFO. The issues explored in this case include
client records, confidentiality, and internal accounting controls and proce-
dures. 
As the corporate controller of a large public company, Chapter 6’s
“Case 6—Megatron Corp: You Are the Corporate Controller,” has you mak-
ing decisions that will not only affect your future, but the future of many
others. Your company’s Singapore subsidiary that manufactures health-
care products had serious questions arise about the safety of its products.
Sales and the stock price plummeted but recovered after the products
received a “clean bill of health.” Later, you received a phone call from one
of your friends in the marketing department of the subsidiary. She informs
you that she saw a letter on the desk of the executive vice president in
charge of marketing that related to a contract for the healthcare products
and that it looked to her like the letter had “other conditions” applicable to
the contract. Unfortunately, she couldn’t get a copy of the letter. Based on
the size of the contract, you know it was material to the subsidiary but it’s
not material to the parent company and therefore doesn’t have to be filed
with the SEC. You also know that the company’s “trading window” will
open in less than a week and that officers and directors may sell stock since
the company’s stock is close to a 52 week high. You are going to have to
make some fast decisions about who to go to (audit firm, CFO, audit com-
mittee) and what to say. The facts of this case cover integrity and objectiv-
ity, confidentiality, compliance with audit standards, internal accounting
controls, and procedures for investigating and reporting irregularities. 
On a somewhat lighter note, Chapter 7’s “Case 7—AA&C LLC.: You
Are a Member of the Practice Development Committee,” places you in the
position of participating on the practice development committee of your
accounting firm. One of your partners has suggested that the firm enter
into a joint marketing arrangement with an e-business that offers valua-
tion services to businesses and individuals. You’ve been asked to assist the
partner in reporting to the committee on the issues created by such an
alliance, including any limitations or requirements that the firm will need
to observe in doing business with the valuation firm. This case requires you
to consider independence, integrity, referral fees, and Internet service
offerings. 
As the head of the audit committee of the board of directors of a pub-
lic company, Chapter 8’s “Case 8—Precious Mining Inc.: You Are the Audit
Committee Chair,” finds you in a quandary. A former employee has con-
tacted you and the audit firm and is making allegations that the company
has been engaging in “round trip” trades of precious metals with a com-
petitor that were done solely to increase reported revenue and profit. You
make some preliminary inquiries of management and their reaction, pre-
dictably, is that the ex-employee is disgruntled and will probably sue for
wrongful termination. When you talk to the engagement partner, she
xv
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informs you that while there is no “smoking gun” that will support the for-
mer employee’s allegation, the audit firm is recommending that the audit
committee look further into the allegations. She does not threaten to
resign, but you’ve concluded that the investigation is probably the only way
the audit firm will render its opinion (and not resign) and that you can be
comfortable that there isn’t a problem. The investigation leads to facts that
require further action; the question is, what? This case covers integrity,
independence, confidentiality, compliance with accounting standards,
client records, and investigation of accounting irregularities. 
In Chapter 9, “Case 9—Incisive Lasers Corporation: You Are the
Outside Counsel,” you are asked to “think outside the box” in your role as
counsel to the controller of a public company after he is accused by the SEC
of following directives from top management or making unsupported
entries that inflated the company’s results of operations. The controller has
confided in you that he may have made the entries, but that his boss, the
CFO, may have done so. The controller also says that he doesn’t recall get-
ting any ethics training at the company, consistent with the “anything
goes” culture of the company that developed in recent years. You note that
the SEC has alleged that the controller sold stock during the time that the
company reported the inflated results of operations, as did the CFO and
CEO.  The company also completed a follow-on public offering during this
period, meaning that investor losses may be significant.  Because the con-
troller is a CPA, you are concerned that the controller may be subject to a
Rule 102(e) proceeding and may also be subject to a range of civil or crim-
inal penalties. The issues raised in this case include integrity, compliance
with accounting standards, internal accounting controls, and the impor-
tance of on-going ethics training.
“Appendix A—Implementing an Ethics Strategy” and “Appendix B—
Designing an Ethics Training Program” have been included to serve as ref-
erence points and also to provide some practical guidance on the steps
involved when preparing a company-wide ethics program. You should refer
to the abundant resources available over the web if you need other exam-
ples of existing corporate ethics programs. In preparing this publication, I
reviewed a number of business ethics codes and corporate philosophies
available over the Internet (at no cost) from leading companies such as
Johnson & Johnson, Hewlett Packard and Halliburton, among others.
Remember, the most effective ethics program is one that is right for your
business and industry, establishes the proper “tone from the top,” and pro-
motes values that will make your business or practice a respected member
of the business and/or professional community.
Robert W. Walter
Denver, Colorado
xvi
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1CHAPTER 1
CASE 1—
SUPERLATIVE SOFTWARE CORP.: 
YOU ARE THE CFO
This chapter’s case study is designed to highlight the most common cause
of accounting irregularities, busted audits, restatements, and accounting
enforcement actions: revenue recognition. Time and again, financial man-
agers are called upon to make business decisions about how (or if) to record
revenues from the sale of services or products. Many of these decisions are
made in reliance on the representations of officers or employees of the
organization, meaning that your integrity can oftentimes be riding on the
integrity of others. While maintaining proper internal controls and proce-
dures are instrumental in addressing many of these issues, personal
integrity and the willingness to confront difficult choices are a necessary
part of effective financial management. A lack of integrity on your part or
on the part of others may condemn the organization to joining the ranks of
corporate wrongdoers and may expose you to regulatory, civil or criminal
sanctions. Therefore, when you encounter difficult revenue recognition
issues, take time to reflect on the regulatory, ethical and business implica-
tions of your decisions and ask yourself: How will this determination look
in hindsight, particularly to someone outside of our company?
As you read this chapter, remember that the purpose of these materi-
als is to (1) review common accounting, auditing and regulatory issues
related to revenue recognition, (2) heighten your awareness of how your
integrity can become an issue in financial management decision making,
and (3) remind you of proper internal and external reporting procedures to
follow when your company encounters accounting irregularities. 
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FOCUS POINTS
The Treadway Commission report entitled Fraudulent Financial Reporting:
1987_1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, analyzed approximately
200 cases of fraudulent financial statement reporting from 1987 through
1997 and found that over 50% of these cases involved either the premature
recording of revenues or the recording of fictitious revenues. Moreover, the
CEO and CFO were implicated in the fraudulent reporting in 83% of the
cases. Most of the cases were brought against companies that lacked an
audit committee or had an audit committee that met only once each year. 
According to the 2001 Securities Litigation Study conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 57% of the federal securities class action law-
suits filed in 2001 included accounting allegations (excluding IPO alloca-
tion cases). Improper revenue recognition is the most commonly alleged
accounting abuse, with many complaints alleging violation of the criteria
in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 48, Revenue
Recognition When Right of Return Exists. 
The Huron Consulting Group prepared an analysis of financial
restatements that occurred in a five-year window and concluded that
almost 800 companies had restated their financial statements during 1999,
2000 and 2001. The number of restatements increased each year during
this period. Based on the restatement activity in the first six months of
2002 and the implementation of financial statement certifications by CEOs
and CFOs that started in July 2002, it is reasonable to expect that the
number of restatements again increased in 2002.
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 316), issued by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) in
October 2002 highlighted several sources of pressure that may increase the
risk of fraudulent financial reporting, including:
Avoid this Pitfall: Educating the sales force that undis-
closed side letters or side agreements are unacceptable as a
matter of company policy, and will result in their immediate
firing, is important to the company avoiding regulatory
action. In cases where quarter-end sales are claimed, finan-
cial managers are wise to question the timing of the sales
and even seek written confirmation from customers if any
doubt exists about whether to book revenue from a sale. 
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers2
02-Chapter 01.qxd  10/16/2002  9:17 AM  Page 2
• The company’s financial stability or profitability is threatened by eco-
nomic, industry, or entity operating conditions; 
• Excessive pressure on management to meet third-party expectations,
such as those of analysts, creditors, rating agencies, or potential acqui-
sition targets; 
• Management or the board members’ net worth is threatened by the
company’s financial performance; and 
• Incentive sales or profitability goals create undue pressure on manage-
ment or operating personnel. 
REGULATORY ISSUES
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statements of Financial
Accounting Concepts (SFACs), Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Staff Accounting Bulletins (SABs) and a wealth of Statements of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFASs), Accounting Principles Board Opinions
(APBs), Accounting Research Bulletins (ARBs), AICPA Statements of
Position (SOPs), Financial Reporting Releases (FRRs) and Emerging
Issues Task Force (EITF) issuances give general and specific industry
guidance for revenue recognition. (See the discussion in the introduction of
SAB No. 101, “Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements” for a non-
exclusive listing of revenue recognition releases, including industry topics.)
Avoid this Pitfall: If other members of your management
team evidence tendencies to internalize these types of pres-
sures, your integrity (not to mention your professional
career) may ride on your ability to withstand such pres-
sures. In talking with the other members of management,
remind them that once the company takes the first step
down that “slippery slope,” it becomes increasingly likely
that more steps will have to be taken, thus leading to a
“snowball” effect. If you sense that this is where pressures
from third parties are likely to take the company, you need
to carefully consider whether you want to be associated with
the company under these circumstances. It is interesting to
note that many cases of fraudulent financial reporting begin
with “minor” adjustments that multiply over time and ulti-
mately result in a restatement that finds the company and
its officers the subject of regulatory action. Conversely, a
management team that deals with these or other pressures
in an honest and forthright manner will command the
respect of outsiders and is a desirable place for you to be. 
Chapter 1: Case 1—Superlative Software Corp. 3
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Unfortunately, revenue recognition or, more to the point, improper record-
ing and/or recognition of revenues, are also prevalent topics in the SEC’s
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) involving public
companies, their financial executives, and their auditors. 
Revenue recognition is now the regulatory enforcement topic de jour.
This is a result of the well publicized use of “round tripping” by Enron,
other energy traders and a host of telecommunications carriers. Round
tripping involves the recording of revenues from simultaneous or nearly
simultaneous trades of financial instruments, capacity, products or com-
modities by two companies. In most instances, round trip trades should
have been characterized as exchanges rather than sales.
Revenue recognition is without doubt the critical accounting policy to
be discussed in Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).
Furthermore, the discussion of any critical accounting estimates that
underlie revenue recognition is vitally important to regulators and
investors seeking to understand the impact of estimates on a company’s
financial performance. Remember, however, as the Commission stated in
its release on Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues in August 2001,
“The disclosure should be concise and to the point; more disclosure is not
necessarily better.” In other words, quality, not quantity.
The following four criteria must be met under SAB No. 101 to recog-
nize revenue: (1) persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists, (2) the
product has been shipped and the customer takes ownership and assumes
the risk of loss, (3) the selling price is fixed or determinable, and (4) collec-
tion of the resulting receivable is reasonably assured. These criteria are
consistent with those set forth in SOP  97-2, Software Revenue Recognition,
which specifically addresses revenue recognition in the context of software
sales. SOP 97-2 goes on to state that if software upgrades, enhancements
or consulting services are included that are integral to the functionality of
the software license, then contract accounting is applied and revenue
recognition delayed. 
Avoid this Pitfall: When dealing with a customer of your
company that also happens to be a supplier of products or
services to your company, be especially cautious about book-
ing revenues, particularly if the timing or dollar amount of
purchases and sales between the companies happen to coin-
cide. Remember that these types of relationships will draw
a high degree of regulatory and audit scrutiny, so your files
should have backup that will help in delineating why the
transactions were proper, necessary and in the ordinary
course. 
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers4
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CONSEQUENCES
The legal and professional consequences of violating the rules and regula-
tions enforced by the SEC and other government agencies are severe. Ask
yourself “what are the common results of accounting and auditing enforce-
ment cases brought by the SEC against companies and financial officers
that are found to have facilitated premature revenue recognition?” Beyond
the “perp walk”, violators of securities laws face the following:
• the company and the officers involved are typically charged with viola-
tions of the antifraud, internal controls, and books and records provi-
sions of the federal securities laws;
• the CFO is often charged with lying to auditors;
• the officers are made to disgorge the proceeds of any stock sales and
incentive compensation received as a result of premature revenue recog-
nition, and pay civil penalties for their wrongdoing;
• the officers are suspended or barred from serving as officers or directors
of public companies; and
• the company is enjoined from any future violations of the federal secu-
rities laws. 
These consequences are life-altering and, in many instances, become a
permanent part of an officer’s work history. It does not take much thought
to realize that a financial officer or manager with such matters in his or
her background is usually unemployable by public companies. 
ETHICAL GUIDES
The Code of Professional Conduct, “Article III: Integrity” (AICPA,
Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET Sec. 54) states:
Integrity is measured in terms of what is right and just . . . Integrity
requires a member to observe both the form and the spirit of techni-
cal and ethical standards . . .
Webster’s defines integrity as “the quality of being honest and trust-
worthy . . .” 
“Your integrity is your destiny . . . it is the light that guides your
way.” Heraclitus, Greek poet and philosopher.
“Integrity and Objectivity. A certified public accountant shall not
knowingly misrepresent facts and, when engaged in the practice of
public accounting, shall not subordinate his judgment to others
including but not limited to clients, employers or other third par-
ties.” Rules of the State of Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy, Chapter 61H1-
21.002.
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“Does one’s integrity ever lie in what he is not able to do? I think that
usually it does, for free will does not mean one will, but many wills
conflicting in one man.” Wise Blood, Flannery O’Connor, 1952.
“The competitive pressures of the modern marketplace are causing
ethical dilemmas for all of America’s professions.” “The best safe-
guard for the accounting profession may be the simple fact that this
is a business where a firm’s integrity is its best selling point.” A
Conflict for CPAs? , Albert Crenshaw and Brett Fromson,
Washingtonpost.com, March 29, 1998. [Emphasis added]
“The Company will take action to remedy any deficiency in inter-
nal accounting controls, procedures and records to ensure contin-
uing compliance with the requirements of this [Code of Business
Conduct].” “The implementation and maintenance of internal
accounting controls, procedures and records that are adequate in
all respects to satisfy the requirements of this Corporate Policy
will be the primary responsibility of the Chief Financial Officer.”
Halliburton Company Code of Business Conduct: Internal
Accounting Controls, Procedures & Records Corporate Policy,
May 18, 1999.
“Corporate culture is an unwritten value-set that management com-
municates directly or indirectly that all employees know and work
under. It is the underlying soul and guiding force within an organi-
zation that creates attitude alliance, or employee loyalty.” “How to
Create a Winning Corporate Culture,” John O’Malley, Birmingham
Business Journal, August 11, 2000. 
* * * *
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE CFO
The following case study illustrates the fraud risks associated with rev-
enue recognition as discussed in the chapter. How would you respond?
Superlative, its Background and the CFO
Superlative Software Corp. is a software development and marketing com-
pany headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, that was founded 18 years ago
and has been public for 10 years. Superlative markets software to satellite
television (SATV) providers that lets these providers put programming
changes into effect nearly instantaneously. Offering a significant cost and
speed advantage over previously existing software solutions, Superlative
has enjoyed compound annual growth rates of over 28% per annum in the
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last five years. This has allowed Superlative to deliver solid bottom line
performance and outpace its competitors such that Superlative now holds
a market share of 34% for licenses of SATV programming software in the
U.S., and 22% worldwide. 
In September 2002, Superlative’s CFO, Oren Jaffe, announces that he
is leaving Superlative after serving as the controller, and later CFO, for
almost 14 years. Superlative issues a press release indicating the board’s
regret at Mr. Jaffe’s departure, citing the years of his service as contribut-
ing in a major way to Superlative’s managed growth and financial well-
being. Mr. Jaffe’s resignation is due to personal reasons, according to the
press release you happen to see on the web. Later, you see a short story in
an industry magazine, SATV Times, that implies Mr. Jaffe has contracted
a serious illness and that Superlative intends to hire a new CFO by the end
of the year. 
The Interview and Hiring Process
In November 2002, you receive a call from a nationally known headhunt-
ing firm. The caller indicates she is working on behalf of an undisclosed
software company and is wondering if you have any interest in interview-
ing for the position of CFO. As a partner with over 19 years’ experience in
auditing software companies and with several journal articles and seminar
presentations to your credit, this is hardly the first call you’ve received
from a headhunter. After asking for some financial details about the com-
pany and why it is now looking for a new CFO, you begin to suspect that
the headhunter is representing Superlative. When you ask her directly,
she demurs, stating that she can disclose the identity of her client only
when you have indicated you have further interest and signed a confiden-
tiality agreement. Letting curiosity get the best of you, you agree to do so
and a confidentiality agreement shortly comes across in your e-mail. After
signing and returning the agreement, the headhunter calls and confirms
your suspicion that Superlative is the potential employer. You are ecstatic
to be in the hunt for the CFO position, as Superlative’s earnings and stock
performance are the standard against which all others in the software
industry are judged. 
The interview process is grueling, with you and what appear to be sev-
eral other candidates being subjected to a comprehensive vetting by the
CEO, the COO, the three members of the audit committee, and two of the
audit partners from the company’s audit firm. When you have a chance to
turn the tables, you quickly conclude that the CEO and the COO are both
very knowledgeable about the operating and financial aspects of the SATV
software business. This is hardly surprising, given the success that
Superlative has enjoyed over the years. When you ask to talk to Mr. Jaffe,
the departing CFO, you are told that this will have to wait until the final
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two candidates for the CFO position are chosen, and that you’ll get to talk
to him at that time if you are fortunate enough to be among the finalists
for the job. After an agonizing wait of 10 days, you get a phone call from
the recruiter with the happy news you are among the final two candidates. 
The final round of interviews covers some of the same ground as was
covered previously, with a few notable exceptions. First, when the subject
of Mr. Jaffe comes up, the members of the audit committee inform you that
you’ll be able to talk to him by phone, but not in person. It seems that his
illness is keeping him from coming into the office. When you inquire fur-
ther about his health, the audit committee members say that they know it
is serious, but they aren’t at liberty to discuss what is really a personal
matter. At dinner that evening, the CEO confides in you that Mr. Jaffe is
believed to have contracted the human variant of mad cow disease due to
his spending lengthy periods of time in London when Superlative was in
the middle of its European expansion in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.
Knowing this disease is always fatal, you understand much better Mr.
Jaffe’s situation and volunteer to greatly abbreviate your questions for
him. The CEO expresses his appreciation, and says that you can spend
more time with the controller if you have questions that he can address or,
failing that, you can talk to the two audit partners about any accounting
issues. 
The next day, you have a chance to sit down and talk in detail with the
controller. The controller appears somewhat miffed that he is not being
considered for the CFO position, but is cooperative. The controller is rea-
sonably familiar with the literature, including revenue recognition under
SOP 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition, as amended by SOP 98-9,
Modification of SOP 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition, With Respect to
Certain Transactions, valuation allowances and warranty reserves related
to returns, SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, on good-
will and testing for its impairment, and SFAS No. 86, Accounting for
the Costs Of Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased or Otherwise Marketed.
You note that Superlative is providing service to many of its SATV cus-
Avoid this Pitfall: Having the opportunity to discuss
financial reporting, internal controls, and expectations of
management, the audit committee and outside stakeholders
with your predecessor is often a critical means of developing
judgments about his or her expertise, integrity, and reasons
for leaving the company. While this case is extreme due to
Jaffe’s illness, you should virtually insist on interviewing
your predecessor to give yourself the benefit of learning all
that you can about the company you intend to join and the
individual you expect to replace. 
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tomers, but training and consulting revenue is being recognized only as
service is performed. The audit partners confirm that Superlative’s
accounting has been meticulous, and commend both Jaffe and the con-
troller for their work ethic and accounting skills. Thereafter, you have a
brief, if somewhat unsatisfying, conversation with Mr. Jaffe. He confirms
that he has a serious illness and that this is the only reason he has been
forced to tender his resignation. Mr. Jaffe says that the controller, mem-
bers of the audit committee and the audit partners are collectively very
familiar with Superlative’s books and can answer almost any question you
have about the accounting or prior audits. In an effort to limit your ques-
tions, you choose to ask only a few questions about management integrity:
was he certain of the CEO’s integrity? How about the COO? Was anything
that the CEO or COO had done previously of concern to him from an
integrity perspective? Mr. Jaffe answers your questions in the affirmative
with short, abrupt responses that you attribute to his illness. You are
vaguely uncomfortable with the brevity of his responses, but you are forced
to conclude that anyone facing imminent death will not be eager to talk of
these issues. 
A week after the interviews are completed, you are offered the CFO
position, with a substantial raise in pay, a comprehensive benefits pack-
age, and an option for 200,000 shares. You talk the offer and the interviews
over with your spouse, and after sleeping on it for a day, you accept the
position. You are excited to have been Superlative’s choice and believe this
change will position you to retire in style in just eight to 10 years.
Superlative issues a glowing press release about your hiring, and both the
trade press and investment community react positively, with Superlative’s
shares rising by $.75 per share on the day of the announcement. You are
as happy as can be, and it looks like the world is your oyster!! 
Your First Month at Work
Having started with Superlative right before year end, you become
immersed in pre-audit preparations, getting to know the company’s inter-
nal controls, checking on end of quarter transactions, and overseeing the
general ledger and schedule preparations. You also attend your first board
meeting on January 3, at which tentative year-end results are discussed
with the board members. The numbers continue to tell a strong story, with
revenues increasing by 19.7% over the prior year and earnings increasing
19.1% over the prior comparable period. The CEO expresses some concern
about the fact that the Street’s consensus estimate was looking for a 20%
increase in earnings, but the most outspoken of the board members, who is
an ex-investment banker and a member of the audit committee, says a dif-
ference of less than 1% is truly “immaterial” given the company’s contin-
ued strong results. 
Two days after this board meeting, one of the company’s leading sales-
people calls you with some startling news. She informs you that one of her
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larger customers in Mexico, Arriba, had placed a purchase order for a soft-
ware license, but it had not been included among year-end sales since the
purchase order had to get board approval from Arriba. She goes on to
explain that Arriba’s board had signed a consent on December 30 approv-
ing the purchase order, but that the consent didn’t reach her until January
5. She forwards the consent to you by fax and, sure enough, the consent is
dated December 30. You instruct the controller to call Arriba’s controller
and confirm the date of the board approval, and to verify this with a sec-
ond source. The controller gets confirmation both from his counterpart at
the customer (in writing) and from counsel to the company. The fax “tag
line” across the top of the consent shows a date of December 31, so it seems
to you that booking the sale is proper. You are left wondering, though,
about one thing: the size of the sale is just enough to allow Superlative to
meet the Street’s earnings expectations. 
The Denouement 
As you continue your preparations for the upcoming audit, you still wonder
about the somewhat “magical” appearance of the order from Arriba, and
something continues to nag at you. Finally, in an effort to put this issue to
rest in your own mind, you call the CFO at Arriba yourself, just to confirm
that the board’s action had been taken prior to December 31. Your coun-
terpart, however, has some disturbing news. He indicates that according to
his records, the board had no meeting in late December and, because one
board member was out of the country from December 15 until January 4,
it was impossible for the consent to have been signed prior to January 4. 
Steaming, you call the saleswoman who handles Arriba’s account,
Claudia West, and ask her to explain just what the *%$#@! had happened.
Claudia responds by saying that she can’t talk about it on the phone, but
Avoid this Pitfall: When you encounter circumstances
such as this where you are vaguely uncomfortable, and the
events appear to allow the company to address an important
pressure point such as expectations of analysts, rating
agencies or management incentive compensation, let your
“gut” be your guide. Follow-up is key in these types of situ-
ations. Since you can’t afford to simply ignore the possibili-
ty that the sale was contrived in some fashion, keep asking
questions and don’t stop until you are very comfortable with
your conclusion. Remember, too, that whatever you have
done to make yourself comfortable will be closely examined
by auditors and regulators who will have the benefit of hind-
sight if the situation is later investigated. Document and
ask questions—now is not the time to be shy! 
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers10
02-Chapter 01.qxd  10/16/2002  9:17 AM  Page 10
she would meet you that evening to discuss what took place. You anxious-
ly await the appointed time for the meeting, wondering what explanation
she could possibly have for what had taken place. When Claudia finally
shows up 45 minutes late, it is clear she has been drinking and is not in
the best condition to answer questions. What you do get answers to is
enough to make your blood run cold. She confesses that she, the CEO and
Mr. Jaffe, the former CFO, have been working together to, as she put it,
“smooth our earnings.” She says that the whole thing was Mr. Jaffe’s idea,
and that rather than being sick, he got scared that their scheme would be
uncovered and was, at that very moment, on his way to a country that had
no extradition treaty with the U.S. As she stated it, “the sickest Jaffe ever
got was when he was afraid the auditors had tumbled on to his schemes.”
She said that she knew what they were doing was wrong, but once it got
started, they had little choice but to continue. She also tells you that the
revenue number had been manipulated upward by recognizing service rev-
enue for services that Superlative hadn’t yet performed, and shipment of
software to international customers that were merely “way stations” for
parking software until a “downstream” customer could be located. Claudia
asks if you can do anything to help her keep her job, and you answer, “You
better hope we all have someplace to work tomorrow.” 
Leaving the meeting in a stunned state, you realize that if even a por-
tion of what you’d learned was true, your career is hanging in the balance.
It is also clear to you that immediate action of some kind is necessary
unless you decide to try and “clean up the mess” by talking through the
issues with the CEO. You arrive home that evening shaken and disbeliev-
ing, not knowing quite what to do or which way to turn, and wondering
about your future as a financial officer of Superlative or, for that matter, of
any other company. 
Situational Analysis
1. The next morning you start to wonder if Claudia’s drinking had made
her invent this fantastic story in order to save her job, since she knew
you were on to her when you called her and asked what had gone on
with the Arriba purchase order. To determine if this is the case or if
Jaffe really was managing earnings, you: 
(a) Set up a meeting with the CEO as quickly as possible
(b) Review the schedule of accounts receivable and pull documentation
on all customers that licensed software and received services in the
last year
(c) Go through the Arriba sales documentation again to try and ascer-
tain if Jaffe was involved in what took place
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(d) Contact the audit partner to ask the audit firm to review all of the
relevant records for service contracts
2. You decide that you are going to have to confer with someone about
these allegations so that you are not “going it alone.” You bring into your
confidence: 
(a) the COO
(b) the audit engagement partner
(c) the chairman of the audit committee
(d) the controller
Practitioner Response: Answers (a) and (d) are not your best choices for
the reason that you don’t yet know how far the fraudulent scheme reaches
into Superlative. Since you don’t yet know if the COO was in on the scheme
with the CEO, and you don’t know if the controller was working in concert
with Jaffe or simply being duped by him, bringing either one into your con-
fidence could backfire. Answer (b) is incorrect because, as discussed in the
solution to Question 1 above, you don’t know if anyone at the audit firm was
involved in the scheme to inflate revenues, and you would probably hire a
new audit firm if the allegations prove out. 
Practitioner Response: Answer (a) is not your best choice because if, as
Claudia asserted, the CEO is involved in managing earnings, your holding a
meeting with him may result in your being fired immediately. While this
could be your preferred result, this also could cause you to be described as
the wrongdoer by Superlative, rather than Jaffe. In other words, if
Superlative attacks your credibility, you have no documentation with which
to show that it was Jaffe, not you, that committed the fraud. Answer (c) is
incorrect because the sales documentation in the Arriba transaction was
“phonied up” and it’s not likely that these documents will tell you who else
was involved, particularly if Jaffe became adept at covering his tracks.
Answer (d) is a course of action you could seek to take at some point, but the
fact that the audit firm did not discover the alleged fraud may mean you will
want to hire a new audit firm to help in re-auditing the books and doing a
restatement, if required. Also, you do not know at this point if one of the
audit partners was in on the fraud with Jaffe and the CEO, so involving
them prematurely could accelerate your firing and again result in you tak-
ing the blame. Answer (b) is the correct choice. By pulling documentation
surrounding sales and service contracts, you can compare the purchase order
terms, billed amounts for both software and services, and begin to track
down discrepancies in what was supposed to be billed versus what was
billed. You can also begin to identify any patterns in billing practices that
would help you identify suspect transactions more quickly.
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3. Short of conducting a forensic investigation of Superlative’s financials,
which of the choices below offered the best chances of helping you find
out that Superlative had a revenue recognition issue before you came on
board?
(a) Discussing in detail the key accounting policies with the audit com-
mittee, audit partners and seniors 
(b) Further conversations with Mr. Jaffe 
(c) Talking with the sales staff about their familiarity with revenue
recognition practices within Superlative
(d) Reviewing Superlative’s financial statements and schedules
Practitioner Response: Given Mr. Jaffe’s apparent involvement in the
effort to manage earnings, it is unlikely that further discussions with him
would have been productive, so (b) is not your best choice. Also, to the extent
the sales staff was (or some members of the staff were) involved in the alter-
ation of sales documents, they are probably not the most reliable source of
information, although you would not have known this during the hiring
process. Hence, (c) is also not the best choice. Since the financial statements
were apparently misstated during some period of time, a review of the state-
ments and schedules might have been helpful, but unless some adjusting
entries caught your attention, even this review may not have tipped you off
to potential problems. 
Of the choices given, (a) may arguably be the best choice, since you
might have been able to press the issue of revenue recognition with the audit
partners or seniors and perhaps had the fortune of hearing a concern
expressed (or maybe statements about a reversal of an adjustment made by
the company). Also, the conversations with the audit committee might have
illuminated a revenue recognition issue, or at least provided you with an
opportunity to question the audit committee and compare their answers to
those of the audit partners and staff. Unfortunately, hindsight is 20/20 and,
even in the best case, none of these actions might have alerted you to prob-
lems at Superlative before you joined the company.
Also, keep in mind that prematurely discussing this with the audit firm
whose personnel are innocent could place the firm in a position where it
would have to resign immediately, having become aware of illegal acts com-
mitted by Superlative, and force the audit firm to file a Section 10A report
with the SEC. While this may be the end result in any event, a premature
filing could simply sow more confusion and delay in getting to the bottom of
what occurred. The correct answer is (c), since the audit committee will be
required to deal with retaining a new audit firm, authorizing an investiga-
tion, consulting counsel, and perhaps even recommending to the board the
termination of any executives found to be involved with Jaffe.
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4. Assume you went to the CEO, who confesses to helping Jaffe “engineer”
the financials. The CEO points out that a restructuring charge could
eliminate any accumulated overstatement, which in any event would be
less than 3% of the net earnings, and that this would save the company
(and its employees their jobs). He also points out that any restatement
would affect the timing of revenue recognition, rather than their receipt,
meaning that investors really weren’t hurt to a material degree by what
went on. You:
(a) Understand his position and decide to talk it over with the auditors 
(b) Ask that you and he jointly confer with the audit committee in the
next few days about what he’s proposing
(c) Assess the situation and find that due to the immaterial nature of
the net adjustments, you should let prior reports stand as is 
(d) Reject his assertions and tell him you must inform the audit com-
mittee of the facts immediately
Practitioner Response: As described in the answer to Question 2, a dis-
cussion with the auditors may trigger an immediate Section 10A filing with
the SEC and result in more confusion and finger pointing than would be the
case if you first understand the magnitude of the issues. Hence, answer (a)
is not the best choice, particularly if your understanding of the CEO’s posi-
tion amounts to a tacit or implied endorsement. Likewise, answer (b) implies
that a “joint” appearance before the audit committee may be either an
acknowledgment that the CEO has a point, or even as an endorsement by
you of his position. Also, answer (b) is flawed since sitting on information for
even a day without taking some type of action could, in hindsight, make it
appear you are being complicit in the wrongdoing. 
Answer (c) is obviously an even greater compromise (about as compro-
mising as possible) to your integrity than answer (a) or (b). Not only are you
overlooking the fact that the financial statements are materially incorrect as
filed, your “netting” of the adjustments to an amount of less than 3% does not
allow for accepting the status quo. SAB No. 99 cautions that the practition-
er cannot use materiality rules of thumb or netting of misstatements to
“cure” materially misstated financial statements. Anyone electing this
course is not only compromising his or her integrity, but will inevitably
become part of the problem, rather than the solution. The correct answer is
clearly (d). You must take immediate steps to inform the audit committee
and let the chips fall where they may. As CFO, you are accountable to the
CEO, but more importantly, you owe a duty to the audit committee and to
the stockholders to do the right thing. By rejecting his assertions, you have
taken an ethical stand that needs to be made.
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5. Assume that when you go to the CEO, he categorically rejects what
Claudia West said about him and insists that Jaffe acted on his own.
The CEO also says he is going to fire the audit firm and Ms. West imme-
diately, as they are culpable in this mess. What is your best course of
action when facing these circumstances? 
(a) Confer with the COO and ask him to countermand the CEO’s actions
(b) Confer with the audit committee
(c) Inform the CEO that hasty firings could have unintended conse-
quences
(d) Call the audit firm and tell them that any “firing” by the CEO is to
be ignored
Practitioner Response: Because you still do not know if the COO is
involved in the earnings management scheme, answer (a) is probably not the
most effective thing you can do. Conferring with the audit committee is an
excellent idea under these circumstances, but probably after you outline for
the CEO what the possible consequences of his actions may involve.
Assuming the CEO is telling you the truth, his overreaction in deciding to
immediately fire the audit firm and Ms. West could trigger a substantial
drop in Superlative’s market price (since investors will infer the worst if the
company can’t articulate the reasons for the firing, which the company may
not be able to do at this point without having all the facts) or deprive the
company of a valuable source of information (Ms. West) for the ensuing
investigation. Answer (c) is therefore probably the best course of action for
you to take in the near-term, although answer (b) is hardly incorrect. 
Answer (d) is an invitation to cause yourself many more problems, since
the audit firm will want to know why you think you can countermand the
CEO. If the CEO hears this, he could also overreact and fire you!
Additionally, your call to the audit firm gives them a basis to ask you ques-
tions about why they are being fired, who authorized the firing, etc. While
you may know the answers to these questions, this is not the best time for
you to be sharing confidences about the financial statements with the audit
firm. Counsel would probably advise that you not contact the audit firm
(whether fired or not) until you have researched the issues and determined
the truth of the allegations. If litigation is probable, you will want to remind
the CEO of this fact and ask that he restrain his initial impulses until the
company has its “arms around the facts.”
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6. In your opinion, would the implementation of additional internal con-
trols have been successful in deterring what took place at Superlative?
Why or why not?
7. Let’s assume that after you toss and turn all night following your meet-
ing with Claudia West, you go in to the office the next day and tender
your resignation. You don’t give any reasons for your resignation.
Superlative later hires a new CFO, takes a relatively good-sized restruc-
turing charge, and there is no restatement of past results or any further
word about Jaffe. Have you met your ethical duties? (Refer to Florida’s
ethical rules on page 5 as your measuring stick.) 
Practitioner Response: Unfortunately, you don’t appear to have done so.
Knowing misrepresentation of facts should (and would in most people’s
minds) include not passing along material information that you possess. As
the quote from Ms. O’Connor states, integrity lies also in what you are not
able to do; that is, in this instance, not walking away from what you know to
be wrong. Another way to analyze this situation is to keep in mind the defi-
nition of materiality. In SFAC No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information, the FASB said that the concept of materiality can
be defined as:
“the omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report . . . if . . .
the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a
reasonable person . . . would have been changed or influenced by the inclu-
sion or correction of the item.” 
Practitioner Response: The case study doesn’t give you much data about
what internal controls were in place before you came on board, so you could
say that answering this question is difficult, if not impossible. However, keep
in mind the data cited in the Treadway Commission report which stated that
over 83% of the instances of fraudulent financial statement reporting
involved the CEO and the CFO. Looking at this issue from that point of view,
you can argue that adding more internal controls would have been an exer-
cise in futility, since the CEO’s and CFO’s knowledge of those controls would
almost invariably give them the ability to circumvent them. This goes back,
to some degree, to the fact that integrity in an organization must come from
the top down. A corporate culture that encourages cutting corners or empha-
sizes making “the numbers” no matter the consequences will eventually
invite officers or other employees to “do what they have to do.” On the other
hand, a corporate culture with integrity and a focus on doing things “the
right way” will encourage realistic reporting and honest dialogue with
employees, customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. And, if you are a
financial manager or accountant, you should remember that others will look
to you to set an example of what the culture should be.
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8. When you inform the audit committee of what appears to have taken
place the next day, the members look at you with expressions of shock
and dismay, but seem almost paralyzed. Finally, the chairman looks at
you and asks, “Give us a roadmap of where we go from here. What
should the company do?” How do you answer?
Practitioner Response: While there is no “one” or “right” answer to this
question, practitioners might consider some or all of the following: 
(1) develop an attack plan to identify all instances of premature or improp-
er revenue recognition; 
(2) undertake efforts to identify all participants in the scheme both within
and outside Superlative; 
(3) have the audit committee retain counsel, who in turn will retain a
forensic firm, to conduct an internal investigation and assist in identi-
fying transactions and the players in (1) and (2) above; 
(4) until the CEO is cleared (if in fact he is) of the allegations, place him on
paid leave; 
(5) have the board determine what action to take as to firing employees
and/or the audit firm;
(6) if a change in audit firms is expected, the audit committee should begin
the process of interviewing prospective successor audit firms (the suc-
cessor firm will need to consider the factors in the Professional Issues
Task Force (PITF) Practice Alert 02-3, Reauditing Financial
Statements, available at www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/lit/prac-
tice.htm); 
(7) the forensic firm’s results should be discussed at the board level so that
the board can determine if a restatement is necessary; 
(8) the board and counsel should discuss whether the company wants to
voluntarily bring the fraudulent accounting to the attention of the SEC
and volunteer to share the independent counsel’s report, thus hopeful-
ly earning the company some leniency under Section 21A of the
Exchange Act; 
Looking at the facts through the lens of materiality, there is no doubt
that what you learned was material information that any investor would
want to know. Moreover, by walking away with this knowledge, you have 
deprived the company of the opportunity to correct its past misdeeds and set
itself out on the right path. Arguably, you have subordinated your judgment
to others with a lesser moral standing, but have in effect lowered yourself to
their level by being complicit by your silence. Judged by the Florida ethical
rule, you have not upheld your professional duty to practice with integrity
and objectivity.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
To refresh your knowledge of revenue recognition and the issues sur-
rounding this topic, readers should begin by reviewing SAB No. 101,
“Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements,” and “Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) Concerning SAB 101,” both of which are accessible on
the SEC’s web site (www.sec.gov). As indicated above, the introduction of
SAB No. 101 has a fairly good listing of the literature relating to revenue
recognition. SAB No. 99, “Materiality,” also contains helpful, related guid-
ance. 
The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC regularly issues com-
prehensive bulletins entitled Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues.
The bulletin dated August 31, 2001, not only discusses recently adopted
and proposed rules, but also addresses recent interpretations given by the
Staff. In this bulletin, an entire section is devoted to Disclosure About
Revenues, including suggestions on disaggregating product and service rev-
enues, examples of when revenues are appropriately recognized, how rev-
enue is measured over multiple periods, and a brief discussion of the criti-
cal accounting estimates and material assumptions that underlie revenue
recognition. 
Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 60, Cautionary Advice
Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, and “Proposed
Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about the
Application of Critical Accounting Policies,” Securities Act Release No. 33-
8098, May 10, 2002, provide information about what critical accounting
policies and critical accounting estimates must be disclosed. These releas-
es will add considerably to the reader’s understanding of required disclo-
sure of revenue-related accounting policies and estimates in MD&A and
also outlines the Staff’s view of audit committee involvement in selection of
these policies.
(9) you and the (new) audit firm need to determine if the company’s
restatement will cause the company to fall below the maintenance stan-
dards of NASDAQ or the NYSE, and prepare to appeal any notice of
pending de-listing until the restated financials can be filed; 
(10) the board and counsel will need to determine what action the company
will take against ex-employees, the predecessor audit firm, and any
other culpable parties; 
(11) the board will need to notify its insurance carrier of possible claims
against the company, the board and perhaps present or ex-officers; and 
(12) attempt to trace Jaffe and help the authorities bring him to justice.
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CHAPTER 2
CASE 2—
POINTER ELECTRONICS, INC.:
YOU ARE THE AUDIT PARTNER
This chapter’s case study is designed to illustrate audit issues from the
perspective of a concurring partner on an audit that is nearing its comple-
tion. You have identified certain excess reserves that do not appear to be
presented in accordance with GAAP and have discussed these concerns
with the engagement partner. The engagement partner has not yet pro-
posed adjustments to eliminate the excess reserves, and has argued that
the proposed adjustments are not material to the company’s financial
statements taken as a whole. The company has received an unqualified
audit opinion in the past and it appears that the reserves may have been
an issue in prior years’ audits, although the work papers evidence no dis-
agreements and there is no indication that the prior concurring partner
was focused on the reserve issue. 
You are considering taking the position that the report be withheld
unless the adjustments are made. As the concurring partner, you must
decide to whom, and when, this position is communicated, whether the
audit firm has conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards (GAAS), and what recommendations you will make to
the audit committee of the board. Issues raised by this case include integri-
ty and objectivity, compliance with auditing standards and accounting
principles, and procedures for investigating and reporting irregularities. 
FOCUS POINTS
“Increasingly, I have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall
Street earnings expectations may be overriding common sense business
practices. Too many corporate managers, auditors, and analysts are par-
03-Chapter 02.qxd  10/16/2002  9:17 AM  Page 19
ticipants in a game of nods and winks. In the zeal to satisfy consensus
earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking
may be winning the day over faithful representation. As a result, I fear
that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore,
the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way to manipu-
lation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.” Former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, speech before The NYU Center for Law and Business,
September 28, 1998. [Emphasis added]
“The purpose of reserves are to reflect a company’s true revenues . . . But
these accounting practices do ‘open up the door to earnings management, if
not done right.’” SEC Is Investigating Microsoft’s Accounting Practices,
July 1, 1999, New York Times, quoting Jack Ciesielski of Analyst’s
Accounting Observer. [Emphasis added]
On June 3, 2002, the SEC announced that it had entered into a set-
tlement with Microsoft Corp. following an investigation of Microsoft’s
accounting practices from July 1994 through June 1998. “The agency said
Microsoft enhanced its financial results by setting aside artificially large
reserves to reduce revenues, with the idea of reversing that procedure to
record the revenues in less profitable times.” CBSNews.com story dated
June 3, 2002. [Emphasis added]
REGULATORY ISSUES
Setting aside the issue of revenue recognition, the deliberate manipulation
of reserves or estimates is clearly a primary focus of the SEC’s enforcement
program. Examples of recent enforcement actions addressing reserve
manipulation include Xerox, Sunbeam, Enron, and Williams, not to men-
tion Microsoft and the earlier case of W.R. Grace. In the regulatory context,
the issues of reserve or estimate manipulations most often appear once
there has been a failure or circumvention of internal controls. 
FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, permits a com-
pany to establish reserves for “identifiable, probable and estimable risks”
and forbids the establishment of reserves for general or unknown business
risks unless they meet the accrual criteria of SFAS 5. “Excess” reserves are
to be treated just as a general reserve; that is, excess reserves that do not
meet the accrual criteria should be immediately released into income once
they are identified. 
Changes in accounting estimates or accounting methods, including
those estimates or methods that may alter existing reserves or result in the
creation of new reserves, require disclosure under APB Opinion 20,
Accounting Changes and APB Opinion 28, Interim Financial Reporting.
Under Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Communication
With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
380), if an auditor finds that management’s recorded estimates are clus-
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tered at either end of the auditor’s range of acceptable amounts, or if the
cumulative effect of estimates used reflects a possible bias, the auditor
should consider whether such matters should be communicated to the
audit committee. 
SAS No. 55, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as
amended, and SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit: An Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No.
55 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), as amended, pro-
vide the outside auditor with a framework for defining and understanding
a company’s internal control structure in order to plan an audit. The audi-
tor must understand the five interrelated components of the internal con-
trol system, being (1) the control environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) the
control activities, (4) information and communication, and (5) monitoring.
While the effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance with
applicable laws are addressed by these SASs, they concentrate principally
on controls that affect the reliability of financial reporting. 
SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted
in an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 325), requires
the outside audit firm to report to the audit committee any significant
internal control deficiencies that could affect financial reporting. In a
speech on September 4, 2002, Barry Melancon, President of the AICPA,
outlined an agenda of six items as to which the Institute intends to take a
leading role in addressing. One of the items: Revise standards so the pub-
lic will be put on notice when an auditor communicates internal control
weaknesses to an audit committee.
The interpretations of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in
Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312),
state that financial statements would be considered materially misstated
if they “contain misstatements whose effect, individually or in the aggre-
gate, is important enough to cause them not to be presented fairly, in all
material respects, with GAAP.”
SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508.36), states that a judgment of
Practitioner’s Note: On June 5, 2003, the SEC issued its final rule pur-
suant to Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley entitled, “Management’s Reports on
Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure
in Exchange Act Periodic Reports” [Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47986] avail-
able at www.sec.gov/rules/final33-8238.htm). The rule specifies the required
content of management’s report on a company’s internal controls, the
required filing of the independent auditor’s attestation report on internal
controls, and any changes in internal controls that may likely or will mate-
rially affect the financial reporting.
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materiality should take into account (1) the significance of an item to a par-
ticular entity, (2) the pervasiveness of the misstatement, and (3) the effect
of the misstatement on the financial statements taken as a whole.
ETHICAL GUIDES
The Merriam-Webster OnLine Collegiate Dictionary defines objectivity as
“expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without
distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations .”
[Emphasis added]
The AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 102, Objectivity and
Integrity (Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET Sec. 102.01) states:
“In the performance of any service, a member shall maintain objectiv-
ity and integrity, shall be free of conflicts of interest, and shall not
knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to
others.”
“Subjectivity and objectivity commit a series of assaults on each oth-
er during a human life out of which the first one suffers the worse
beating.” Andre Breton, French poet and essayist, in Nadja.
“A licensee . . . shall be objective and shall not place his own financial
interests nor the financial interests of a third party ahead of the legiti-
mate financial interests of the client or the public in any context in
which the client or the public can reasonably expect objectivity from
one using the CPA title.” Title 46, State of Louisiana Professional and
Occupational Standards, Part XIX, Chapter 17, §1701B1. [Emphasis
added] 
“A licensee who knowingly makes, or permits or directs another to
make, false and misleading entries in an entity’s financial statements
or records shall be considered to have knowingly misrepresented facts
in violation of this [statute].” State of Minnesota Code of Professional
Conduct, Chapter 1100, §1100.4500B. [Emphasis added]
* * * *
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE AUDIT PARTNER
The following case study illustrates the audit issues from the perspective
of a concurring partner on an audit that is nearing its completion. How
would you respond?
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Pointer Electronics and Your Firm’s Involvement
Pointer has been in business since 1995, when its founder and chief execu-
tive began work on a new videoconferencing technology. After developing
several desktop videoconferencing products that increased transmission
speed and reliability, the founder was able to secure for Pointer a signifi-
cant investment from a large, technology-oriented venture capital fund.
Using this capital, Pointer was successful in obtaining multiple patents for
a breakthrough product: on-demand Video Mail. 
Rather than sending plain old e-mails, Pointer’s combination of pro-
prietary/patented bundled hardware and software gives users the ability to
send video mails over digital lines to any user with the Pointer software
installed on their server. Pointer also figured out a unique way of increas-
ing its installed base of users: if a user sent a video mail to a computer lack-
ing the Pointer software, the Video Mail system automatically sent a com-
panion e-mail that asked the recipient if he or she wanted to download the
Pointer software so the recipient could view the video mail on their com-
puter screen. The downloaded software was available over the web, so
viewing the video mail was easy (and free). Of course, the trick was that
the recipient had to purchase the hardware if he or she wanted to send a
Video Mail. Pointer went public on the strength of the Video Mail technol-
ogy in late 2001, its stock quickly appreciating by 20% even in a down mar-
ket. With quarterly sequential revenue growth rates of 45% or more and
year-to-year increases of more than 10%, Pointer has become the darling of
Wall Street and, not coincidentally, of Michaelson, Woulds and Ells, the
accounting firm of which you are a partner.
As changes have occurred in the accounting profession, your firm has
grown opportunistically through a combination of savvy acquisitions,
excellent client service, and a deserved reputation among regulatory
authorities for stringent quality controls. Now possessing one of the 20
largest auditing practices of public companies in the country, MW&E (as it
is called) is committed to accounting and auditing excellence. You joined
MW&E in 1996 and recently became a partner in the auditing practice,
although you were a partner in another regional firm and now have almost
24 years’ experience in accounting and auditing. As it happens, you were a
principal of MW&E at the time Pointer received its large venture capital
infusion, and worked on the audit team for three years before rotating on
to another assignment. Based in part on Pointer’s rapid growth and vora-
cious need for capital, MW&E’s audit, tax and related services billings
topped $1.3 million last year and appear headed toward $1.5 million this
year. The partners of MW&E have lavished both praise and pay on Mr.
Arnie Ells, the engagement partner for Pointer, as Pointer is now the
largest audit client of the firm outside of quasi-governmental entities and
a charitable foundation. 
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After the retirement last year of another partner, Mr. E.Z. Rider, the
partnership had a meeting to designate the review partner for several
audit clients, including Pointer. Much to your delight, you were designat-
ed to serve as the review partner for Pointer, a plum assignment that you
landed due to your knowledge of the client’s affairs from its pre-public days
and your well-known mastery of accounting and auditing principles, not to
mention your attention to detail. In private conversations with several of
the partners of MW&E who are your friends, they congratulate you warm-
ly and remind you that this could be your springboard to become chair-
woman of the firm in a few short years. You welcome their thoughts, but
harbor a few doubts based on the fact that you’ll be working more closely
with Mr. Ells than you had previously. The scuttlebutt around MW&E is
that even E.Z. Rider had a few rough spots with Arnie Ells when E.Z. was
the review partner on Pointer’s account. You resolve to go into the review
with an open mind about Arnie, knowing that his service as a founding
partner of MW&E and key role in obtaining Pointer as a client mean that
he is entitled to considerable credit, even if he might be a little hard to
work with. 
The Audit and Your Review 
With year end inventory observations completed and the audit plan in
place, January and February find the audit team hard at work in complet-
ing the field work and reviewing schedules prepared by the Pointer finan-
cial personnel. Confirmations and inquiry letters directed to counsel are
returned in the ordinary course, and all appears to be progressing smooth-
ly to a wrap-up of the audit by the end of February or the first week in
March. As is customary, Pointer announces its preliminary year end earn-
ings after the close of trading on the last Monday in February. Pointer’s
earnings not only exceed the consensus estimate, it beats the high end esti-
mates by $.02 per share, sending its stock price climbing by 9% to $38.50
per share. The comments from analysts are uniformly ecstatic, with many
analysts comparing the market penetration of Video Mail to the success
enjoyed by Microsoft in its early days when introducing Windows®. 
In the meantime, you are diligently reviewing work papers as the
audit team is making every effort to complete the audit in time for a March
7 board meeting. The board is expecting a presentation by MW&E of the
“next to final” numbers at this meeting and both you and Arnie Ells are
expected to attend the audit committee meeting that will precede the board
meeting by a few hours. Late on the evening of March 4, one of your
favorite seniors comes into your office with another batch of work papers
and pauses beside your desk for a moment. 
“Mary, I know you’ve been busy reviewing these work papers, but I
was just wondering if you’ve had a chance to look over last year’s work
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papers in as much detail,” he says. Something about the look on his face
strikes you as odd, and your antennae go up. “Justin, is there something in
last year’s papers I should be looking for?” you ask. 
“I wouldn’t know, Mary, since Tom Traylor was the senior in charge
last year,” Justin comments. Still, Justin’s demeanor seems strange to you,
almost like he is driving at something without being specific. He continues
to stand by your desk, saying nothing. You make some quick decisions that
you hope might help the situation. “Justin, how about if you select a few of
the files from last year’s work papers and bring them in for my review? I
just remembered that I wanted to review a few audit issues from last year
that might come in handy when I’m finishing off my review for this year.”
Justin’s face seems to register relief, and he nods his agreement as he
walks off. “I’ll be back with those files in a jiffy.”
With your curiosity peaked but believing that anything in last year’s
work papers will likely reflect a minor adjusting entry at best, you contin-
ue with your review. A few hours later, one of your staff people stops by to
drop off a few files with a note indicating they came from Justin. More out
of boredom with the current year’s review, you open the files and begin to
thumb through them. One of them catches your eye, a file with “Reserves”
and “Reserve Analysis” in bold letters across the top. As you flip through
the contents of the file, you come across the following memo. 
Memo To : Reserve File 
From: Tom Traylor
Re: Analysis of Reserves at 12/31/01
I have determined that several issues cause me some feelings of dis-
comfort about Pointer Electronics’ reserves at 12/31. They are as follows:
1. Pointer established a reserve during this fiscal year for “hardware war-
ranty returns.” The amount of the reserve is $1.6 million. Previously,
Pointer had no need for such a reserve, as hardware warranty returns
were less than $100,000 annually. When I asked Jack Voss, the CFO,
about this reserve, he indicated that Pointer had felt it was appropriate
to establish this reserve in view of their rapidly escalating hardware
sales and some problems Pointer had experienced with some of its fiber-
compatible cameras. He gave me a memo from the production depart-
ment indicating that returns had increased to $75,000 in the most
recent quarter, based almost solely on returns of the fiber-compatible
cameras. I told him I was concerned about the size of the reserve rela-
tive to their return experience, but he said that the audit committee had
already discussed this with Arnie and that everyone had agreed that the
reserve, and its size, was appropriate. I think we need to do further test-
ing of this reserve and make sure that Pointer’s MD&A has included
within it some discussion of this development. The third quarter’s
MD&A has no reference to these returns. 
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2. Pointer’s revenues have grown over 240% this year in sales to interna-
tional customers, and it has reserved almost $3.5 million against sales
to two distributors in Australia and New Zealand. Voss told me that the
reserve was necessary due to the deteriorating Australian economy,
adverse changes in exchange rates, and an increase in days in receiv-
ables that Voss said these two distributors were experiencing. When I
asked Voss if that meant Pointer was making sales to the two distribu-
tors on consignment, he got hot under the collar and said that Pointer
expected to collect every dime, but they wouldn’t put the distributors out
of business to do so. I followed up with Arnie about this, who said he
would talk with Voss to make sure the reserve was adequate but not
excessive. 
Copy: Work Paper correspondence file
You take a look through the file just to see if there was any further
information about these reserves, but you don’t see anything. You conclude
that Arnie, E.Z. and the audit committee must have been comfortable with
the reserve estimates, as you don’t recall any adjusting entries of any size
on reserves. But, just to put your mind at rest and remembering the
strange look on Justin’s face, you decide to take a look at the work papers
for this year’s reserves on hardware warranty returns and sales in
Australia and New Zealand. The work papers show that the hardware war-
ranty reserve has increased by 40%, from $1.6 million to $2.25 million, not
an unreasonable figure given Pointer’s increase in sales. The Australian
reserve has increased to $6.0 million. You remember that sales in that
region didn’t increase as fast as sales in the U.S. and the E.U., and decide
to check on sales to the two distributors. When you find the schedule, you
are a little surprised to find that sales to these distributors actually fell by
almost 70%. The schedule shows that sales increased substantially to
another distributor, however, so you figure that the reserve increase is
more related to the new distributor. You decide to sleep on this and return
to it in the morning. 
The next day, you ask for a receivables history for all three of the dis-
tributors in Australia and New Zealand, figuring that you can put this
issue to rest. Far from doing so, however, the receivables history only
increases your level of concern. What you see seems to support the fact that
the reserve, when initially established, was called for and in an appropri-
ate amount given the payment history of the two distributors. The pay-
ment history of the new distributor, however, is nearly spotless. Based on
the fact that this distributor accounted for 60% of sales in Australia and
New Zealand in 2002, you can’t understand why the reserve has gone up,
instead of down. You decide you better call Arnie to discuss this and find
out what you aren’t aware of. 
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You and the Engagement Partner’s Confrontation 
After calling for Arnie and finding out that he would be in the office late in
the afternoon after playing golf with Pointer’s CFO, you are able to catch
him just before the end of the day. To try and depersonalize the issues, you
decide to approach Arnie by referring to Traylor’s memorandum as a way
to break the ice. However, when you put the memo in front of Arnie, he
immediately turns red as a beet and explodes. 
“Where did you get this? Rider told me that he had gone over these
points with Traylor and that there was no reason for Traylor to be uncom-
fortable!! In fact, Traylor admitted that he hadn’t done enough work on the
Australia and New Zealand reserves when he wrote the memo, and that he
actually helped create a problem that wasn’t there to begin with!” Arnie
added a few expletives that made it clear what he thought of Traylor. 
“Arnie, there may not have been an issue last year, but we need to
take a look at what will support Pointer’s position on these reserves for this
year,” you say in your best consoling tone. You proceed to recount your con-
versation with Voss, the CFO, on the hardware warranty reserve, as well
as what you found in the way of reserves on sales to the old Australia and
New Zealand distributors and the new distributor. Arnie’s face takes on an
alarming cast and, after hesitating for a moment, he jumps up and closes
his door. He then proceeds to tell you the following. 
“Listen, I appreciate the fact that you’ve had to come in here on short
notice and pick up where E.Z. left off last year,” he says. “However, there
are a few things I need to share with you that might affect how these issues
should be resolved. First, you know that Pointer is our largest public com-
pany audit client and that if we challenge them on some overly conserva-
tive accounting, they might decide to jump ship next year and hire a
national firm, right?” Arnie looks at you expectantly, but you remain silent.
“Also, you do understand that their business is growing so fast that there
is a lot of leeway on what is an appropriate reserve, right?” Again, you are
silent. 
Arnie then lowers his voice to a whisper. “Look, the hardware reserve
might be somewhat high, but their returns have been rising each quarter,
so I don’t think you should have a problem there. The situation in
Australia and New Zealand is different. Voss thinks that the two old dis-
tributors might go into liquidation in the next 12 months and, if they do,
the reserve will be just enough to cover the uncollected receivables.
Pointer’s probably over-reserved on the sales to the new distributor, but
they just don’t want to get caught with a shortfall in earnings if things
don’t go well down there. I’ll have Voss call you and take you through the
numbers so that you can get comfortable.”
You leave Arnie having committed to talk to Voss the next day. In the
interim, however, you pull credit information from Brad & Dunstreet on
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the two old distributors in Australia and New Zealand. In disbelief, you
find that the distributors are in reasonable financial shape, or at least
appear to be so. Doing a little detective work on your own, that night you
call down to Australia and speak to the chief accounting officer for one of
the distributors. She tells you that they are doing fine, and they expect to
pay off their receivables balance in the next 120 days, less some amount for
the warranty claims on the defective fiber optic cameras they sold. When
you ask how many they had, she indicates that fully 30% of their cameras
came back and that they are still getting warranty claims even now, nine
months later. You are convinced that the problem with Pointer goes much
deeper, but you’re unsure how involved Arnie is at this point. 
The next morning, you arrive at work to find an e-mail from the chair-
man of the firm indicating that Pointer’s CEO and CFO have asked that a
new review partner be assigned to their account. The e-mail states that,
“Voss said that you have questioned his accounting in a variety of ways,
and they feel that you may have not understood their business quite as
well as they had hoped.” The e-mail goes on to say that Arnie has concurred
in their request for the appointment of a new review partner, feeling that
perhaps you have been overzealous in your role and had a negative impact
on the firm’s relationship with Pointer. 
You understand that Arnie’s relationship with the founding partners
of MW&E makes it almost impossible for you to convince them that Arnie
has lost his objectivity about Pointer. And, knowing that Arnie lied to you
about the financial health of the two distributors, you are beginning to
wonder what else he has lied about. Far from being intimidated, though,
you are convinced that you can act to save Pointer from a fate far worse
than a revision in audited reserve numbers, and preserve your position
with MW&E. 
Situational Analysis
1. What documents would you want to have in your possession before talk-
ing to any other partner of MW&E about this situation? 
(a) the Traylor memo 
(b) the credit report for the Australian distributor
(c) the schedule of Pointer’s reserves 
(d) all of the above
Answer:_____
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2. If you are going to question Arnie’s objectivity when talking to your part-
ners or the chairman of the firm, what is the most compelling evidence
you can focus on? 
(a) the fact that Arnie was playing golf with Voss
(b) the existence of the Traylor memo
(c) Arnie’s reaction when he saw that you had the Traylor memo 
(d) the fact that Arnie seconded your removal as review partner
Answer:_____
Practitioner Response: Answer (a) is not an adequate basis for question-
ing his objectivity and is too simplistic. Answer (b) is good evidence of the
fact that Arnie was on notice of the reserve issues, but does not say that
Arnie was necessarily lacking in objectivity. This answer may, however, be
the right one if compelling evidence means “in writing.” Answer (c) is the
best answer if your audience is willing to take your oral statements as com-
pelling evidence, since Arnie’s reaction seems to imply that Traylor had no
reason to be uncomfortable. The very existence of the memo is reason enough
for an outside observer to believe that Traylor had reason to be uncomfort-
able, otherwise he would not have written it. Arnie also asks where you got
the memo, which at least implies the possibility that he thought the memo
was “no longer in existence.” Finally, Arnie says that Rider went over this
with Traylor, not that he (Arnie) had done so. Given the memo’s subject mat-
ter, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that Arnie would have gone over this
with Traylor, rather than having the review partner do so? Answer (d) is per-
haps additional evidence of Arnie’s lack of objectivity, but your reliance on
this fact could be interpreted by others at the firm as “sour grapes” from you
due to your removal. This is not compelling enough evidence without your
having more to back up your position that Arnie has gotten too close to this
client. 
Practitioner Response: Knowing in advance that you may face some
tough questions from the chairman or others at the firm who might view
your challenging Arnie as being motivated by your removal as the review
partner, you must have your “ducks in a row.” For this reason, Answer (d) is
correct, since it is imperative for you to marshal all available information to
show the partners to whom you talk that you are not overreacting or taking
this personally. The Traylor memo by itself doesn’t show that the current
year’s accounting is in error, which is why you must have the credit report
and the current year’s schedule of reserves. Using these documents to help
the partners understand that what began in the prior year has now only got-
ten worse (i.e., more pronounced) is critical to your ability to demonstrate
that Pointer has overstated reserves and that this is a continuing problem,
not a one-time event.
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3. You approach the vice chairwoman of MW&E and she agrees that you
all have a major problem that has to be addressed immediately. What is
your suggestion to her for the next step? 
(a) Go to the chairman of MW&E to convince him of the problem 
(b) Call the SEC and send a resignation letter citing a Section 10(A)
basis for resigning 
(c) Meet with the chairman of Pointer’s audit committee 
(d) Confer with the CEO of Pointer 
Answer:_____
Practitioner Response: This question is really directed at one of the most
difficult decisions that you (and whomever you have enlisted to help you, in
this scenario the vice chairwoman) must face. You first need to think about
whose interest you are charged with protecting. If you were to choose Answer
(a), you face the difficulty of what to do in the event you cannot convince
MW&E’s chairman that there is a problem. Even if you succeed in that
effort, this does not necessarily result in the problem being addressed in a
way that protects the interests of the client and the public investors. Answer
(b) is justifiable, but might be compared to using a bazooka to kill a fly. In
other words, there may be a basis for arriving at this result, but doing so this
early in the process may be more injurious to the interests of the client and
the public than a more judicious approach. 
This leaves you with the choice of Answer (c) or (d). Although either
answer is acceptable, a meeting with the audit committee chairman may not
be as effective as conferring with the CEO of Pointer first. Why? If you meet
with the audit committee chairman and then he informs the CEO, the CEO
may ask why you didn’t inform him first. This is a legitimate question,
because if Arnie and the CFO (Voss) were engaged in wrongdoing together,
it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the CEO was involved as well.
If not, the CEO would probably prefer to deal with the management integri-
ty issue by firing Voss himself. If the CEO was involved, any hesitation in
taking action against Voss could provide the audit committee chairman with
the impetus to act. Furthermore, if the CEO was involved but fires Voss any-
way in the hopes that Voss becomes the scapegoat, the inevitable internal
investigation that will follow should provide the audit committee with a
basis for deciding if further housecleaning is in order. Your answer would
obviously be different if there was any evidence that the CEO was privy to
the questionable dealings.
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4. If your partners understood your position but required more convincing,
what additional work would you want to do in order to provide the best
support for the conclusion that Arnie had indeed lost his objectivity con-
cerning Pointer? 
(a) Undertake a complete analysis of the warranty and Australian/New
Zealand reserves 
(b) Ascertain what revenues were derived from sales of hardware and to
the Australian/New Zealand distributors so as to be able to verify
that the reserves are not presented fairly in accordance with GAAP 
(c) Assess in writing Arnie’s responses to the issues raised by Traylor
(d) Demonstrate that Arnie and Voss were using the reserves to man-
age earnings 
Answer:_____
Practitioner Response: Again, like the last question, this question can be
answered using several of the alternatives presented, but asks you to select
the best solution. Answer (a) is the correct answer, in that a complete analy-
sis will result in you developing information concerning the revenues derived
from hardware sales, rates of return, distributor sales, distributor returns,
and whether the reserves meet the accrual criteria of SFAS No. 5,
Accounting for Contingencies. While the case study provides you with rates
of growth and the aggregate size of the reserves, you do not yet know the
total revenues from hardware sales or from each distributor. Once you finish
a complete analysis, you would also have this information at your fingertips
and be able to determine if Pointer has established excess reserves. By focus-
ing on producing a complete analysis of the reserves, you are really able to
encompass the actions described in Answers (b) and (c), but taking either of
these actions alone is probably not enough. For example, Answer (b) does
address the hardware reserves, but doesn’t get at the issue of whether the
reserves set up for receivables from the two distributors (and the new dis-
tributor) are excess and therefore should be released into earnings now.
Answer (c) might likewise be something you are eventually called upon to do,
but the historical nature of that exercise is not going to help you get at
today’s issue of whether or not Arnie has lost his objectivity. The better
answer is to examine today’s reserves and use Traylor’s memo to demon-
strate that Arnie was all too aware of the issue when this year’s audit began. 
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5. If after you analyzed all of Pointer’s reserve accounts, you conclude that
nearly all of the estimated reserves were overstated, what action would
you first be required to take? 
(a) Provide footnote disclosure concerning the new reserves 
(b) Decide if the misstatements were material 
(c) Inform the audit committee that Pointer has significant internal
control deficiencies
(d) Reverse the reserves into income 
Answer:_____
Practitioner Response: Answer (a) is incorrect because disclosing the exis-
tence of a misstated reserve does not cure the misstatement. Answer (b)
would be a proper course of action, but misses the point of the question,
which is that “nearly all” of the reserves were overstated. Answer (d) is obvi-
ously a possible end result, but the decision of reversing the reserves still has
to be discussed with Pointer, and it must concur in the treatment of the
reserves. Answer (c) is correct since the pervasiveness of the misstatements
seem to call into question whether Pointer’s internal controls are deficient.
If so, the content of SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related
Matters Noted in an Audit and SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit
Committes, as amended (Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 325 and
380) require you to consider communicating a possible bias to the audit com-
mittee and to communicate any significant internal control deficiencies.
Answer (d) is something of a jump ahead of the facts as you now know
them to be; that is, it may appear that Voss and Arnie were both involved in
an effort to manage earnings using the reserves, but if anything, it looks like
earnings might have been understated, rather than overstated. You may
well end up showing that earnings management was the end result of their
actions, but you don’t yet have enough information about what their moti-
vation might have been to do so. If further investigation indicated that the
hardware returns were understated and the reserves from Australia/New
Zealand were overstated, you could end up concluding that Voss was trying
to cover up the hardware situation by over-reserving elsewhere. However, at
this point, further work is necessary before you’ll be able to decide if earn-
ings management was their objective, albeit that this would be a natural
conclusion. Because of the explosive nature of such an allegation, you would
be wise to undertake a full forensic review of the reserves and hardware
returns before making such an assertion.
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1. Assume that you and the vice chairwoman talk with the CEO, who
immediately fires Voss. The CEO and the audit committee chairman are
willing to work closely with MW&E to rectify any issues, but want to
know as soon as possible if Pointer needs to issue a revised earnings
release or, if not, what they should disclose about the revision to
reserves. What would you advise Pointer to do, and why? 
Practitioner Response: This question involves the application of some
subjective judgments, particularly because Pointer and MW&E may not yet
have all of the information needed to issue a revised earnings announce-
ment. If your firm is not yet in a position to tell Pointer the exact effect on
earnings as a result of the reversal of the reserves, Pointer’s issuance of a
press release that says Pointer will be revising its earnings upward could be
an invitation to speculation in Pointer’s stock. Additionally, if Voss’s firing is
announced at the same time, Pointer could invite speculation that its books
are open to question. This is not a simple question, however, since Pointer’s
failure to promptly announce this information could be later called into ques-
tion by regulatory authorities who conclude that Pointer knew that some
upward adjustment in earnings would be made. If material (and the facts
seem to support materiality), it may be that Pointer has no choice but to pro-
ceed with some type of announcement. 
The ideal situation would allow you and your partners sufficient time to
calculate and work with Pointer to come up with the proper adjustment to
reserves so that the first announcement could be the definitive announce-
ment of final, audited numbers for the year. Regretfully, this could expose
Pointer and MW&E to further questioning in the event that hasty work
results in an adjustment that is later revised. Rather than risk such a result,
this situation is probably best handled with some type of interim announce-
ment that indicates year end earnings will likely come in slightly higher
than previously reported. This will provide your firm and Pointer with a
chance to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the reserves without addi-
tional time pressure, while giving the market what material information
Pointer now knows. 
The release of excess reserves will need to be discussed in the MD&A of
Pointer’s annual report on Form 10-K, and the alteration of the existing
reserves will need to be discussed in the financial statement footnotes. The
disclosure could also be made under Item 9 of Form 8-K (Regulation FD dis-
closure) and by attaching the press release as an Exhibit to the Form 8-K. If
Pointer elected to go this route, however, the MD&A and financial statement
footnote disclosure would still be sufficiently material so as to merit inclu-
sion in the 10-K, in order that the reader would be able to fully appreciate
the impact of the release of reserves on full year earnings.
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2. What qualitative factors would you consider in making an evaluation of
the materiality of any misstatement of reserves?
Practitioner Response: Among other factors, you should begin with an
analysis of whether the misstatements have the effect of masking a trend in
returns of the fiber optic cameras or perhaps in historical or current collec-
tion of receivables. Ironically, due to Pointer’s excellent financial perform-
ance, it is highly unlikely that the misstatement changed a loss into a profit
or had a material effect on segment information. Likewise, unless the
reserve numbers are grossly in error, it is unlikely that the misstatement
would affect Pointer’s compliance with loan covenants, contracts, or regula-
tory compliance. With respect to management compensation, it is not likely
that management’s current compensation was impacted favorably (and
materially) by the misstatement, but if the misstatement resulted in defer-
ral of income into future periods when performance might not be as good, it
is possible that management could then benefit from the taking of reserves
into income.
The circumstances surrounding the misstatement imply that fraud or
illegal acts may have been involved. The financial statement element affect-
ed by the misstatement (reserves) also appears to involve recurring events
rather than a one-time event. While Pointer exceeded earnings expectations
before the reserve treatment is reversed, it is not yet clear if the change in
earnings will be significant to public company investors. The misstatement
of reserves involved amounts that were objectively determinable to a great
degree, rather than subject to inherent uncertainty. Although Pointer may
have reasonably concluded that some reserves were appropriate, it is clear
from the case study that the reserved amounts had very little relation to the
facts and circumstances that pertained to the reserved amounts. Rather, it
appears that the excessive reserves were pervasive and reflected a bias of
Voss and perhaps others. If the excessive reserves pertaining to Australia
and New Zealand were used to net out the hardware returns that Pointer
was experiencing, this too would be a relevant consideration. Finally, it is
possible that the misstatement, if continued, would build over time and have
a cumulative effect that would perpetuate the misstatements of Pointer’s
financial results and condition. It is unlikely that the cost of correcting the
misstatement would not have been cost-beneficial. 
The foregoing factors are set forth in, among other places,
Interpretation No. 4, “Considering the Qualitative Characteristics of
Misstatements,” of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 9312.17), and SAB No.
99, “Materiality.”
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3. Assume that your firm is organized in Louisiana, and that the partners
decide to give Arnie a chance to explain his actions before the firm takes
any action. Arnie points to the language of the Louisiana Professional
Standards on page 22 above and argues that he “did not place his own
financial interests” nor the financial interests of a third party “ahead of
the legitimate financial interests of the client or the public” in a context
where the public expected objectivity from him. In fact, he argues, his
“conservative” approach to reserves has “protected the public from
unanticipated future declines in earnings and/or collections.” How do
you think the MW&E partners should respond to this argument? Why?
If you lived in Minnesota, how would application of the Minnesota Code
of Professional Conduct affect the partners’ deliberations? (The
Minnesota Code also appears on page 22.) 
Practitioner Response: The Louisiana Professional Standard noted does
not say that a lack of objectivity is defined as “placing the member’s own
financial interests or those of a third party ahead of the client or public.”
Rather, it states that the member “shall be objective” and then goes on to dis-
cuss ways in which a lack of objectivity may be determined. The MW&E
partners might find Arnie’s argument to be somewhat novel, but not very
persuasive. Remember that the public has a right to expect Arnie to be objec-
tive, and that “protecting the public from future declines in earnings or col-
lections” is not the job or the professional obligation of the member. While
Arnie may not have placed his financial interests above those of Pointer or
the public, he is obliged to be objective in this context, and the public has a
right to expect this objectivity. By not being so, Arnie is contributing to the
creation and continuation of misstatements within Pointer’s financial state-
ments that will almost inevitably be discovered, as they were in the case
study. 
The Minnesota Code section is more definitive in that it states that the
member will be considered to have knowingly misrepresented facts if he
“permits or directs another to make false or misleading entries in an entity’s
financial statements.” This language does not tie a knowing misrepresenta-
tion to a lack of objectivity, but it is difficult to imagine how one could know-
ingly misrepresent a material fact without having lost (or not had) objectiv-
ity. In terms of the partners’ deliberations, the application of the Minnesota
Code section seems to provide a solid foundation for the firm taking whatev-
er action it deems appropriate against Arnie. Although Arnie may not have
directed Traylor or others to make false or misleading entries, he apparent-
ly permitted the entries to be made, even after he became aware of Traylor’s
memo. This should not be read as implying that Arnie has a better chance of
demonstrating objectivity in Louisiana, though, since MW&E will have a
reasonable basis for concluding that Arnie failed to meet his professional
obligations.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
FASB Concept No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information, includes a discussion of qualitative factors that the auditor
must consider in making a materiality judgment. SAS No. 47, Audit Risk
and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards,
AU sec. 312.34), describes the auditor’s evaluation of quantitative factors
that come to bear in making a materiality judgment. SAB No. 99,
“Materiality,” revisits many of the issues surrounding both quantitative
and qualitative factors that must be considered by an auditor when assess-
ing materiality. The accrual requirements of FASB Statement No. 5,
Accounting for Contingencies should also be consulted when an audit client
establishes or modifies reserves in a material fashion. 
Given the importance of reserves and the susceptibility of reserves to
deliberate manipulation, it is all too easy for reporting companies to mis-
state financial results and violate GAAP when temptation strikes. Readers
may want to review the complaint filed by the SEC in the Xerox case
at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17465.htm, paragraphs 61
through 67, to remind themselves of the inventive ways that management
intent on manipulating earnings can do so by using reserves. The Xerox
case shows that excess acquisition, corporate, vacation pay, and custom
duty reserves, as well as reserves created for FASB Statement No. 106,
Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions
reasons, can be used to meet earnings expectations when management is
willing to ignore GAAP. 
Readers should also review Practice Alert 00-2, Quality of Accounting
Principles—Guidance for Discussion With Audit Committees, issued in
February 2000, to reinforce guidance about discussion with audit commit-
tees of major items for which reserves and estimates are significant, how
they are determined, and how monitored. 
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CHAPTER 3
CASE 3—
BAN&K ADVISORY SERVICES LLC.:
YOU ARE THE AUDIT PARTNER
As accountants are often called upon to assist their clients in an advisory
role, the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the ethical dilemmas that
can arise when audit and advisory services are co-mingled. In these situa-
tions, the practitioner confronts threshold issues such as independence
impairments and the ethics of contingent fees, as well as “after-the-fact”
issues such as exposure to liability and damage to individual and firm rep-
utations. Clients who respect and value the practitioner’s opinion are gen-
erally less concerned about these issues and more focused on closing their
sale, financing or other transaction with the help of the practitioner.
Unfortunately, a client’s lack of understanding or sensitivity to the practi-
tioner’s situation means that it falls to the practitioner to carefully consid-
er the land mines, both ethical and practical, that await in providing mul-
tiple services.
It is important to keep in mind that fine distinctions between contin-
gent fees, referral fees, “value-added” fees, and commissions can place the
practitioner in the uncomfortable position of trying to defend a compensa-
tion arrangement that appears to be, or is, fundamentally flawed. In the
following case, ask yourself how you would view the compensation arrange-
ment if it were varied slightly; that is, would the arrangement appear more
or less ethical if the fees are defined differently? In addition, you should
take this analysis one more step and ask, notwithstanding appearances, if
the practitioner should be involved at all with the audit client in an
arrangement of this nature. The lure of large fees or commissions can be a
powerful persuader, but it is important to remember that your profession-
al reputation (and that of your firm) may rest as much on appearances as
reality. 
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FOCUS POINTS
“It does not impair independence to reward a professional who excels in his
or her performance, or who exceeds reasonable expectations.” Ray J.
Groves, former chairman and chief executive officer of Ernst & Young, in
written testimony provided to the SEC. 
The following extracts from the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct
(Professional Standards, Vol. 2) relate to this chapter’s discussion: 
• “A member’s fees may vary depending, for example, on the complexity of
services rendered.” [See ET sec. 302.01, “Contingent Fees.”]
• “Certain professional engagements, such as audits, reviews and other
attest services, require independence.” Independence impairments “can-
not be eliminated” by disclosure and consent. [See ET sec. 102.03,
“Interpretations Under Rule 102—Integrity and Objectivity.”]
• A member who accepts a referral fee or permitted commission shall “dis-
close that fact to any person or entity to whom the member recommends
or refers a product or service to which the commission relates.” [See ET
sec. 503.01C under “Rule 503—Commissions and Referral Fees.”]
• If a member accepts “more than a token gift from a client, even with the
knowledge of the member’s firm, the appearance of independence may
be lacking.” [See ET sec. 191.001, “Ethics Rulings on Independence,
Integrity, and Objectivity.”]
Avoid this Pitfall: The Code of Professional Conduct pro-
hibits members from permitting others to perform acts on
behalf of the member that, if performed by the member,
would result in the member violating the Code of
Professional Conduct. Accordingly, if a practitioner or firm
is paid commissions from a third party who uses agents or
resellers to actually make sales to an attest client, the prac -
titioner or firm will be considered to have violated the pro-
hibition on receipt of commissions. 
Avoid this Pitfall: Your spouse cannot receive a contin-
gent fee for services provided to an attest client unless two
conditions are fulfilled: (1) the activities of your spouse are
separate from your firm’s activities, and (2) you are not
“significantly involved” in your spouse’s activities. Even if
these conditions are met, the Code of Professional Conduct
states that the member must consider whether a conflict of
interest exists, which requires you to evaluate how the
arrangement would be viewed by “the client, employer, or
other appropriate parties as impairing the member’s objec-
tivity.”
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REGULATORY ISSUES
The SEC defined a contingent fee (consistent with Rule 302 of the Code of
Professional Conduct) in the final rule on “Revision of the Commission’s
Auditor Independence Requirements” [Release Nos. 33-7919; 34-43602; 35-
27279; October 15, 2001] as “any fee established for the performance of any
service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless
a specific finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is
otherwise dependent upon the finding or result of such service.” 
Interestingly, in the proposed Independence Rule, the SEC cited
“value-added” fees as another example of a contingent fee arrangement. In
the final Independence Rule, the SEC stated that in response to comments
on the proposed Rule, it was deleting “value-added” fees from the definition
of contingent fees. The SEC’s discussion in the final Independence Rule
indicates that if a client (1) at the end of the engagement determines that
the services are deserving of additional fees, (2) there is no written or oral
agreement for the additional fees to be paid, and (3) determines in his/her
sole discretion that the accountant provided services that have greater
value than the contracted amount, then the accountant can be paid a
value-added fee without impairing independence. The SEC noted that it
would carefully scrutinize value-added fees to determine if such fees were
in fact disguised (and prohibited) contingent fees. 
The Code of Professional Conduct indicates that an accountant’s inde-
pendence will not be impaired if he or she “assists in developing corporate
strategies, assists in identifying or introducing the client to possible
sources of capital that meet the client’s specifications or criteria, assists in
analyzing the effects of proposed transactions . . . or participates in trans-
action negotiations in an advisory capacity.” In the final Independence
Rule, the SEC took pains to point out that independence would be impaired
by: (1) entering into preliminary or other negotiations on behalf of an audit
client, (2) promoting the client to prospective buyers, or (3) “with respect to
subsequent audits of a client if the accountant renders advice as to
whether, or at what price, a transaction is entered into.” 
In the final rule entitled, “Strengthening the Commission’s
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence” [Release No. 33-8183]
issued on January 28, 2003, the Commission again reiterated the prohibi-
tion against accountants providing merger and acquisition advisory servic-
es to audit clients, but extended this line of thinking one further step. In
footnote 82 to the final rule, the Staff noted that the “key determination
required here is a functional one, i.e., is the accounting firm or its employ-
ee acting as a broker-dealer? The failure to register as a broker-dealer does
not necessarily mean that the accounting firm is not a broker-dealer.”
Among other ways that a person can functionally be determined to be a
broker-dealer, the Staff noted that
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• “assisting an issuer [in structuring] prospective securities transactions,”
• “helping an issuer to identify potential purchasers of securities,” and 
• receipt of “transaction-related compensation”
can impair independence and also expose the accountant to liability for act-
ing as an unregistered broker-dealer. These points are clearly important
factors to consider in evaluating both independence issues and those issues
associated with the accounting firm or its affiliate acting as a broker-deal-
er, registered or not. 
The Code of Professional Conduct, the Independence Rule, and state
accountancy rules are generally consistent in their exclusion of certain fees
from the definition of contingent fees. These fees include those set by
courts or other public authorities or, in tax matters, if determined based on
the results of judicial proceedings or findings of government agencies.
Interpretations of the Code of Professional Conduct make it clear that a
“contingent” fee is not appropriate if the accountant is merely called upon,
for example, to claim a refund for a client due to the inadvertent omission
of a proper deduction from a return. Rather, the accountant must have a
“reasonable expectation” at the time the fee agreement is executed that a
substantive matter will be considered by the government agency. 
CONSEQUENCES
If a practitioner performs attest services during a time that his or her inde-
pendence is impaired with respect to a public company client, the SEC can
bring a proceeding to suspend or permanently deny the accountant’s abili-
ty to practice before the SEC. Known as a Rule 102(e) proceeding, the SEC
only has to prove that the accountant has engaged in improper profession-
al conduct, meaning conduct that violates applicable professional stan-
dards constituting: 
(A) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct; or 
(B) A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct in circumstances
where the accountant knew, or should have known, that heightened
scrutiny was warranted; or 
(C) Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct that indicate a lack of
competence. 
While suspensions or bars are often the result of Rule 102(e) proceed-
ings against individual accountants, the SEC also has the power to order a
firm to engage an independent consultant to review the firm’s practices,
policies and procedures for maintaining independence and preventing
impairments. Once a review is completed, the SEC can order the firm to
implement the reasonable recommendations of the consultant and even
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order a subsequent follow-up review to ensure compliance has been
achieved (Release No. 34-41425, In the Matter of Moore Stephens). 
ETHICAL GUIDES
“No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible.” Jerzy Lec
Stanislaw, More Unkempt Thoughts (translated by Jacek Galazka,
1968).
“When a fellow says it ain’t the money, but the principle of the thing,
it’s the money.” Frank McCinney, Hoss Sense and Nonsense (1926).
“We laugh at honor, and are shocked to find traitors in our midst.” C.S.
Lewis.
“Capitalism doesn’t work without moral restraints.” Chuck Colson,
Jubilee Extra, March 2002. 
“A person who is engaged in the practice of public accounting shall not
concurrently engage in any business or occupation which would create
a conflict of interest in rendering professional services.” Alabama
Rules of Professional Conduct, Chapter 30-X-6-.05(5). 
“The rules of conduct are intended to have application to all kinds of
professional services performed in the practice of public accountancy,
including tax and management advisory services, and to apply as well
to all licensees, whether or not engaged in the practice of public
accountancy, except where the wording of a rule clearly indicates that
the applicability is more limited.” Connecticut Rules of Professional
Conduct, Sec. 20-280-15a(d) [Emphasis added]. 
“Any licensee who directly or indirectly accepts or agrees to accept
such form of compensation [contingent fees] shall disclose the terms of
such compensation to the client. The disclosure must . . . (a) Be in writ-
ing and be clear and conspicuous, (b) State the amount of the com-
pensation or the basis on which it will be computed . . .; (d) Be made
prior to the time the licensee undertakes representation of or perform-
ance of the service upon which a contingent fee will be charged.” Idaho
Accountancy Rules, Subchapter E, Rule 401.02(d) [Emphasis added]. 
* * * *
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CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE AUDIT PARTNER
The following case study illustrates issues relating to independence when
an engagement mixes both auditing and advisory services. How would you
respond to the issues raised here?
BAN&K and its History
Your firm has been serving clients in the greater Houston metroplex since
1972. Founded as a diversified tax and audit services firm, it now boasts
a lengthy list of public and private clients primarily from the transporta-
tion, oil and gas, and consumer goods industry. The firm developed a
national reputation for its oil and gas services but managed to largely
avoid entanglement with the energy trading firms whose decline had sig-
nificant impacts on your firm’s larger competitors. Unfortunately, the
same did not hold true for some of the firm’s clients, many of whom have
witnessed double-digit declines in their revenues and net income. You and
your partners monitored the situation carefully and decided some time
ago that one way to insulate yourselves from the market fluctuations in
demand for tax and audit services was to begin providing services that
generated income whichever way the market forces were driving demand
for the firm’s services. 
So, after giving this considerable thought and planning, BAN&K in
1998 opened BAN&K Advisory Services LLC and staffed this new pass-
through entity with several well-qualified partners and staff people with
expertise in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), financing of business pur-
chases, due diligence and valuations. Advisory Services was a nearly
instant hit with a fast expanding roster of new and existing non-audit
clients, many of which sought counsel from Advisory Services when their
own audit firms were conflicted out or when the fees charged by the largest
firms became unbearable. With Advisory Services’ gross margins exceeding
50% and comprising over 20% of the combined service revenues of BAN&K,
Advisory Services contributed significantly to the panoply of services
offered by BAN&K. In November 2002, the managing partner of Advisory
Services finished her rotation in this position and you were asked to
assume that role in December 2002. Happy to be given a great opportuni-
ty to expand your “investment banking” knowledge and capitalize on the
MBA you received after securing your CPA designation, you agree to a two-
year stint as partner in charge of Advisory Services. 
Shortly after assuming this position, you receive a call from one of
your audit partners in BAN&K’s attest services division asking if you have
time to meet with her and a client interested in selling his business. The
business is a well-regarded oil field services firm, OGAnalyx, which pro-
vides land and marine based surveys and analyses of seismic data collect-
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers42
04-Chapter 03.qxd  10/16/2002  9:21 AM  Page 42
ed using special geophones that are proprietary to OGAnalyx. Unlike typ-
ical geophones, the Big EarTM digital geophones used by OGAnalyx receive
audio signals over a broad spectrum digital wavelength, thus delivering
seismic data that is considerably more accurate in pinpointing deposits of
recoverable oil and gas. As the president of OGAnalyx, Martin Lancet, is
currently meeting with your partner in the conference room, you readily
agree to join them and discuss with them how Advisory Services might
help OGAnalyx. 
You are greeted as you enter the conference room by your partner
Evelyn Steel, who then introduces you to Mr. Lancet. Martin Lancet does
not rise to greet you, but this is clearly not meant as a slight, as it is obvi-
ous to you that he is in the grip of a serious disease. Your conversation
begins on a lighter note, but shortly turns to the future of OGAnalyx. 
“Mr. Bradshaw, I’ve been a customer of BAN&K since 1973, probably
one of the first customers of the firm, tell ya’ the truth,” Mr. Lancet
explains with a pronounced Southern drawl. “I’ve always been treated real
good by y’all and I trust ya’, which is more than I can say for some of them
financial hustlers I’ve run into over the years. I’ll let Evelyn fill you in on
the details of our business, but here’s the bottom line: I’ve about run out
my string here on earth, and the Good Lord has seen fit to give me a short
window to get my affairs in order before I take that long elevator ride to
the sky. Time’s runnin’ short, shall we say.” Mr. Lancet chuckles, but the
look on his face is a mixture of fear and uncertainty. 
You nod understandingly, aware that the pallor of his skin and slow
cadence are good indications that time is indeed short. “Mr. Lancet, we
here at BAN&K will be glad to do everything we can to help you sell
OGAnalyx in quick order, and our Advisory Services people are tops in
identifying and selecting possible buyers, helping you structure the sale to
minimize your tax consequences, and protecting your estate’s assets.”
“Well, that’s real nice n’all, but I’ve already got a buyer lined up and
all I really need y’all to do is to walk them through those fancy financials
y’all send me every year, help ’em understand all the stuff in our files, and
git them to close within 30 days or so,” Mr. Lancet replies. 
At this point, your partner Evelyn slides a copy of the OGAnalyx
financials across the table to you and there is a pause as you scan the oper-
ating statements. “OGAnalyx has generated EBITDA topping $14 million
in the last two years, and net after tax of about $10 million,” she explains.
“With no debt, a 30 year operating history and a solid core of land and
marine clients, this company should command a 5 times multiple of EBIT-
DA in a sale transaction, don’t you agree?” Your quick appraisal of the
operating statements and Evelyn’s highlights have you convinced that
Martin Lancet may talk like one of the Beverly Hillbillies, but he is obvi-
ously a very skilled operator in the oil patch. Mr. Lancet seems to be care-
fully observing you as you reply. 
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“I think that’s a good assumption, Evelyn, but of course the big vari-
able is how the company will do in Mr. Lancet’s absence—if he is key to the
marketing because of his relationships in the industry, a potential buyer
may be unwilling to pay a premium price. Also, if Mr. Lancet wants an all
cash transaction and isn’t eager to carry back a part of the purchase price,
for obvious reasons, a buyer might want to pay closer to 3 or 3½ times
EBITDA.”
“Mr. Bradshaw, I like your thinkin’,” Mr. Lancet interjected. “I’m due
to meet with the boys from CapSource Energy tomorrow mornin’ and your
estimate is just a teensy bit higher than the neighborhood they been talkin’
about. I’d be obliged if you’d come with me to that sit-down and help me
work those boys over.” Mr. Lancet waved his hands expansively as he con-
tinued. “Heck, I’d be happy as a pig in slop to even give you all a bonus
based on reaching that magic 3½ times EBITDA if’n you’d help me git
there. Those cattle rustlers from Capsource Energy won’t have a chance
against us, you watch!” Before you can reply, Evelyn breaks in. “Mr.
Lancet, I need to spend some time with Mr. Bradshaw before our firm can
make a commitment to get involved on that basis,” she states assertively.
Turning to you, she cautions, “We’ve been auditing OGAnalyx’s statements
for about 10 years now and we’ll need to visit about the independence issue
and the degree to which we can get involved.”
You nod your understanding, at which point Mr. Lancet rises and
begins to head for the door of the conference room. “Now, Evelyn, y’all give
me that speech about bein’ independent and all and like I tol’ you before,
we’all got our independence on July 4. I’d be mighty disappointed if Mr.
Bradshaw here couldn’t lend me a hand so I can go out a winner, ya’
know?” With that, Mr. Lancet slowly departs and you and Evelyn return to
your chairs, knowing that Martin Lancet’s cavalier approach to independ-
ence is about as far from your reality as it could get. 
Avoid this Pitfall: Although early in discussions with this
client, the general reference to pricing of a possible transac -
tion could, in a strict interpretation, impair the audit firm’s
independence with respect to subsequent audits. The ques-
tion, of course, is how the partners and third parties would
interpret this statement; that is, was this statement advice
about at what price a transaction might be entered into? Or
was it general advice more in the nature of analyzing the
effect of a possible transaction? While the position that this
conversation did not impair independence is certainly
defensible, a better approach might have been to use other
transactions to demonstrate to Mr. Lancet what price he
might have expected, and let him draw his own conclusions. 
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“Evelyn,” you begin, “I know OGAnalyx has been a good audit client of
the firm for years and we don’t want to lose them—but if CapSource
Energy does buy them, you know that the Reloitte firm is going to take
over the audit. If we are going to lose them anyway, perhaps we ought to
make a calculated business decision to accept our fate. On the other hand,
what happens if Capsource Energy doesn’t complete the buy? This could
leave us having impaired our independence and without any future with
OGAnalyx.”
Evelyn nodded her assent. “Yeah, and that’s not the worst of it. You
see, Martin has had OGAnalyx on the block two or three times over the last
five years, always informally, of course. He’s been so married to that busi-
ness that he couldn’t bring himself to part with it, even at 4½ times EBIT-
DA. He is also one tough son-of-a gun—he had cancer four years ago and
the doctors gave him six months, but he’s still here. And, if he were to go
tomorrow, his son has worked in the business for about 12 years now and
could take over, meaning that we would stay on as auditors. We’ve got a
great working relationship with his son, and he isn’t the one who wants to
sell. The problem is, Martin doesn’t think his son is up to running the com-
pany, and he’s the decision maker.”
“So, what you’re saying, Evelyn, is that we ‘maybe’ stand to lose a
client, ‘maybe’ not lose one, and whatever we do with Martin at this point
will or may dictate the result before we know all the facts.” You pause,
thinking about the alternatives, as Evelyn replies. “Do you think we can
get 10 or 15 angels to dance on the head of this pin and still have a client
if OGAnalyx is not sold? You know, the SEC just tinkered with the inde-
pendence rule again to clarify the circumstances under which investment
banking services can be rendered to an audit client. Does that help us at
all?”
You nod in the negative. “Unfortunately, no. If anything, the clarifica-
tion that they made just made our case more difficult, as advisory services
in M&A and the receipt of transaction-related compensation put us square
in the middle of an independence impairment. Even if we aren’t acting to
‘effect’ transactions in securities, the SEC took the position that we could
run afoul of the independence rule if we’re acting as an unregistered bro-
ker-dealer. And based on where Martin Lancet is coming from, he’d have
us acting as an unregistered broker-dealer before you could say ‘Texas
wildcat.’” 
Chapter 3: Case 3—BAN&K Advisory Services LLC 45
04-Chapter 03.qxd  10/16/2002  9:21 AM  Page 45
After you and Evelyn ponder a few more minutes, you agree to meet
up in the morning and talk with the partner who is nominally considered
in charge of independence and client management issues, Ira Baskin. Ira
is viewed by everyone at BAN&K as a wise old sage who has seen many
battles over the years and whose opinion is widely respected, but a pro-
gressive thinker who was not opposed to the creation of Advisory Services. 
When you meet with Ira the next morning, he thoughtfully considers
your plight and offers a few suggestions. “First, is there any chance that
you could tell Martin to reward us after the fact if he is so inclined? And,
could you tailor our agreement with Martin to take that into account?”
“Yes, I think I could,” you reply. “But here is where we could run into
trouble. I can see Martin drawing me into the negotiations, particularly
with CapSource, and basically causing me to defend the valuation that he
wants to get. Even worse, I could see him asking for advice about if he
should agree to the last offer they make or if I think he should hold out for
a better deal. He is not likely to be the most understanding client when I
tell him I can only participate in negotiations in an advisory capacity.”
Shaking her head, Evelyn said, “The problem, Ira, is that Martin is unpre-
dictable and I think Ken is right. We could have our independence
impaired before we know it. On the other hand, Martin is also an incredi-
bly generous guy and would probably agree to pay us an above market
advisory fee if we asked for it.” 
“Which would,” Ira continued for Evelyn, “leave us in a position of hav-
ing lost our independence and our audit client if OGAnalyx is not sold—
which takes us right back to my first question,” Ira said looking at you. 
“When its decision time in a situation like this, I always put myself in
the shoes of two people: someone working in enforcement at the SEC and
my old Aunt Rose,” Ira said. “First, I ask myself how it would look to me if
I was working at the SEC and I reviewed the facts of this situation in a
complaint filed by Martin or someone else, maybe his son. Then, I kind of
take the approach to the situation that Warren Buffet said that he took
Avoid this Pitfall: When you are faced with a client such
as Martin Lancet who doesn’t appreciate the independence
rules and the consequences that you and the firm may be
subjected to by being “too involved” in a merger negotiation,
it may be better to make a definitive choice early in the
process to avoid the almost inevitable result: your firm’s
independence is impaired by client actions outside of your
control. While this may be the desired result if the audit
client is bound and determined to sell, the making of a con-
scious choice eliminates the likelihood that your firm ends
up in an independence quagmire from which you may not
easily escape.
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when saying how he wrote in ‘plain English’; you remember what he said?
I think it was something like ‘I just act like I’m writing that 10-K for my
two sisters to read, Bertie and Dottie.’ So, I just think about how my Aunt
Rose would react if I told her the facts—and if she would say it smelled like
rotten eggs, I knew I had my answer.” 
You and Evelyn laugh at that homespun piece of wisdom, knowing
that you still haven’t got an answer. “Does this mean that you aren’t pre-
pared to give us an answer, Ira?” you ask. Ira looks at the two of you and
replies, “Well, I’ve got an answer but my guess is that you two are knowl-
edgeable and professional enough to have one of your own. Why don’t you
all come and share it with me when you decide?” 
With that, Ira shoos you and Evelyn out of his office with instructions
to come back with your decision. “So much for consulting the oracle,”
Evelyn says with a wry smile as she heads back to your office. “Now what?” 
Situational Analysis
1. Assume that Martin Lancet calls you the next morning and you agree to
attend the meeting with Capsource Energy in a purely advisory capaci-
ty. During this meeting, Mr. Lancet distributes a listing of sale transac-
tions for companies comparable to OGAnalyx to the meeting partici-
pants. At the bottom of this sheet, Mr. Lancet has put his hand written
notes that come directly from your best guess (that you gave him right
before the meeting) of what OGAnalyx should sell for. In your opinion,
has BAN&K’s independence been impaired? 
(a) Yes, the inclusion of the information I passed to Mr. Lancet is tan-
tamount to advice as to what price the transaction will be entered
into, and impairs BAN&K’s independence
(b) No, the notes constitute an analysis of the effects of a proposed
transaction and so long as I didn’t render advice beyond the guess of
what OGAnalyx should sell for, the firm’s independence is not
impaired
(c) No, because the advice I passed to Martin Lancet was oral, not writ-
ten, and did not amount to advice about transaction price
(d) No, I don’t believe the firm’s independence was impaired, but for the
sake of being conservative and protecting the firm, I would notify my
partners that I felt our independence had been impaired
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2. Evelyn and you conclude the next morning that you are going to tell Mr.
Lancet that the firm cannot ask for or receive any excess compensation
tied to the sale price of OGAnalyx but that Mr. Lancet is free to reward
the firm in his discretion if the sale takes place. Mr. Lancet’s response
is to say that he is going to pay BAN&K 3% of the sale price over $38
million as a “value added” fee, but he states that he understands he can’t
put that in writing and won’t for your sake. Is this arrangement a pro-
hibited contingent fee? 
(a) No, as stated by Mr. Lancet, he intends to pay the fee for the addi-
tional value that BAN&K is creating for Martin Lancet, who is not
personally a client of BAN&K, so it does not meet the definition of a
contingent fee
(b) So long as the fee is only in an oral agreement, it is not enforceable
and therefore is not a prohibited contingent fee arrangement
(c) No, the fee has been specifically described by Mr. Lancet as a “value
added” fee, so it does not rise to the level of being a prohibited con-
tingent fee
(d) Yes, the arrangement as proposed is a prohibited contingent fee
Practitioner Response: This question calls for you to consider a real hair-
splitting issue, that of whether a guess by you of what OGAnalyx should sell
for is enough to impair independence. Assuming the wording you used was
“a guess” about a potential sale price, and you didn’t advise Martin Lancet
to accept or reject that guess, or otherwise advise him about the transaction
price, it is more likely that answers (b), (c) or (d) are correct than answer (a).
Of course, picking either answer (a) or answer (d) is the easy and conserva-
tive course of action, but may result in the firm losing an audit client due to
the “independence impairment” if the sale does not occur. 
Answer (c) is obviously flawed, as whether the advice was rendered
orally or in writing is not dispositive of whether an independence impair-
ment has been created. Answer (b) is, at least in the author’s view, an accept-
able and defensible answer. While hair-splitting, the use of the “guess” term,
the lack of advice about whether to enter into the transaction at that price,
the fact that you told Mr. Lancet that you would attend solely in an adviso-
ry capacity, and the lack of any other indicia that would weigh in favor of an
impairment conclusion, work in your favor if you selected this answer. To be
fair, it is difficult to say that answer (d) is wrong, however. If Martin Lancet’s
notes also made reference to your conversation the previous day, or if his
notes had “BAN&K’s recommendation” next to them, the conclusion that an
independence impairment exists becomes much easier. As noted in the case
study, making a conscious choice of your firm’s role is often the better result
than leaving you and your firm open to an impairment “charge.”
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3. Assume the same facts in Question 2 above, and that the transaction is
going to close tomorrow with CapSource Energy paying a purchase price
of $42 million. You have just received a draft of the closing instructions
which include a line item entitled “M&A fee to BAN&K—$120,000.” You
contact Martin Lancet’s counsel, and he informs you that this fee was
added into the closing instructions at Mr. Lancet’s behest. You: 
(a) Instruct the attorney to remove this reference and the dollar figure
from the closing instructions and call Mr. Lancet to advise him that
BAN&K cannot accept this fee
(b) Send an e-mail to your partners describing the generosity of Mr.
Lancet in rewarding the firm and his success in selling his business
(c) Instruct the attorney to remove the reference to “M&A fee” and
replace this with a reference to “Audit and Advisory Services”
(d) Contact Mr. Lancet and indicate that the firm cannot accept this fee,
but would be extremely pleased if BAN&K was paid $100,000 at
closing
Practitioner Response: Answers (a) and (c) are incorrect for several rea-
sons. First, whether the promise of the additional fee is coming from the
client or from a third party like the client’s principal stockholder, the fee is
clearly tied to Martin Lancet receiving a purchase price over and above the
$38 million threshold. The fee payable to BAN&K is therefore clearly con-
tingent on a specific result, which meets the definition of a contingent fee.
Furthermore, both of these answers are flawed because of the ostensible
reliance on the client’s description of the fee as “value-added,” as opposed to
the facts that have been given. However the client may want to define a fee,
it is incumbent on the audit firm to evaluate and determine the true nature
of the fee. 
Answer (b) poses an interesting debating point, but choosing that
answer is favoring form over substance. Although the oral promise to pay a
fee of some indeterminate amount may in fact not be legally enforceable,
that overly technical response does not address the fundamental problem
that has been created by Martin Lancet’s statement. That problem is one
that still ties the payment to BAN&K to achievement of some purchase price
over and above the threshold of $38 million. Legal enforceability, or the lack
of enforceability, does not help BAN&K change the contingent nature of Mr.
Lancet’s proposal. Therefore, answer (d) is correct. This is a prohibited con-
tingent fee arrangement based on the fee being contingent on a specific pur-
chase price and payable as a percentage of the purchase price obtained.
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4. Assume that BAN&K and OGAnalyx were both headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama rather than Houston, Texas. Under the Alabama
Rules of Professional Conduct referenced on page 45, could BAN&K pro-
vide purely advisory services at its customary hourly rates to Martin
Lancet at the same time it was auditing the OGAnalyx financial state-
ments? 
(a) Yes, because the audit would certainly be completed before the sale
transaction closed, which means that the services are not rendered
concurrently
(b) Yes, because no conflict of interest would exist so long as BAN&K
did not accept a contingent fee
Practitioner Response: The proper answer to this question lies in first
concluding that Mr. Lancet has obviously arrived at the fee amount by apply-
ing his 3% formula to the purchase price over $38 million and, therefore,
knowing that BAN&K has a problem. Answer (b) is an attractive choice on
its face, but requires you to ignore the ethics of what is right in this situa-
tion. Likewise, answer (c) is morally and ethically wrong, as changing the
description of the fee ignores both the reality of what the fee is being paid
for, and the reality that you know the fee has been calculated on a percent-
age basis.
Answer (d) is not so obviously wrong on its face, but careful analysis
will reveal that this answer is flawed as well. Among other issues created by
this answer, Mr. Lancet has been given the “fee figure” by BAN&K, thus sug-
gesting that Mr. Lancet did not determine the “value added” fee in his sole
discretion. Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Lancet appears to have applied
his 3% formula prior to its suggested modification implies that there was a
preexisting arrangement, as opposed to the fee being determined at the end
of the engagement. An after-the-fact modification of a prohibited contingent
fee arrangement does not alter its original character, nor does it leave
BAN&K in a defensible position if it is later determined that a partner of
BAN&K was the one who suggested the fee modification. Answer (a) is the
correct answer to this question. While a difficult result to accept financially,
it would seem reasonable that BAN&K could inform Mr. Lancet (again) of
the circumstances under which a value added fee could be paid. If the firm
did nothing more than this, perhaps Mr. Lancet would be able to arrive at a
value added fee (on his own and without formulas or results tied in any way
to the purchase price) which BAN&K could accept. However, given the
scrutiny that such a fee would receive, it is not inconceivable for BAN&K to
refuse the fee altogether as one way of avoiding the questions that would
surround this arrangement. In other words, Martin Lancet’s actions and
words may have so “poisoned the waters” that the firm would decide it was
better off foregoing any additional fee.
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(c) No, providing advisory services concurrently would create a conflict
with the audit services being offered
(d) Yes, because maximizing the client’s sale price would not create a
conflict with attest services
5. Assume BAN&K is rendering its services from its offices in Boise, Idaho.
Under the Idaho Accountancy Rules referenced on page 41, could
BAN&K accept a contingent fee to assist in the sale of OGAnalyx with-
out compromising its independence so long as the fee was agreed to in
advance of the sale and the other conditions of the Idaho Accountancy
Rules were satisfied? 
(a) Yes, BAN&K could accept the contingent fee
(b) No, the contingent fee could not be accepted
Practitioner Response: This question requires you to consider the inter-
action of the state Accountancy Rules with the independence rules and, to
some degree, evaluate how you would feel about relying on the independence
rules to justify ignoring or even fighting a complaint concerning violation of
the state Accountancy Rules. Absent information about how the state
Accountancy Rule in question has been applied or interpreted in similar
instances, it is possible to answer this question by selecting answer (b), the
more risky course, or answer (c), the more conservative course. Accepting
that the services to be rendered are purely advisory in nature and that there
is no contingent fee arrangement, you can certainly argue that there is no
conflict of interest created that would prevent BAN&K from rendering advi-
sory services while providing attest services. The more conservative answer
would be (c), which requires you to assume that the concurrent advisory
services would create a conflict that cannot be waived while the audit is
ongoing. If there is a reason for this answer to prevail, it is the wording that
indicates the advisory services are going to be provided while the audit was
being conducted. 
Answer (a) is incorrect because it reaches an answer based on an
assumption that may or may not be true (that the audit will be completed
before the sale transaction) and that exalts technical compliance over com-
mon sense. To say that the services are not being rendered concurrently is a
very narrow and erroneous view that would be difficult, if not impossible, to
justify to an outside observer. Knowing the likely timeline for these services
to be rendered, it is hard to say that they would not be performed concur-
rently. Likewise, answer (d) reaches an acceptable result, but one based on
dubious reasoning. “Maximizing the sale price” is language that on its face
would seem to create a conflict with the role of the independent accountant
in providing attest services and further implies that the accountant is some-
how advocating for the client. Although this answer is not wrong on its face,
it is important to realize that if these words were used by an outsider to
describe what BAN&K had done, questions about the firm’s independence
would certainly be created.
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6. Assume that discussions with CapSource Energy did not work out and
Martin Lancet asked you to send a letter out to other prospective buyers
describing OGAnalyx on a “no-name” basis. In your view, has BAN&K’s
independence been impaired as a result of sending this correspondence?
Would your answer change if the letter named OGAnalyx? Would your
answer change if BAN&K was only to receive its customary hourly rates
for these services? 
Practitioner Response: This question again focuses on the issues sur-
rounding the management of a difficult client who does not, and may not
ever, appreciate the issues you face as an independent accountant. The
SEC’s independence announcements and the professional standards are
clear that “promoting” a client to prospective buyers will impair independ-
ence. As the Supreme Court said in The United States v. Arthur Young, “If
investors were to view the accountant as an advocate for the corporate client,
the value of the audit function itself might well be lost.” In adding another
point of view on this subject, Senator Sarbanes said in his floor statement on
July 25, 2002, “A public company auditor should not be a promoter of the
company’s stock or other financial interest . . . To do so places the auditor in
a position of serving as an advocate for his or her audit client.” 
Even though Martin Lancet suggested use of the no-name approach to
allow BAN&K to contact prospective buyers, this fact does not change the
underlying, irreconcilable conflict that would be created by BAN&K sending
the correspondence that solicits potential buyers. As such, BAN&K could
only do so if it was not providing or intending to provide attest services. 
The follow-up question about whether the result would change if
OGAnalyx was named in the correspondence is something of a red herring.
If the answer is that BAN&K’s independence was impaired by sending a “no-
name” solicitation, it should be readily apparent that the inclusion of
OGAnalyx’s name in the letter only makes a bad situation worse. 
Practitioner Response: The correct answer is (b). Again, this question
asks the reader to focus on the state rule, but the independence rules cannot
be ignored when evaluating this question. Keeping in mind that OGAnalyx
is an attest client of the firm, the Idaho rule would on its face seem to con-
flict with the independence rule. However, the Idaho rule was clearly imple-
mented to address situations that do not involve attest clients, or the rule
would be void on its face and would create an untenable conflict with the
independence rules.
The Bottom Line: when you are citing state rules as justification or as
a basis for a certain course of action, remember that the Code of Professional
Conduct, the independence rules and other professional and ethical consid-
erations cannot be ignored.
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7. Assume for a moment that Mr. Lancet had a change of heart and asked
you to tell him the circumstances under which he could pay BAN&K
something in the nature of a bonus for your services in the proposed
sale. What are the key points that you would want to convey to him
when describing what BAN&K could accept? 
8. Let’s assume that Mr. Lancet came to you the next day after your meet-
ing and made the following statement to you: “Mr. Bradshaw, I guess I
understand that BAN&K has to be independent from us to audit our
books. Can you just explain to me, ’cause I’m a little confused, why y’all
can’t accept a commission without being dependent?” (Hint—try to cite
to him some of the reasons that contingent compensation conflicts with
your independence)
Practitioner Response: In no particular order, here are some thoughs on
this subject:
• Contingent compensaiton creates a financial self-interest that could
threaten objectivity.
• Contingent compensation motivates the auditor to focus on non-audit
services, rather than audit services.
Practitioner Response: The key points that you would want to convey to
Mr. Lancet are: 
• The bonus would be best described by him as a value-added fee. 
• The value added fee would be determined by him in his sole discretion.
• The value added fee could not be agreed to in writing or orally. 
• The value added fee would have to be determined by him at the end of the
engagement.
• The value added fee could not be calculated as a percentage of the trans-
action value or in any other manner that reflected the purchase price paid
for OGAnalyx.
The last question is similarly a red herring, as the method of compen-
sation is not determinative of whether the services to be rendered would
impair independence. Rather, by focusing on the nature of the services to be
rendered, you know that BAN&K would impair its independence by sending
the solicitation, regardless of how it was paid. (Of course, the receipt of a con-
tingent fee would only make matters worse for the firm if it continued to pro-
vide attest services.)
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SUGGESTED READINGS
The SEC’s final rule entitled “Strengthening the Commission’s
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,” [Release No. 33-8183,
January 28, 2003], is both a timely and in-depth summary of the
Commission’s latest modifications to the independence rules. 
The AICPA (www.aicpa.org) and each state have rules of professional
conduct that have generally similar provisions on the offer or performance
of non-audit services for contingent fees although, as we have seen, some
state provisions vary from the prescriptions mandated by the Commission
or the AICPA. Some states publish interpretive advice or the results of dis-
ciplinary hearings that can illuminate specific fee-related issues. 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1360, entitled In
the Matter of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP and issued on January 19, 2001, is
one of the more recent cases that has been fully litigated (including a
rehearing) that dealt with:
• independence issues,
• contingent fees (in the form of royalties),
• the standards for applying Rule 102(e) sanctions, 
• whether an audit firm’s affiliate acted as a broker-dealer, and
• loans from the auditor to members of management. 
• The perception (or reality) of auditors compromising accounting or audit-
ing judgments in order to retain or obtain non-audit service fees. 
• Objectivity in fact and appearance is impossible to maintain given con-
tingent fee arrangements. 
• Compensation paid or earned for non-audit services provided to an audit
client compromises independence, even more so if paid on contingency. 
• Auditor independence is critical to maintaining confidence in the attest
function. 
• High quality audits depend on objectivity, professional skepticism, and
unbiased judgments by the auditor that are inconsistent with contingent
fees. 
• Economic incentives such as contingent fees can transform the auditor
into an advocate for the client, which is not the defined role for auditors. 
• Having a stake in the outcome of the sale of OGAnalyx places BAN&K in
conflict with the objectivity required of an auditor and identifies BAN&K
too closely with OGAnalyx, which adversely affects the confidence of a
potential purchaser in the audited statements.
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This case, involving KPMG’s turnaround affiliate known as KPMG
Baywatch, gives a very good overview of the independence issues created
by contingent fees, loans and the provision of non-audit services to audit
clients. The decision cites authority from Commission rules and regula-
tions, GAAP and GAAS, as well as governing AICPA materials, including
the Code of Professional Conduct. The release (AAER 1360) can be found
at www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-43862.htm.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE 4—
FORENSIC REVIEW SERVICES LLC.:
YOU ARE THE
FORENSIC AUDITOR
This chapter’s case study finds you in an entirely different situation from
that described in the previous two chapters where you were a partner with
an audit firm. In the situation at hand, you have now been contacted by
counsel for a private company who engages you for the purpose of assisting
in an internal investigation. The private company is one that is being posi-
tioned for a public offering or sale in the near future, thus providing a liq-
uidity event for the two venture capital firms that have provided a signifi-
cant part of the company’s funding to date. Your engagement relates to a
forensic review of certain accounting matters that have come to the atten-
tion of the board, and a related review of audit procedures employed by the
independent accounting firm that now audits the company’s books. There
is also a question of whether a restatement of the prior years’ audited
financials may be required as a result of your analysis and the case study
facts. 
According to a study issued by the Huron Consulting Group in
January 2003, the number of restatements of financial statements due to
accounting errors rose to 330 in 2002. The study stated that the primary
causes of restatements were misapplication of accounting rules, human
and system errors, and fraud. Since 1999, the number of public companies
has declined by 14%, according to Who Audits America, while the number
of restatements has risen by 53%. Huron Consulting Group found that the
industries with the largest increase in restatements in 2002 were experi-
enced by:
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• wholesale and retail trade industry—95%;
• transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services—
45%; and 
• services industry—19%. 
The study also found that revenue recognition accounted for 85
restatements in 2002, up 73% from 2001, and reserves/accruals/contin-
gences accounted for 14% of the 2002 restatements. It should be noted that
the restatements surveyed by Huron were from public reporting companies
and did not include information on private company restatements that
occurred during the periods in question. 
According to a June 2002 article in CFO Magazine that covered the
May 2002 Business Ethics Conference sponsored by the Conference Board,
100 senior ethics executives polled about Enron cited management’s ethi-
cal lapses as the single greatest reason for that company’s collapse, fol-
lowed in order by Arthur Andersen, the lawyers, analysts and regulators.
According to Steve Priest of the Ethical Leadership Group, “These findings
show that an absence of ethical leadership and a culture of ‘anything goes
as long as it makes a buck’ will prevail over even the best training, code of
conduct or hotline. . . This emphasizes the critical importance of building
integrity into the essence of the corporation.” 
This chapter is designed to increase your awareness of how manage-
ment integrity issues play directly into audit scope and procedures used by
independent accountants and into forensic investigations, review and sen-
sitize you to red flags that audit team members must be educated to
observe and report on, and emphasize the critical nature of antifraud pro-
grams and controls that are so integral to a company’s internal controls. 
FOCUS POINTS
According to CFO Magazine’s June 19, 2002 issue, the Business Ethics
Conference survey found that 57% of the ethics officers surveyed had never
provided their boards of directors with ethics training and 60% felt that
their boards were not engaged enough in ethics and compliance issues.
Coming from the very people in charge of ethics programs and compliance,
these statistics should give you pause. How is it that board members can
discharge their ethical duties if they have had no training in how to do so? 
The creation of a strong value system in an organization is the foun-
dation for ethical behavior by all employees. As stated in SAS No. 99,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), “Directors and officers of cor-
porations set the ‘tone at the top’ for ethical behavior within any organiza-
tion”(See Exhibit, “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls,”page
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57). While having a code of conduct is considered to be part and parcel of
the ethical makeup of a corporation, codes of conduct and ethical standards
carry little meaning if the “tone from the top” is that anything (or every-
thing) goes. SAS No. 99 points out that management’s ability to circumvent
or override internal controls requires strong oversight of senior executives
by the board and/or audit committee and an evaluation of top manage-
ment’s commitment to ethical values, financial reporting and risk man-
agement.
SUPPORTING LAVISH LIFESTYLES: LARGE AND SMALL
COMPANY MANAGEMENTS LOSE THEIR MORAL COMPASS
One of the recurring themes in financial fraud investigations is the desire
of management or principal shareholders to continue in a lifestyle to which
they have become accustomed. Consider the following examples of man-
agement self-dealing that differ widely as to scale, but each of which result-
ed in enforcement action by the SEC:
• In July 2002, the Commission brought civil proceedings against
Adelphia Communications Corporation and members of the Rigas fami-
ly, the former controlling shareholders and senior management of
Adelphia, together with the Vice President of Finance and Assistant
Treasurer. The Complaint filed by the SEC alleges that:
— open market purchases of Adelphia stock amounting to over $59 mil-
lion by a partnership controlled by the Rigases were funded with
Adelphia’s own cash;
— $12.8 million was spent on constructing a golf course and clubhouse
on land mostly owned by the Rigases;
— $241 million in personal margin and other loans of the Rigas family
were paid by Adelphia;
— Adelphia purchased “valuable timber rights” for $26.5 million on
land bought by the Rigases for less than $500,000; and
— the Rigases had exclusive use of luxury condominiums in Mexico and
Colorado, and at least two New York City apartments;
the value of which were collectively at least $30 million, and none of which
were disclosed in Adelphia’s public filings.
The Commission’s complaint seeks permanent bars for the Rigases
and the two other officers acting as officers or directors of publicly held
companies, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains (including severance pay
received), and civil penalties. In November 2002, the Vice President of
Finance consented to a permanent injunction, permanent officer and direc-
tor bar, and agreed to provide the court with an accounting. (Litigation
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Release No. 17627, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
1599, July 24, 2002; Litigation Release No. 17837, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1664, November 14, 2002.)
• In August 1999, the Commission brought a civil action against a micro-
cap company located in Southern California, American Telephone+Data,
Inc. (“ATD”) and its principals. The action alleged that the management
team had committed financial fraud and looted the company of “more
than $900,000 in investor funds to finance their lavish lifestyles.” The
action seeks to permanently bar the principals from serving as officers
and directors of public companies and disgorgement of proceeds from the
illegal conduct. Contemporaneously, the Commission brought a 102(e)
action against the auditor for ATD, Gerald R. Hinshaw, under which
Hinshaw consented to a bar from appearing or practicing before the
Commission. The 102(e) proceeding was based on Hinshaw’s failure to
comply with GAAS, issuance of unqualified audit opinions for ATD, and
failure to determine or report that ATD’s financial statements did not
comply with GAAP. (Litigation Release No. 16232, August 2, 1999;
Release No. 34-41680, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9945,
August 2, 1999.)
Avoid this Pitfall: What steps do you believe the audit
committee and/or auditors could have taken to identify the
“lavish lifestyle” risks that seem inherent in both of these
situations? Do you believe that “character assessment” is
now part of the duties of the audit committee and the audi-
tor? Notwithstanding the enormous differences in the dol-
lars at stake, these enforcement actions should give you a
sense that integrity assessment (if not character assess-
ment) is now an important part of risk management for cur-
rent and proposed audit clients. If you are a financial officer
or a member of the audit committee, the implications of
these cases are several:
• you are personally accountable to the corporation for the
reasonable protection of its assets;
• you must have a system of checks and balances in place
to identify efforts to circumvent or override internal con-
trols; and
• even senior executives are placing their professional
futures at risk if ethical breaches (or breaches of the
newly required codes of conduct) are found.
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In a bulletin issued late in 2002, Protiviti (a wholly owned subsidiary
of Robert Half International, Inc.) summed up the current corporate gov-
ernance environment this way: “Personal accountability is a vital tenet of
corporate governance.” [“Increasing knowledge of the enterprise’s risks and
risk management capabilities] will be attained through more anticipatory
and proactive oversight as well as more explicit dialogue with management
and continued emphasis on establishing personal accountability through-
out the organization.” If accountability is one of the new central themes of
corporate life, so too will be the creation of communication, evaluation and
feedback loops within a company to create and foster ethical behavior and
integrity that is so vital to the varied constituencies (management, board
members, committee members, auditors, legal counsel, shareholders, ana-
lysts and regulators) of both public and private companies.
WHY DID THE AUDIT FAIL?
In January 2003, the Commission released its “Report Pursuant to Section
704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” (available at www.sec.gov/news/
studies/sox704report.pdf). The report examined the prior five years’
enforcement actions by the SEC to identify areas of financial reporting in
which reporting companies are most susceptible to fraud, manipulation, or
earnings management. The following four categories represent the most
common reasons cited for audit failures in these enforcement actions (all
remaining categories accounted for a total of 17 enforcement actions):
Frequency of Audit Issues in Enforcement Matters Against Auditors*
Number of
Audit Failure Enforcement Matters
Failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidential
matter to support audit opinion 37
Failure to exercise professional skepticism on unusual,
last minute, or related-party transactions 30
Failure to maintain independence 19
Failure to respond adequately to red flags 16
*See SEC’s “Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” page 38.
Between failures to respond to red flags and exercise professional
skepticism as to related party transactions, it is clear that audit firms must
focus resources and emphasis on audit methodologies designed to surface
“red flags” and highlight related party dealings.
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It is interesting to note that the report of the O’Malley Panel on Audit
Effectiveness issued in August 2000 included as its first major recommen-
dation the following: “Auditors should perform some ‘forensic type’ proce-
dures on every audit to enhance the prospects of detecting material finan-
cial statement fraud.”
REGULATORY ISSUES
For fiscal years ending after July 15, 2003, a public reporting company will
be required to disclose in its annual report whether it has (1) at least one
“audit committee financial expert” on its audit committee, and (2) adopted
a code of ethics that applies to its principal executive officer, principal
financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons per-
forming similar functions. If it has not adopted a code of ethics, the com-
pany must explain in its disclosure why it has not done so. Any changes or
waivers to the code of ethics other than technical or administrative
changes must be disclosed on an 8-K or on the company’s website if it has
previously disclosed that it intends to use its website for this purpose. If
disclosed in this manner, the company must maintain the disclosure on the
website for at least 12 months. Small business issuers have until fiscal
years ending after December 15, 2003 to provide disclosure concerning the
audit committee financial expert.
The code of ethics must be filed as an exhibit to the company’s annual
report, posted on the company’s website, or the company must undertake
to provide a copy to any person requesting a copy. The code of ethics must
be “reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing” and promote the following
five objectives:
• honest and ethical conduct, including ethical handling of actual or
apparent conflicts of interest in personal and professional relationships;
• full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure in publicly
filed reports and other public communications;
• compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations;
• prompt internal reporting of ethics code violations to appropriate per-
sons identified in the code; and
• accountability for code adherence.
As you might expect, the instructions to preparing this disclosure
state that the code of ethics can be part of a broader document that applies
to a larger population of executives or employees. Only that portion that
applies to the designated officers has to be filed or made publicly available. 
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers62
05-Chapter 04.qxd  10/16/2002  9:26 AM  Page 62
Avoid this Pitfall: What should you do if you are the out-
side auditor and the client tells you that it intends to dis-
close that it does not have a code of ethics and has not adopt-
ed one because:
• independent board members always approve any trans-
actions between the company and its officers; and
• these transactions are always on terms at least as favor-
able as those available from unrelated parties.
Avoid this Pitfall: Financial officers of companies that are
adopting a code of ethics are well advised to carefully con-
sider two overriding issues when presented with a draft
code. First, is the code as written “reasonably designed to
deter wrongdoing?” Savvy financial officers will want to
evaluate the code of ethics carefully while keeping this ques-
tion in mind, as the SEC’s final rule places great emphasis
on this objective. Review of examples of different codes of
ethics that are publicly filed and the strategies for imple-
menting ethics programs given in Appendix A to these
materials will be key to developing a comprehensive code.
Remember, the “reliance on counsel” defense may not do you
much good if it is later determined that the code was clear -
ly inadequate or incomplete when prepared—you need to be
involved in this effort, as you are professionally “on the line.”
Second, has the person who prepared the code of ethics
come at the code with a preexisting bias of some kind? In
other words, has the drafter somehow expanded on the
duties of the principal financial or accounting officer (or con-
troller) while circumscribing the duties of the principal
executive officer? This might seem like a rudimentary ques-
tion, but it helps to keep in mind that whoever first drafts
the code of ethics can give the code a certain slant that has
the effect, unintended or not, of allocating responsibility
among the identified officers. Company counsel may not say
so, but in extreme cases, you may want to seek out individ-
ual counsel to advise you on how the code can be revised if
you feel the code has unfairly allocated accountability,
reporting, compliance and similar responsibilities.
Remember—as the code is going to be a public document
that is accessible to shareholders, regulators and the plain-
tiffs’ bar, you have a direct interest in seeing that the code
is balanced, comprehensive, and kept current.
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ETHICAL GUIDES
“The cosmos is neither moral or immoral; only people are. He who
would move the world must first move himself.” Edward Ericson.
“If you have integrity, nothing else matters. If you don’t have integri-
ty, nothing else matters.” Alan Simpson.
“Character is much easier kept than recovered.” Thomas Paine.
“When you choose the lesser of two evils, always remember that it is
still an evil.” Max Lerner, Actions and Passions, 1949.
“Integrity and objectivity: Certified pubic accountants, public account-
ants, or firms shall not knowingly or recklessly misrepresent facts
when engaged in the practice of public accounting, including the ren-
dering of tax and management advisory services.” Arizona State
Board of Accountancy Professional Conduct Rules, R4-1-455(B).
“Standards of Fieldwork: (1) The work is to be adequately planned and
assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised. . . (3) Sufficient com-
petent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, obser-
vation, inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an
Unlike a waiver or a change in a code of ethics, which
must be publicly disclosed by the company on an 8-K or on
its website, a public company cannot always disclose that a
transaction is on terms at least as favorable as are available
from unrelated parties. Often, this occurs where the compa-
ny does not get a bid for a service or product from an unre-
lated party, and timing requires that the company secure
the service or product quickly. Occasionally, the service or
product is unique and an exact competitive bid cannot be
obtained from an outside supplier. While the board may
believe that the transaction is on comparable terms, such a
belief does not meet the standard for disclosure of related
party transactions in the absence of documented support.
An outside auditor is well advised to advance these
arguments and to discuss any inclination of management to
not adopt a code of ethics with the audit committee. As sure-
ly as a red flag will enrage a charging bull, the failure to
adopt a code of ethics has great potential to draw unwanted
attention to the company, its audit committee, its auditor,
and its other outside directors. Whether this attention
comes from the media, industry, regulators, shareholders or
the plaintiffs’ bar, it is hard to see any reasonable justifica-
tion for failing to implement a code of ethics.
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opinion regarding the financial statements under examination.”
Professional Conduct Rules, Illinois Public Accounting Act, Part 1430,
Appendix A.
* * * *
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE FORENSIC
AUDITOR
The following case study illustrates issues that a forensic auditor may face
in an investigation that raises questions about the effectiveness of a com-
pany’s auditor in detecting possible fraud. How would you respond to the
issues raised here?
You Get the Call 
Arriving at work one Monday morning, you get a phone call from one of the
lawyers with whom you’ve worked on several forensic investigations.
“Melinda, how are you?” you ask. “I haven’t heard from you since we
wrapped up the Biohelix investigation. Did you manage to recover any
assets from those two promoters who ran off to Canada?”
“Sue, all I can say is that those two are probably in Switzerland by
now and the shareholders probably aren’t going to see a dime in recovery
for some time to come,” Melinda replies. “But, you and your team did
such a good job of sorting through that financial nightmare that Venture
Fund II has agreed to let us hire you all for a new problem child in their
portfolio.”
Smiling, you say, “We are happy to help as always, Melinda, you know
that. Why didn’t Samuel call us directly, though?”
“This situation is a little more complicated, that’s why. He asked me
to call you because he can’t have anything to do with hiring you directly
since, of all things, he is a member of the board of directors of this
company.”
“You have got to be kidding me!” you exclaim. “Samuel never sits on
the boards of their portfolio companies. What could have possibly persuad-
ed him to waive their policy on that?”
“Well,” Melinda explained, “Don’t quote me on this, but I think Samuel
felt that this company was so well run, and its prospects were so good, that
this was a no-lose proposition. It seems that things didn’t turn out that
way, though. Did you see their last portfolio company report and happen to
notice the investment in Mediageni?”
“No, I didn’t,” you reply. “But wasn’t that the company written up in
the Broad Street Journal that had the adapter you could fit to your exist-
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ing televisions that would allow you to receive digital tv broadcasts on your
old analog tv?”
“Yes, that’s the one, Sue. Threatening to make digital tv’s obsolete, or
at least interfere substantially with their roll-out schedule. And with a pro-
jected cost of $99.95, it makes buying a digital tv today and junking your
old tv’s look a lot less attractive. However, some recent events inside
Mediageni could make it the loser in the race for digital broadcast cus-
tomers—you won’t believe what’s been going on inside the company for the
last month.”
Before she continues, you inform Melinda that you have to run all
appropriate conflict checks and will get back to her later in the day. Having
availed yourself of the firm’s quality control and conflict check system, you
resume your conversation later that morning.
“So, Melinda, now let’s hear the scoop on what’s been happening at
Mediageni. Please don’t tell me that Samuel did anything wrong!”
“No, Samuel is actually one of the board members responsible for
bringing us in to start the internal investigation. We were retained a few
days ago and have tried to get our arms around recent events so I can brief
you. In a nutshell, here’s what happened: Samuel and his firm brought in
a new CFO about three months ago, and I think it’s safe to say that the two
Mediageni founders felt somewhat threatened by his experience and
knowledge. Among other things, the new CFO, a guy named Steele, asked
to review all the minutes for board meetings over the last three years.
Somehow, Steele realized that the board had authorized the signing of new
employment agreements with the founders, but that the form of the signed
agreements didn’t match up to the form of the agreement attached to the
minutes. It turns out that the signed agreements each contained golden
parachutes giving the founders 3 times their annual compensation in a
lump sum on any change of control, either negotiated or non-negotiated,
but the version the board approved didn’t have these provisions.”
Avoid this Pitfall: If your firm also provides attest or other
services, the ensuing conversation is not one you would
want to have without performing a conflict check. While you
might be aware of current attest clients, you cannot assume
that the information you are about to receive does not relate
to a former client; nor can you assume that the information
is necessarily confined to only the most recent 30 days. Be
very sensitive to your receipt of information relating to the
subject of a forensic investigation before you have fully per-
formed the necessary conflict check.
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At this point you interrupt Melinda’s recitation. “Did Samuel agree
that what was signed was not in the same form approved by the board, or
did an old draft of the employment agreements just get attached to the
minutes?”
“To tell you the truth,” Melinda responded, “the board members seem
to have differing recollections of the facts, and even the corporate counsel
is unsure if this issue was just one created because of poor recordkeeping.
He agrees that the agreement was not approved with a golden parachute,
but he can’t explain how the golden parachute got into the agreement in
the first place, as it was never discussed.”
“So why didn’t they just execute new agreements, rescind the old ones,
and let it go at that?” you ask.
“Because in the meantime, Steele found some entries in the books that
made him start to dig a little bit, and before you know it—you guessed it—
he found a series of checks that had been written by one of the founders,
Fulton, I think, to a company that turns out to have been owned by
Fulton’s girlfriend. What got his attention was that the invoices were
always one or two liners that had a remittance address in Palm Springs.
Turns out Mediageni has a West Coast office, so when Steele went out
there a month ago, he went by the vendor’s place, which happens to be a
very nice half million dollar house with two pools and a gardener. He
didn’t meet the girlfriend, but by then he didn’t need to. It looks like the
down payment on the house was made by Fulton, but the mortgage pay-
ments have been covered by the monthly billing sent to Mediageni.”
“I assume that once the board found out about that little arrangement,
Fulton was fired and the second founder came under suspicion, right?” you
asked.
“You would think so, but Steele wasn’t done digging yet, so he evi-
dently put off going to the board. Next thing you know, Steele finds
expense reimbursements for Fulton and the other founder, Chase, for their
recent trip to London and Paris on their EU sales tour that total almost
$140,000.”
“What did you say? $140,000?” you ask.
Chuckling, Melinda says, “When you fly the Concorde and stay at the
Dorchester in London and the Raphael in Paris, those dollars add up quick.
Only problem is, it appears that Fulton and Chase took their girlfriends
with them and that some portion of the bill was for advances at the casino
cage in London, among other interesting expenditures.”
In a sarcastic tone, you comment, “At this point, don’t tell me that
Steele decides he’s just going to keep on digging!”
“No, he finally decides that he ought to go to the board with this,”
Melinda responds. “And this is where things really get interesting. Steele
goes to the board meeting a few weeks ago, having prepped two of the
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board members to take immediate action and fire Fulton and Chase. He’s
not a member of the board, though, so he’s asked to come in and discuss the
financials about mid-way through the meeting. When he gets done giving
the financial report, he launches into what he’s found since joining the
company. Fulton and Chase had no idea this was coming, so they immedi-
ately tell Steele that he’s out of line and slandering them, while the board
members that Steele prepped are saying that Fulton and Chase should be
fired. When Steele gets to the vendor payments made to Fulton’s girlfriend,
Fulton shuts up, but Chase continues to yell and scream at Steele about
how he’s done nothing wrong. Then, when Steele gets into the EU sales
tour, Chase goes really nuts, claiming that three-fourths of the board knew
that his girlfriend was going, and that his compensation was supposed to
include all of her expenses, so there was full disclosure to the board. Of
course, not all the board members recollect things this way, including
Samuel, but they do recall that there was some discussion of how Fulton’s
and Chase’s compensation was going to be adjusted upward to take into
account some of their personal expenditures.”
“Sounds like a fine mess, Melinda. Do you have a sense for where
things stand now?”
“The board has suspended Fulton and Chase with pay, and they have
asked Steele to continue digging through the books to see if any more ques-
tionable expenditures are out there, but Fulton and Chase have accused
Steele of being on a witch hunt and have asked the board to stop him from
going any further. The compromise was that we would get involved to
investigate this situation, and we would retain you all to do some digging
that would otherwise have fallen to Steele. The board is looking a little
bipolar right now, torn between their need for Fulton and Chase to head up
the EU sales program, and worried about what lurks beneath the surface
of all this. To make matters worse, Mediageni without Fulton and Chase is
like a ship without a rudder—and that is what has everyone hoping we can
get to the bottom of this F—A—S—T.”
“Any other good news today, Melinda?” you ask laughingly.
“Yeah, there is one other thing. I hate to tell you this, but the finan-
cial statements for Mediageni have been audited for the last two years by
JNP, one of the second-tier national audit and accounting firms. None of
these issues surfaced in the audit reports, management letters, or discus-
sions with the audit committee. Since Mediageni was being groomed for a
public offering, JNP was retained to do a full audit in accordance with Reg
S-K during this time period. Heck, the company might as well have been
public, since they have acted as if they were during the last few years, and
they have almost 400 shareholders now.”
You pause for a moment to digest that bit of news. “Have you seen
JNP’s engagement letter and are you sure about the nature of the audit?
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They’re a great group of people, very professional, so I’d be a little sur-
prised if that turned out to be the case.”
Melinda’s reply confirms the worst. “Yeah, I’ve seen the letter myself,
Sue. The audit was supposed to be full-blown SEC compliant, and if most,
or any, of this stuff is true, then Mediageni may have a big problem, not to
mention JNP. Samuel is beside himself, as you’d expect from someone with
$30 million at risk. He’s asked us, and you too, to expedite this investiga-
tion so that the board can figure out what to do with Fulton and Chase, and
whether Steele is just out to get those guys. The board also wants you to
interface with JNP’s engagement partner and find out what they’ll do to
help. When can you get started?”
The Investigation Begins
Shortly after this conversation, you and Melinda begin assembling and
reviewing documents submitted to her firm, including receipts from the
European trip taken by Fulton and Chase. There isn’t any doubt about the
impropriety of the payments made to Fulton’s girlfriend, so your focus is on
the other allegations made by Steele. The document review supports the
fact that the expenditures were made, but it is clear that the real issue will
be whether, and to what extent, the board had approved the expenditures
in question and intended to have Fulton’s and Chase’s compensation
increased by the amount of their personal expenditures. Before getting to
the board interviews or talking to JNP, you and Melinda decide that the
best place to start is to interview Mediageni’s controller, a man named
James King.
As it turns out, King is a fount of information and a forensic investi-
gator’s dream. He is young, clearly somewhat naïve and nervous when he
sits down with you and Melinda. After filling you in on his background,
including the fact that he previously held only one other accounting posi-
tion at his brother-in-law’s company, the interview takes an unexpected
direction.
“Are you familiar with the allegations that have been made against
Mr. Fulton and Mr. Chase, Mr. King?” Melinda asks.
“Yeah, I heard from my boss, Mr. Steele, about what those guys have
been up to. Actually, this stuff wasn’t much of a surprise, to tell you the
truth. Everybody here in the company knew that those guys were living
high on the hog using the company’s money, and it seemed like it was ok
until Mr. Steele came along.” You and Melinda exchange glances, aware
that young Mr. King may have just blown open your investigation.
“When you say that, Mr. King, can you give us an idea about who knew
this and what it was that everyone knew?”
“Oh,” replied King, “everybody in Mediageni knew about that stuff.
When Fulton and Chase used to come in on Fridays before a holiday week-
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end, everybody used to laugh about the fact that those guys always asked
for checks payable to cash so they had some spending money over the
weekend. Heck, even the auditors used to joke about those guys. One time,
I was in the back of the office kitchen area and I heard one of the managers
and a staff person from the audit firm laughing about how Fulton spent
more money on supporting his girlfriend than on actual marketing.”
At this, your attention level rises dramatically. “Are you sure that the
two people you heard were from the audit firm?” you ask. “Oh sure,” King
replies, “I worked with them pretty closely over the time they were out for
the field work, so I know it was them.”
“And did they ask you about these expenditures or about how they had
been booked?”
“Well, not really,” King said. “I think they knew that we had a few gen-
eral ledger accounts for our excess marketing expenditures, but they never
pressed real hard on those. It kinda seemed like they and my old boss had
some kind of agreement that they weren’t going to look too hard into that
stuff. You know, my old boss used to work at JNP about 10 years ago, so I
think he had a pretty good idea of what the audit plan looked like, you
know what I mean?”
Following King’s interview, you caucus with Melinda. “If JNP’s staff
people knew what was going on, Melinda, and the financial statements
were prepared in accordance with Reg S-K, then it’s clear that there should
have been footnote disclosure of related party transactions, at a minimum,”
you state. “This also raises a really ugly possibility: that someone from JNP
and the former CFO were working together to conceal this stuff, or maybe
that the auditors saw what was going on but pretty much just signed off
without looking too closely. Either way, not what the board expected,
unless they were compliant in all this too.”
Melinda shook her head. “I can’t imagine the board knew exactly what
was going on, any more than I can imagine that the auditors did. It sounds
like what might have been going on was that everyone was so happy with
Avoid this Pitfall: Predictable audit plans and cozy rela-
tionships make unwelcome bedfellows. You can see where a
relaxed corporate atmosphere and the “tone from the top”
can establish a corporate culture that encourages a laissez
faire attitude that may even permeate the audit. If there is
a lesson here, it is that audit teams must maintain a
healthy skepticism, all the more so when the company has
a free-wheeling culture that invites these sorts of abuses. In
addition, the audit team members must know how critically
important is for them to surface these issues to others in the
audit firm as they arise.
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers70
05-Chapter 04.qxd  10/16/2002  9:26 AM  Page 70
how sales were growing, what a great job Fulton and Chase were doing,
and the prospect of the IPO right around the corner, that they kind of let
things slide, figuring someone else would catch anything that was really
wrong. Maybe the board thought Fulton and Chase were big spenders, but
not to the degree it turned out, and the auditors just followed everyone
else’s thinking and didn’t look too hard. You know, Mediageni was a large
client and getting bigger, so they may have been tempted to overlook a few
things.”
After some more discussion, you and Melinda decide that you’ll contact
JNP’s audit partner to ask for access to the workpapers on the most recent
audit. In anticipation of a phone conversation, you prepare a letter for
Melinda’s signature requesting access to the workpapers and indicating
that Mediageni’s board has approved this request. When you call for the
engagement partner to discuss this request a few days later, however, you
are referred to JNP’s supervising SEC partner, Laura Levin.
Laura begins the conversation with the following: “Sue, I understand
that your firm has been engaged to assist Melinda’s firm in this internal
investigation, is that right?”
“Yes, that’s correct.”
“And its my understanding that you all are looking into some expen-
diture issues on behalf of the board—can you tell me a little more?”
“Yes, it appears that there may have been some related party
expenses that might have constituted compensation but that were record-
ed as general and administrative expenses. We’re to look into this and
report back to the board.”
“Well,” Laura responds, “you know that our workpapers belong to us
and not to the company, so that is hurdle number one. The next issue is
that even if we were to give you access, we would have to know exactly
what workpapers you wanted to see, and why. And since we haven’t been
discharged, we are still the auditor of record and would need to see any-
thing you intend to report on back to the board, because if there has been
any breach of the representations made by management to us, we have to
consider whether or not to pull our prior opinion and whether our resigna-
tion or a restatement is called for.”
Pausing, you decide that the time has come to exert a little pressure of
your own. “Laura, all of what you said is true, and we understand JNP’s
position. If you want to have your counsel talk to Melinda about this, that’s
fine, but I think you should know that there seems to be some question
about whether someone on your firm’s audit team might have had some
knowledge about what was going on inside the company. If so, the board
would probably look more kindly on your firm’s cooperation with this
inquiry, and access to the workpapers would be a great step in that direc-
tion. I think that all the board wants to do is get to the bottom of this so
that they can determine how to best deal with Mr. Fulton and Mr. Chase.
As a private company, there is no reporting requirement to the SEC, so
that should lessen the visibility of this situation for all concerned.”
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“I understand your point, Sue,” Laura replies. “Let me talk about this
with our counsel and the engagement partner and get back to you. In the
meantime, you might want to tell Melinda that our cooperation is subject
to our receiving requests for specific workpapers in our possession. We also
had a firm policy in effect during those years that required the destruction
of all extraneous documentation on completion of the audit, which may
lessen the likelihood that anything in our files will help you. Of course,
we’ve since changed that policy to conform to the SEC’s latest pronounce-
ment on retention of records. And, finally, we will require you or anyone
from your firm to sign a confidentiality agreement that will prevent dis-
closure of any information you learn to anyone outside the board and
Melinda’s firm.”
You sign off by confirming that you’ll get a specific list of workpapers
to Laura and her firm that you will want to review. You know that the
battle over the investigation has only just begun, and where it will lead is
anyone’s guess.
Situational Analysis
1. Assume that you get access to the workpapers and there is no “smoking
gun” that confirms that the audit team members knew what was going
on with Fulton and Chase. What further evidence would you want to
review to try and answer the question of whether JNP knew or should
have known about personal expenditures of company funds?
(a) Interview the former CFO of Mediageni
(b) Review checks made to cash, the endorsements on those checks, the
amounts of those checks and how they were recorded in the
company’s statements
(c) Determine the magnitude of amounts paid to Fulton’s girlfriend and
to third parties compared with other amounts recorded in accounts
payable
(d) Review all of the marketing expenses to try and form a preliminary
judgment about the extent of any misappropriation
(e) All of the above
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2. Assume that a review of the expenses run up by Fulton and Chase in the
course of the European sales trip show that only $4,000 was spent in the
London casino. You discuss this with JNP, and they argue that this is
immaterial. Knowing this, and the fact that Fulton and Chase are going
to say they intended this amount be treated as compensation to them,
how would you recommend that Melinda address this issue in her report
to the board?
(a) Raise the issue and conclude that the amount was immaterial, but
note that Fulton and Chase did not have the amount included in W-
2 income in spite of their claims about this being chargeable to them
as income
(b) State the facts and indicate that materiality is irrelevant given the
fact that the company’s financial statements are misstated, and
indicate Fulton and Chase’s claims are not supported unless such
amounts appear in W-2 income
(c) Do not raise the issue in the report
(d) Raise the issue and aggregate the $4,000 with any amounts spent by
Fulton and Chase on their girlfriends during this trip so as to estab-
lish materiality
Practitioner Response: As a matter of forensic practice, and particularly
where assertions are being made that reflect upon an audit firm, this situa-
tion cries out for more investigation. Each of the possible answers listed
above may provide some further indication of the extent to which JNP’s
audit team knew of improper practices or should have reacted to “red flags”
that were somewhat or readily apparent. For these reasons, answer (e) is
correct. Answer (a) has the potential to illuminate further the relationship of
the former CFO to JNP’s personnel, including how his prior employment at
JNP could bear on these issues. This interview may also provide some indi-
cation as to whether the CFO can confirm that the JNP personnel knew
what was going on inside the company. Keep in mind, the former CFO may
be concerned about his own liability and may prove a willing source of infor-
mation about what JNP knew. Answer (b) is also correct because the record-
ing of this information in different accounts may increase the likelihood that
the auditors should have come across the information in the course of the
audit. Answers (c) and (d) are also correct and are designed to get at the
issue of materiality; that is, were the amounts involved so material as to be
red flags for an audit team? Answer (d) also gets at another issue present in
this case study: without significant additional investigation, you may not
uncover other misappropriations by Fulton and Chase. As a forensic investi-
gator, you would be obligated to pursue a more comprehensive examination
of accounts payable, vendor payments, and marketing expenses given the
knowledge you already have at hand about misuse of company assets.
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3. After the investigation is concluded and Fulton and Chase are fired, you
and Melinda are asked to help Mediageni put together a code of ethics
for the executive officers and other employees. Given the facts of the
case study, what points would you want the code of ethics to stress?
(a) Full, fair and accurate disclosure in public reports and communica-
tions
(b) Honest and ethical conduct, specifically including transactions with
related parties
(c) compliance with governmental laws and regulations
(d) Internal reporting systems for violations and accountability stan-
dards for violations
(e) Answers (b) and (d)
(f) Answers (a) and (c) 
Practitioner Response: This question asks you to consider two related
issues: materiality and the characterization of the amounts paid on behalf of
Fulton and Chase. Answer (a) is not the best choice, because you are raising
an issue that you’ve conceded (in the answer) is immaterial. When examin-
ing this issue through the lens of Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, it is hard
to say that this is immaterial given the fact that it appears that Mediageni’s
financial statements intentionally misstated the nature of the expenditure.
Answer (c) likewise requires you to conclude that the issue is either imma-
terial or was properly included in income by Fulton and Chase, which pre-
supposes facts that are not in the case study. Answer (d) could allow Melinda
to raise the issue and ignore JNP’s materiality argument, but has the poten-
tial to distort the conclusions of the report and may open an avenue for
Fulton and Chase to question the report’s fairness. In other words, if the
report seems to be stretching the facts to fit a certain conclusion, it may
appear to the board that the report is biased. The best answer is (b), because
by stating the facts and indicating that the amount was intentionally mis-
stated, the materiality argument is defeated. (Note: Fulton and Chase have
not argued that they were unaware of how Mediageni had recorded the
$4,000; if they made this claim, it could facilitate an argument about
whether there was an intentional misstatement. That claim would be weak-
ened, however, by the fact that Fulton and Chase undoubtedly signed the
management letter and are charged with knowledge of the recording of
expenditures in accordance with Mediageni’s accounting policies and proce-
dures.) Since you do not have the W-2 information at this point in the inves-
tigation, this answer also allows you to address Fulton and Chase’s position
in the report without assuming facts that are not yet known.
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4. In your view, did Steele properly and timely report the ethical issues he
unearthed to the board members?
(a) No, he should have reported the issues to the audit committee of the
board
(b) No, he should have reported the issue concerning the payments to
Fulton’s girlfriend when he found out those facts
(c) Yes, he reported these issues properly and as timely as could be
expected given the likely response
(d) No, he reported the issues without having sufficient facts in hand
and should have done so only after he completed more investigative
work
Practitioner Response: This question is susceptible to different responses
and really requires the reader to make a subjective judgment about how he
or she would respond in similar circumstances. That said, here are a few
points that should be considered when evaluating your answer and the pos-
sible responses. Answer (a) is technically correct but, to some degree, ele-
vates form over substance. Since issues of this nature would eventually
reach the board in any event, this answer may not be your best. Answer (b)
is correct also; the question is, did Steele have enough of the facts at that
point to go to the audit committee or the board? One way to look at this is to
say that he had enough on Fulton to go to the audit committee or the board. 
Practitioner Response: This question asks you to consider the facts of the
case study when making a decision about what points you want to stress in
the code of ethics. While all of the answers are points that you would want
in a code of ethics, you have to remember that Mediageni is not yet public
and is not yet filing reports with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. For these reasons, answers (a) and (c) are not necessarily the best
answers, especially given the facts in the case study that revolve around
related party transactions and an apparent lack of internal reporting sys-
tems or accountability. The best choice, given the facts of the case study, is
answer (e) since this answer focuses the code of ethics on establishing prop-
er ethical standards, as well as monitoring and reporting systems that are
designed to reinforce these standards. While answer (f) is not quite as good
an answer, the reader who is inclined to anticipate future events will want
to have ethical standards in place for post-public reporting and for compli-
ance with laws. To the extent that Mediageni is already subject to govern-
mental regulations other than the 1934 Act, answer (c) must be considered;
however, because the question is asking you to determine which factors you
would stress in the code of ethics based on the case study, you must keep
those facts uppermost in your mind.
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5. If you were in Laura Levin’s position and evaluating where JNP might
have exposure for a busted audit, which of the most common reasons for
an audit failure would give you the greatest concern?
(a) Failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidential matter to support
the audit opinion
(b) Failure to exercise professional skepticism on unusual, last minute,
or related party transactions
(c) Failure to maintain independence
(d) Failure to respond adequately to red flags
(e) Answers (a) and (c)
(f) Answers (b) and (d)
Practitioner Response: The facts of the case study clearly raise the great-
est concern about the issues covered in answers (b) and (d), meaning that the
correct answer is (f). While not discounting the failure to obtain sufficient
evidence to support the audit opinion, the facts of the case study do not
really raise material independence issues. Clearly, if the controller is to be
believed, the audit team failed to respond adequately to red flags and failed
to exercise professional skepticism about the related party transactions that
appeared to permeate the corporate culture at Mediageni.
If you assume Chase would have, or could have, reacted to this by somehow
“covering his tracks” or attempting to undermine Steele or have him fired,
you likely would not have chosen this answer. This gives you a sense of why
answer (c) may be the best answer, because it takes into account the proba-
ble response that Chase and Fulton will make when presented with evidence
of their wrongdoing. By waiting until he had more of the facts in hand, Steele
may have made the best choice and, for that matter, he obviously strength-
ened his position. Again, as a relatively new CFO asserting claims against
one or more of the founders that could cost them their jobs, you can assume
that the more evidence Steele has, the better. Answer (d) takes that position
to its illogical conclusion; that is, that Steele holds the information even after
uncovering enough to raise serious management integrity issues in the
hopes that he finds more. The case study facts arguably indicate that Steele
had enough information at hand to go to the board when he did. Although
caution is an appropriate watchword in this situation, undue caution in
addressing these issues to the board could actually cause the company
greater harm. The bottom line: this situation requires a subjective judgment
that is difficult to second guess under these facts. If anything, this empha-
sizes the need for a code of ethics, a reporting mechanism, and accountabili-
ty to identify and address these types of issues before they reach this point.
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6. What do you think about the statement you made to Laura Levin of JNP
that because Mediageni is not public, there is no reporting requirement
pertaining to these facts? Does the fact that the financial statements
were audited to SEC standards bear on this?
7. Let’s assume you have been asked to attend the board meeting at which
the report you and Melinda prepared is being discussed. One of the
board members asks you the following questions: “During the two year
period covered by the financial statements audited by JNP, we conduct-
ed two private placements and raised $4.3 million. Based on what
Fulton and Chase did, do you think we have to offer these investors
rescission rights? If we don’t offer rescission, what does that do to our
financial statements? Do we even have to tell our investors about this
mess?” How would you respond?
Practitioner Response: This series of questions requires you to first ana-
lyze what Fulton and Chase did. If what was done is properly characterized
as fraud that was undisclosed at the time the private placements were sold,
it would appear that Mediageni either has to offer the investors rescission or
disclose the existence of rescission liability in the financial statement foot-
notes and on the face of the balance sheet. (The stock sold in the placements
would be reclassified above the stockholders’ equity section as “Common
Stock subject to rescission” or substantially similar language.) If you con-
cluded that what Fulton and Chase had done was merely negligent and
lacked fraudulent intent, the analysis becomes more difficult, but the case
study facts are not consistent with the conclusion that their actions lacked
intent.
The question of whether Mediageni has to “tell our investors about this
mess” is more of a legal issue than accounting, but it is incumbent upon you
to explain to the director that these issues are going to appear in the restat-
ed financial statements or in a new set of audited statements prepared by a 
Practitioner Response: The statement you made is technically correct in
that Mediageni is not public and there is no requirement that a restatement
or withdrawn opinion be communicated to any regulatory authority if the
company is not publicly reporting. However, there could be circumstances
where Mediageni would be subject to other reporting requirements, such as
those imposed by a senior lender, a subordinated lender, or perhaps the
Federal Trade Commission or a state regulatory authority if Mediageni were
in the business of offering and selling franchises. The fact that JNP’s engage-
ment letter called for JNP to audit the financial statements in accordance
with the Regulation S-K does not impose a reporting requirement on
Mediageni or JNP that is otherwise absent.
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8. When considering Adelphia, Tyco and even smallcap companies that
have developed a corporate culture of greed and excess, what concrete
steps would you take to set the right “tone at the top” and establish a
corporate culture that fosters integrity and ethical behavior?
Practitioner Response: Some or all of the following are concrete steps that
you might consider to set the right tone:
— build a code of ethics with integrity at its center;
— establish a stringent set of internal controls as well as anti-fraud controls;
— populate the audit committee with knowledgeable, competent members
who understand the financial, accounting and auditing issues encoun-
tered in your business;
— provide ethics training at hiring and on an on-going basis;
— demonstrate a commitment to corporate responsibility by implementing
company-wide policies that encourage ethical behavior;
— establish well-publicized means inside the company for anonymous and
other means of reporting suspected ethics violations;
— create a system of accountability that penalizes behavior that is at odds
with the corporate culture you seek, and ensure that all employees know
that accountability begins in the executive suite;
— test end of month and related party transactions for reasonableness, fair-
ness and full disclosure;
— appoint independent directors who understand their responsibilities and
take them seriously;
— obtain the service of knowledgeable and competent professionals who are
not afraid to challenge management and who understand their obliga-
tions to other constituencies such as shareholders, regulators and the cor-
porate entity; and
— conduct yourself in a manner that demonstrates integrity and commit-
ment to the ideals you wish others in the organization to follow.
successor audit firm. From a strict disclosure perspective, it is possible that
Mediageni could put off the “day of reckoning” by not furnishing its investors
with copies of the audited statements if it was not required to do so, but to
what end? The investors in the placement will, sooner or later, learn the
facts and Mediageni's management team is probably better off being proac-
tive with disclosure. A new management team would have a keen interest in
making a clean start and letting the investors know that the old regime, with
its old problems, had been removed. It is easy to imagine that later disclo-
sure of these facts (for example, in a registration statement for an IPO that
disclosed the company’s rescission liability) would simply magnify the nega-
tive reaction of Mediageni's investors and perhaps raise more disclosure
issues at exactly the point in time where the company would not want to be
perceived as being less than forthcoming.
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SUGGESTED READING
The “Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”
(available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf) released by the
Commission in January 2003 is worth reviewing when considering the
causes of audit failures and if you are seeking a good overview of trends in
accounting and auditing enforcement actions over the last five years. This
report also noted the fact that one of the Commission’s recommendations
is to amend the 1934 Act so that parties could provide privileged informa-
tion to the SEC without fear of this information being subject to discovery
by third party claimants (i.e., shareholders and their counsel).
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CHAPTER 5
CASE 5—
DEPARTMENT OF ENFORCEMENT:
YOU ARE THE ACCOUNTING
INVESTIGATOR
In a peculiar twist of fate, you are now employed by the Government
Regulatory Agency (GRA) as an accounting investigator. You are being
asked to review the file on the progress of an investigation into Magnificent
Stallions, Inc., a public company listed on the Seattle Stock Exchange
(SSE). When the investigation began as an informal inquiry six months
ago, it was a routine preliminary matter. After the enforcement depart-
ment took the statement of Magnificent Stallions’ controller, the investi-
gation got some traction and was upgraded to a formal investigation.
Armed with subpoena power, you have been called on to take the deposi-
tion of Charlie Kist, the CFO who is suspected of having caused
Magnificent Stallions to distribute public reports that presented false and
misleading information about its financial exposure to obligations held in
a bankruptcy-remote variable interest entity 1 (formerly known as a special
purpose entity (SPE)). You are not only to make a recommendation about
whether civil charges should be filed against Magnificent Stallions and/or
Mr. Kist, you must also consider whether the GRA should file enforcement
proceedings to suspend or revoke Mr. Kist’s right to practice as a certified
public accountant before the GRA. As a prominent figure in Seattle
society, Mr. Kist makes an inviting but difficult target, one sure to garner
sympathy from the local business community.
1 Note. With the release of FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest
Entities, the term “special purpose entities” (SPEs) was changed to “variable interest entities” as
it applies to the Interpretation’s guidance.
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FOCUS POINTS
In Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470, issued October
23, 2001, the SEC Staff issued a report under Section 21(a) under the 1934
Act. [The report can be found at www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
44969.htm.] This release, which concerned the settlement of a cease and
desist proceeding against a public company controller, contains a compre-
hensive list of the factors the Commission will consider in deciding
whether to take enforcement action and, if taken, what remedies the
Commission will seek. Among other factors discussed in this release, the
Staff indicated it will consider: 
— the nature of the misconduct, including whether there was an honest
mistake or willful misconduct; 
— whether the auditors were misled; 
— how the misconduct arose; 
— whether the misconduct was systemic or enterprise-wide, confined to a
few rogue employees, and how high up the misconduct reached;
— how the conduct was uncovered;
— how much harm was inflicted on investors; 
— the steps the company took on learning of the misconduct; 
— whether or not the audit committee and the board were informed;
— was an independent investigation undertaken and, if so, was it shared
with the SEC; 
— did the company take action fully, promptly and timely to disclose what
information it uncovered to the public;
— was the investigation full, fair and did the company take appropriate
action once presented with its findings;
— what action did the company take to prevent a recurrence; and
— is the company the same one in which the misconduct took place, or has
it since merged or filed for reorganization? 
This release and others issued under Section 21(a) provide excellent
reference points for a company to consider when determining what action
to take with respect to alleged misconduct and the likely response it may
face from the Commission. 
REGULATORY ISSUES
This chapter’s case study includes references to an off-balance sheet
financing that may form part of the basis for enforcement action being
taken against the company and its officers. In January 2003, the
Commission adopted the final rule “Disclosure in Management’s
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Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and
Aggregate Contractual Obligations” [Release No. 33-8182]. The rule is
effective for fiscal years ending after June 15, 2003, except that the table
of contractual obligations must be included for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 2003. The rule defines an off-balance sheet arrangement as
any obligation under: 
— certain guarantee contracts, as covered under Financial Accounting
Standards Board Interpretation No. 45, Guarantor’s Accounting and
Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees, Including Indirect Guarantees
of Indebtedness of Others;
— certain derivative instruments indexed to the company’s own stock and
classified in the statement of stockholders’ equity; and
— a material variable interest held in an unconsolidated entity that pro-
vides liquidity, market risk or credit enhancement to the company; leas-
ing or hedging with the company; performs research and development
(R&D) for the company; or in which the company has a retained or con-
tingent interest in assets transferred to an unconsolidated entity that
provides financing, market risk or credit enhancement to the company,
as referenced in FASB Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable
Interest Entities. 
The entity that has off-balance sheet arrangements must disclose in
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A):
— the nature and business purpose of the arrangements; 
— the importance of the arrangements to the company’s liquidity, capital
resources, market risk, credit enhancement, and other benefits; 
— revenues, expenses, cash flows, indebtedness incurred, interest
retained, and obligations or liabilities, including contingent ones and
those that are or may become material, related to the off-balance sheet
arrangement, and the triggering events that may cause them to arise;
and 
— known trends, events, demands or commitments that will terminate or
are reasonably likely to terminate material off-balance sheet arrange-
ments, or reduce their benefits, and what the company is doing or will
do in response. 
Filers other than small businesses must also provide a table of con-
tractual obligations disclosing the types of obligations (e.g., long-term debt,
capital lease, operating lease, purchase obligations and other long-term lia-
bilities), including total obligations and due dates of increments through a
five-year period. 
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When disclosing information about off-balance sheet arrangements, it
is important to note that nearly all of the information provided that is for-
ward-looking is eligible for the safe-harbor protections of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-67, 12/22/1995).
To take advantage of the safe harbor, however, the company must satisfy
the other requirements of the safe harbor, such as providing meaningful
cautionary statements and ensuring that the company provides the infor-
mation through an authorized officer or representative. 
This chapter’s case study also includes references to loan losses, the
recognition of which may have been avoided through transfer of loans into
a variable interest entity. Under Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 102,
“Selected Loan Loss Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues,”
the Commission sought to address issues associated with unfavorable
trends in the quality of a loan portfolio that did not correspond with
decreases or increases in loan loss allowances. SAB No. 102 requires the
company to:
— develop, document and apply a systematic allowance methodology;
— measure and document individual loan losses under FAS No. 114,
Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan and on a group basis
under FAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies; and
— validate systemic methods to estimate loan loss allowances and docu-
ment the validation process. 
Consider how the proper application of systematic allowance methods,
including proper measuring and documentation of impairment of individ-
ual and grouped loans, should have been used in the following case study
to avoid what appears to be a pending and serious enforcement action. 
ETHICAL GUIDES
“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial
appearance of being right.” Thomas Paine.
“Character is higher than intellect.” Ralph Waldo Emerson.
“A man has to live with himself, and he should see to it that he always
has good company.” Charles Evans Hughes.
“Live so that your friends can defend you but never have to.” Arnold
H. Glasow.
* * * *
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CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE ACCOUNTING
INVESTIGATOR
In this case study you are an accounting investigator asked to review the
file on the progress of an investigation into a public company suspected of
distributing public reports that presented false and misleading informa-
tion about its financial exposure to obligations held in a bankruptcy-
remote variable interest entity. How would you respond?
The Case Status Report
During your weekly meeting with your fellow enforcement investigators,
your branch chief gives the staff a brief summary on the Magnificent
Stallions matter. 
“As most of you know, Maria and I took an informal statement from
Bertha Reed, the controller of Magnificent Stallions, a couple of weeks ago.
What you may not have heard was that once she started talking, her
nerves evidently got the best of her and she couldn’t stop. We ended up put-
ting her on the record and we now have some compelling evidence that
Magnificent Stallions’ books were manipulated last year in an effort to
meet the Street’s earnings estimates. It looks like the manipulation was
accomplished through use of a variable interest entity to transfer under-
performing loans made to its racetrack affiliates and some of the owners of
their top racehorses that had encountered a run of bad luck. We have
asked the GRA for authority to open the formal investigation and we
expect to have that in the next few days. Ben, since you’re our most expe-
rienced investigator, I’d like you to take over the file from here and conduct
the deposition of Charlie Kist, the CFO of Magnificent Stallions.”
You put a wry smile on your face, aware that the rest of the enforce-
ment staff is waiting for your reaction. “Nothing like having to investigate
Mr. Popularity, huh? Maybe I should take on Bill Gates while I’m at it!”
The rest of the staff has a good laugh until the branch chief interjects. “I
know all of you take this job seriously and understand the investigative
powers we have can be pretty daunting. We have to keep in mind that if
Charlie Kist was at the center of this VIE thing at Magnificent Stallions,
he has to be held to account, regardless of his popularity or political ties. I
expect all of you to give Ben any support he needs so that he can focus on
wrapping up the investigative phase.” 
“Ben, if you can get prepared by the end of the month, let’s go ahead
and schedule Kist’s appearance. I’ll handle getting the notices and author-
ity issues completed so you can focus on unraveling this thing. I’ve already
put the case summary in your box, so let me know if you need anything
else.” 
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When you arrive back at your office, you begin reading the case sum-
mary, a copy of which appears below. 
CONFIDENTIAL CASE STATUS REPORT
FOR GRA STAFF INTERNAL USE ONLY 
PREPARED NOVEMBER 25, 2003
ASSIGNED TO WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE 
Investigation No. 2003-187
CASE TITLE: MAGNIFICENT STALLIONS, INC.
Listed: Seattle Stock Exchange
FACTS: Magnificent Stallions, Inc. (MSI) is a public company listed and
trading on the Seattle Stock Exchange. MSI has been public since 1996 and
is a holding company for subsidiaries that are licensed in various states to
operate horsetracks and off-track betting parlors. In the normal course of
its business, MSI makes loans to its subsidiaries on an as-needed basis. By
virtue of operating its tracks, MSI has developed a loyal following of well-
heeled racehorse owners to whom it provides loans that the owners use for
buying foals and grown horses, paying breeding fees and covering training
expenses. At December 31, 2001, the outstanding balance of MSI’s loans to
its subsidiaries totaled $140 million and all but two with a balance of $32
million were disclosed as performing and the loans to racehorse owners
totaled approximately $220 million. The owners’ loans were secured by a
pledge of ownership interests in horses, some personal guarantees, and in
some cases by mortgages on the owners’ training facilities or horse farms.
The owners’ loans are typically short-term notes that are payable interest-
only until maturity, generally three to five years. The 10-K for the 2001
year indicates that almost 30% of the owners’ notes were coming due in the
following year. 
At June 30, 2002, MSI’s 10-Q disclosed that it had entered into a securiti-
zation transaction under which $100 million of its loans were sold to an
institutional investor. The disclosure about this transaction indicates that
the variable interest entity formed to purchase the loans was not under
MSI’s control and that MSI had no further exposure or interest in the secu-
ritized loans. MSI’s June 30 disclosure about the remaining loans in its
portfolio indicated that its delinquency rates were less than 5% in each cat-
egory of subsidiary loans and owners’ loans. MSI reported earnings of $16
million for the June 30 quarter after taking into account the securitization
transaction. 
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MSI’s stock rose on strong volume after its quarterly conference call was
held on July 29. StockMonitor detected concentrated selling by two invest-
ment banking firms during the period from July 29 until the 10-Q was filed
on August 14, 2002, and buying patterns consistent with MSI having met
or exceeded most analysts’ expectations. Within two days of the filing of the
10-Q, trading patterns support the conclusion that analysts and institu-
tions reacted to the appearance of the securitization transaction by dump-
ing the stock. Within a week of the 10-Q filing, MSI’s stock declined over
37% on volume ranging from 110% to 150% of average weekly trading vol-
ume. StockMonitor notified MSI and GRA of these facts and asked MSI if
it had any information that was not yet publicly disclosed, but MSI stated
it had no information that required initial or additional disclosure. As a
result of analysts’ continuing to question the company about the securiti-
zation of the loans, MSI held another conference call and issued a press
release filed with GRA under cover of an 8-K. That release and the confer-
ence call reiterated MSI’s position that the securitization transaction was
properly accounted for and that the company had no continuing interest in
the loans that had been transferred. Magnificent Stallions’ subsequent fil-
ings have offered no additional disclosure concerning the securitization of
these loans. The stock has continued to trade at a discount of over 35%
from where it was trading at the time of the quarterly conference call on
July 29. 
FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE FACTS: In September 2002, GRA enforce-
ment staff was contacted by a representative of CAL Hedge Fund. CAL
Hedge Fund admitted it maintained a short position in MSI shares and
stated that it had come into possession of information that indicated MSI’s
securitization of the loans was improperly disclosed. About the same time,
one of CAL Hedge Fund’s analysts publicly questioned the accounting for
MSI’s loans to its “stable” of horse owners. The analyst asserted that due
to stock market declines, falling prices of fine art, and general changes in
the liquidity profiles of the racehorse owners’ community, it was her opin-
ion that MSI must have “rolled” the worst of its owners’ loans off of its
books and into the securitization. The analyst went on to question why any
institution would have purchased the loan securitization without some
type of recourse to MSI or credit enhancement paid for by MSI. GRA
requested information from CAL Hedge Fund and was given a copy of the
analyst’s report. An informal investigation was commenced shortly there-
after. 
ANALYSIS: Staff has reviewed the available public disclosure furnished by
MSI concerning the securitization transaction, trading information from
StockMonitor, and public information furnished by CAL Hedge Fund. A
number of facts support the request for a formal investigation profile [see
update provided below], including the following: 
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Macro Factors
1. Economic conditions generally and in horse racing are deteriorating,
inclining companies to stretch the facts to make their numbers. 
2. Securitization transactions are well-accepted financing vehicles, but
are complex and may deserve more attention when being used for the
first time. 
3. Well-publicized financial difficulties of certain racehorse owners and
related stock market losses lead to questions about loan performance.
Entity-Specific Factors 
1. [CLASSIFIED FILE ACCESS] Magnificent Stallions FBI file indi-
cates possible connection to organized crime activity through betting
operations. 
2. Assuming 10% of racehorse owner loans were non-performing, write-
offs of these non-performing assets would have much more than
negated the entire June 30 profit reported by MSI. 
3. Delinquency rates for owners’ and subsidiary loans reported by MSI
in its June 30 10-Q are consistent with transfer of non-performing
loans off of the books. 
4. Concentrated selling by two investment banking firms, Dynasty
Securities and Moss Trading, after conference call but before filing of
MSI June 30 10-Q is suspect due to additional information developed
by Staff. We determined that Dynasty and Moss acted as placement
agents for MSI in the securitization transaction. Staff suspects that
Dynasty and Moss anticipated market reaction to the non-performing
loans and “front-ran” the trading of MSI securities to reduce their
exposure or clients’ exposure. Open Issue: Did Dynasty or Moss short
MSI stock? [REFERRAL TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION PENDING; REFERRAL TO INSIDER
TRADING STAFF PENDING ON CLIENT TRADES] 
INVESTIGATION STATUS: Through September 2003, Staff had complet-
ed disclosure and document review and developed background information
on which to base initial preliminary investigative inquiries. In October
2003, Staff requested informal interview with Bertha Reed, controller of
Magnificent Stallions. Ms. Reed attended interview in early November
without counsel and advised Staff that MSI had attempted to prevent her
from attending interview without counsel. Ms. Reed stated, “I haven’t done
anything wrong and I told them I didn’t need an attorney. I also told them
that Charlie Kist is the one who ought to go hire an attorney, since he’s the
one who put this stupid securitization deal together!” Staff asked Ms. Reed
to go on the record at this time and advised her of her right to have coun-
sel present. Ms. Reed agreed to go on the record and declined the opportu-
nity to be represented by counsel. 
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Ms. Reed testified that Magnificent Stallions knew that the June 30 quar-
ter was going to be a “tough” quarter and that early in the quarter, she
heard that Mr. Kist and the CEO, Marty Consigliera, had begun holding
meetings with Benetti Bermuda Holdings, a large offshore money man-
agement firm. Sometime in May, Kist approached Ms. Reed and asked her
to prepare a schedule of maturity dates for racehorse owners in 2003 and
the first quarter of 2004. The next thing Ms. Reed heard, the outside law
firm for MSI, Dewey Cheatem and How, had formed a bankruptcy remote
entity called Horse Partners I, and the loans from one of the subsidiaries
of MSI and to nearly all the racehorse owners with loans maturing in 2003
were transferred to Horse Partners I. By June 15, Dynasty Securities and
Moss Trading were preparing private placement materials and by June 25,
Benetti had committed to buy the securitized loan portfolio. Ms. Reed
denied ever having seen the purchase agreement, but she did see a copy of
the private placement memo that was issued to Benetti. The memo indi-
cated that the A tranche of the securitization was $70 million, the B
tranche was $20 million and the C tranche was $10 million. Staff believes
these amounts are consistent with risk profiles inherent in loans to race-
horse owners. 
According to public disclosure filed by MSI, the securitization transaction
was insured by Global Insurance & Fidelity. Staff confirmed this fact with
Ms. Reed. Global Insurance has been contacted by Staff and has confirmed
their role in insuring the performance of the securitization. When Staff
inquired about whether the securitization permitted any recourse to MSI,
or whether Global Insurance received any credit enhancement from
Magnificent Stallions, Global Insurance declined to answer and requested
GRA Staff contact their counsel. Counsel later indicated that Global could
not answer Staff’s inquiries without being issued a subpoena. 
Ms. Reed indicates she does not know if MSI gave anything of value to
Global Insurance or Benetti to, as she put it, “take the loans off MSI’s
hands.” Ms. Reed testified that in her view the accounting for the securiti-
zation transaction is “suspect at best,” but she states that she was kept
“out of the loop” by Kist and Consigliera. She also testified that since the
filing of the 10-Q, the executive officers have “adopted a bunker mentality”
and been “closeted away” with attorneys and investment bankers. 
INVESTIGATION UPDATE: Auditors for Magnificent Stallions submitted
resignation to MSI in October 2003 but indicated there was no disagree-
ment with MSI on accounting policies or procedures. Letter confirming this
fact now on file with GRA. Staff recommends that GRA institute formal
investigation and exercise subpoena power to determine facts surrounding
loan securization transaction. 
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POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES: Magnificent Stallions, Inc.;
Marty Consigliera, chief executive officer; and Charlie Kist, chief financial
officer (currently licensed as certified public accountant and authorized to
practice before GRA).
POSSIBLE CHARGES: To be determined.
PLAN FOR TAKING TESTIMONY: Global Insurance; Benetti; Kist;
Consigliera 
END CONFIDENTIAL CASE SUMMARY 
Avoid These Pitfalls:
1. Even those who are innocent and have nothing to fear
should think long and hard about volunteering informa-
tion to a regulatory agency without having counsel pres-
ent. Experienced securities counsel will advise that
informal sessions in front of enforcement personnel have
a way of ending up on the record. Often, witnesses do not
realize that the enforcement staff has already spoken to
another party or obtained documents, which may enable
the questioning to be much more in-depth than expected.
Once a witness is on the record, defense counsel has a
much more difficult job and the innocent witness may
find himself or herself with an unexpected difficulty—
like being perceived as part of the problem, and not the
solution.
2. Had you been in Charlie Kist’s shoes, ask yourself a few
questions. Wouldn’t you have been better off writing off
the loans than trying to salvage the quarter (or, for that
matter, the year) by engaging in transfers of non-per-
forming loans in a way that can cost you your career?
Even if the transaction was properly accounted for, was
the end result worth compromising your integrity for?
Isn’t the loss of your license to practice and giving up the
right to be an officer or director of any public company
worth more than whatever temporary financial benefit
gained through this transaction?
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers90
06-Chapter 05.qxd  10/16/2002  9:22 AM  Page 90
3. Short sellers are often active in developing information
about companies in which they hold short positions.
There is nothing that is per se illegal about doing so, as
long as the short sellers do not violate applicable laws in
collecting or disseminating that information. If you are
an executive officer or director of a public company, do
not ignore information that is circulated by “sell-side”
analysts or short sellers. Since regulators read “sell-side”
analysts’’ reports and are sometimes directly handed
information by short sellers, your ignorance of what oth-
ers are saying about your company can come back to
haunt you. If the “shorts” are right about an issue, you
may also be able to forestall regulatory action or obtain
some leniency in the penalty phase if you are “out ahead”
on a particular matter. 
4. Each stock exchange and NASDAQ maintains active sur-
veillance programs that trigger staff inquiries when
unusual trading patterns develop, when prices rise or fall
materially without currently disclosed information, or
when trading volumes significantly exceed historical
norms. These inquiries may sometimes be written or may
be made over the telephone. The NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ also have rules that require a company to
promptly disclose material information in its possession
or, if it fails to do so, the company may be subject to sus-
pension of trading or delisting. Getting a phone call from
market surveillance personnel can be unnerving, espe-
cially when they call with questions such as, “Does the
company know of any information that would justify or
relate to the recent rise [fall] in its stock price? Is there
any information that the company has not disclosed that
you’d like to get out now?” Your company may not be able
to control whether or not you get such calls, but it helps
to have the right answers and be comfortable knowing
that the company has fulfilled its disclosure responsibili-
ties. 
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Situational Analysis
1. Assume you are the CEO of Magnificent Stallions and that you’ve
learned facts that support the conclusion that when Charlie Kist put
together the securitization transaction, he gave Global Insurance a side
letter. The letter promised Global Insurance that their insurance policy
would not be called upon unless Magnificent Stallions had made up the
first $18 million in loan losses. You: 
(a) Fire Kist immediately and notify the GRA
(b) Notify the audit committee
(c) Hire counsel to conduct an internal investigation to get to the bot-
tom of it
(d) Investigate these facts and then report to the audit committee
(e) Notify the Seattle Stock Exchange and request a trading halt of MSI
stock
Practitioner Response: This question asks you to make a judgment about
what course of action to take, but is premised on the fact that you don’t have
the smoking gun in your hands. For this reason, answer (a) is incorrect, since
a premature firing of Kist and notifying the GRA may simply open you and
Magnificent Stallions up to an unlawful termination lawsuit and a lengthy
regulatory investigation. Answer (c) is also incorrect, because your hiring of
counsel may be regarded as an infringement on the board or audit commit-
tee’s authority to hire counsel. Likewise, answer (d) is not your best choice,
because if you do your own investigation, it is possible that (1) another party
may discover some of the facts and report them to the board or audit com-
mittee, leaving you to answer the question of why you failed to do so; and (2)
the board or audit committee may conclude that your “investigation” was
simply a cover story, and that you were really trying to cover up your involve-
ment in what went on. Either way, this is not the position in which you want
to place yourself. Answer (e) would be the likely response of a regulatory
agency to this information coming to light, but is not the CEO’s first choice.
Among other things, once a trading halt is called, it is often difficult to have
trading resumed unless the company is able to make full and complete dis-
closure about what has occurred. Without an investigation to get to the “bot-
tom line,” the company may be placing itself and its shareholders in harm’s
way if it asks for an immediate trading halt. Given all of the foregoing, it is
clear that the best answer is (b) since it places the facts in the hands of the
audit committee and lets the committee decide how to proceed with fact find-
ing and appropriate actions.
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2. Assume that you are back in your capacity as the GRA accounting inves-
tigator. Before you are able to depose Charlie Kist, the audit committee
of Magnificent Stallions hires counsel, completes an investigation, fires
both Kist and Consigliera, and offers to give the GRA a copy of the report
of its counsel. Based on the factors used by the SEC that are listed at the
beginning of the chapter, and keeping in mind the information in the
investigation case summary, what facts would you cite as supporting
more stringent penalties to be imposed on Magnificent Stallions? 
(a) The apparent lack of an investigation until after the GRA became
involved in its investigation
(b) The clear intent of the CEO and the CFO to engage in willful mis-
conduct
(c) The enterprise-wide nature of the misconduct
(d) The significant price decline in the company’s shares
(e) Answers (a), (b) and (d)
(f) All of the above
Practitioner Response: This problem asks you to assess the facts in light
of what appears to be the sudden awakening of the company’s audit com-
mittee. Answer (a) seems to be correct, since the GRA had already talked to
Bertha Reed by the time the audit committee appears to have gotten its act
together and pursued this matter. Answer (b) is also correct, as whatever
took place seems to have been planned and intended to allow Magnificent
Stallions to avoid writing off the bad loans. Answer (c) is a little problem-
atic, however, as it is difficult to conclude that this is an enterprise-wide
scheme given (1) the testimony of Bertha Reed concerning the efforts of the
CEO and CFO to exclude others from the securitization transaction, and (2)
her willingness to testify in spite of the efforts of others to cause her to hire
counsel. If you assume those efforts originated with Kist and Consigliera,
this factor would not argue that the organization is “rotten to the core.”
Answer (d) is correct, however, because the case status report makes it clear
that investors have suffered significant harm as a result of the conduct in
question. If you agree that answer (c) is incorrect, the correct answer is (e). 
One point deserves elaboration with respect to this problem and answer
(d). An outside observer might argue that the investors have already suf-
fered enough as a result of the price decline in the company’s stock, and
penalizing the company for this would seem to be adding insult to injury for
the stockholders. The SEC Staff is sensitive to this issue and, for that rea-
son, will often seek injunctive relief against the company (seeking to have
the company agree to an injunction that it will not violate the 1934 Act in
the future) and a consent order on a simple “books and records” violation.
The culpable individual officers and directors, meantime, are often left look-
ing at permanent officer and director bars, civil monetary penalties, and
102(e) orders against chief financial officers and controllers. 
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3. Assume the same set of facts described in the immediately preceding
question. What facts would you cite in support of leniency for the penal-
ty to be imposed on Magnificent Stallions? 
(a) Prompt action being taken by the audit committee to address the
misconduct
(b) How the misconduct was uncovered
(c) The fact that the audit committee was informed of the misconduct
(d) The fact that the company performed a full and fair investigation
4. Assume the situation is resolved as described in question 2 above. If you
were asked by your branch chief to consider whether the GRA should
bring civil charges against Magnificent Stallions’ audit firm, what theo-
ry or theories would you consider as being a reasonable basis upon
which the audit firm might be charged? 
(a) Failure to determine whether Magnificent Stallions had financial
exposure to Benetti or Global Insurance for loan losses experienced
in the securitized portfolio
(b) Lack of follow-up as to red flags that should have been recognized
before market reaction brought attention to company’s nondisclo-
sure
(c) Failure to notify management and the audit committee of an illegal
act and provide notification to the GRA under “SEC equivalent”
Section 10A
(d) Failure to notify the GRA that their resignation was, or should have
been, due to disagreements in accounting policies or principles
Practitioner Response: As outlined in the previous question, the facts
support answer (a) being the only answer that would point toward the com-
pany being granted some leniency. Answer (b) is incorrect because the mis-
conduct was uncovered by the GRA and/or the CAL Hedge Fund, rather than
by the company. Answer (c) is not correct because the audit committee would
appear to have become “self-informed” after Kist has already received his
notice of deposition and Bertha Reed has already appeared before the GRA.
In other words, the audit committee and the board were not informed of the
misconduct by the executive officers (who obviously were the wrongdoers in
the case of Kist and Consigliara) of the company, but instead were informed
as a result of events transpiring. Answer (d) is not obviously wrong on its
face, but the facts are intended to cause you to question how the company
could have conducted a thorough investigation of the situation in the time
that remained before Kist’s deposition. If a “full and fair” investigation was
conducted, one would assume that it would take some weeks, whereas a
“truncated” investigation could be done quickly if the intent was to assign
blame and attempt to put this situation in the past. 
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Practitioner Response: This question is a straightforward one, but the
answers are not so easily determined. First, since the case summary makes
it clear that Magnificent Stallions is on a December 31 year end, it is clear
that the audit firm did not audit the June 30 numbers. The question then
becomes (1) is there any evidence in the record that the year end audited
financial statements should have contained a loan loss reserve, and (2) did
the audit firm comply with the SAS No. 100, Interim Financial Information
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 725), review standards in
completing the review of the June 30 statements? The case summary does
not have information about loan loss reserves for year end or about the
nature of the review, although an investigator would obviously want to
review that information. Given the facts, answer (a) is not the best choice
here, because the securitization took place in a period that was not yet audit-
ed, so you would assume that normal review procedures would not call for a
detailed examination of the voluminous documents generated in a securiti-
zation. Conversely, if you chose answer (a) under the theory that the securi-
tization transaction was an isolated financial transaction that deserved
more scrutiny because, among other things, the transaction allowed
Magnificent Stallions to make its numbers and was completed at the June
30 quarter end, there is at least some basis for concluding answer (a) may be
correct. Answer (b) is not the best answer given the facts now in hand. With
the exception of the securitization being an isolated but significant financial
transaction that deserves scrutiny, as well as the timing falling immediate-
ly prior to the end of the quarter, there are not facts that support allegations
that “red flags” were overlooked. Moreover, keep in mind that we are not
talking about red flags that arise in the course of an audit, but only in the
context of a review. Arguably, the record does not support the conclusion
that the auditors ignored obvious red flags when conducting their review,
although one could envision such a charge if more facts were developed. A
good example: if the auditors had found out about the side letter.
Answer (c) is also incorrect on its face, as Section 10A requires the audi-
tor, in the context of an audit, to take the three steps of (1) determining if an
illegal act took place, (2) determining the possible effect of the illegal act on
the financial statements, and (3) informing management and the audit com-
mittee. This is not to imply that an illegal act, if uncovered in a review,
would not require 10A equivalent treatment, but the case facts do not sup-
port the conclusion that the audit firm had knowledge of any illegal acts. Of
any of the answers provided, answer (d) is likely the best basis upon which
charges might be pursued against the audit firm. It appears that at the time
the firm resigned as auditor, it must have (or should have) had knowledge
that whatever accounting policies and procedures were employed in connec-
tion with the securitization were at variance with GAAP and Regulation S-
K. The case summary indicates that the resignation of the audit firm con-
tained no statement about disagreements concerning accounting policies and
procedures, albeit that the facts would seemingly “cry out” for such a state-
ment in the resignation letter. 
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5. Assume that you headed up the audit team on Magnificent Stallions’
account. At the conclusion of the December 31 audit, you posted an
increase in loan loss reserves of $1.2 million to the schedule of proposed
adjustments and Kist declined to record that adjustment, under the the-
ory that the adjustment was not material to MSI’s financial statements
taken as a whole. If you were asked to discuss this proposed adjustment
with the audit committee, what points would you cite in support of
recording the adjustment? 
(a) As the racehorse owners’ loans were material to MSI’s business, the
loan loss reserve is a critical accounting estimate that the audit com-
mittee needs to closely examine and about which it should chal-
lenge/question management
(b) The failure to establish an appropriate reserve is not in accordance
with GAAP
(c) SAB No. 99 requires a qualitative and quantitative analysis of mate-
riality, and strictly looking at the dollar amount of the proposed
reserve does not conclude the materiality analysis
(d) As a prerequisite to the issuance of an unqualified audit report, the
reserve would have to be established if the lack of a reserve would
cause the financial statements not to be presented in conformity
with GAAP
(e) All of the above
Practitioner Response: The correct answer is (e), in that each of the
answers given is correct. Based on the dollar amounts of the loans and with-
out other information from the balance sheet, it is prudent to assume that
the loans were material to MSI’s business. This conclusion is supported by
“earnings” of $16 million reported at June 30, 2002, which places the amount
of the loans in a context that almost inevitably requires you to conclude that
the loans are material. Since loan loss reserves would be a critical account-
ing estimate given the materiality of the loan amounts, the audit committee
should be discussing the amount reserved with management and challeng-
ing a conclusion that appears to be designed to maintain earnings. This is
particularly true given the macro facts cited in the case summary, including
deteriorating economic conditions and the references to well-publicized
financial difficulties of certain racehorse owners, which should naturally
cause loan loss reserves to get more attention. Answers (b) and (c) are clear
and correct on their face, and recite both GAAP and SAB No. 99
“Materiality” doctrines. Answer (d) is a harsh result but one that would have
to be discussed with the audit committee if the audit firm was complying
with GAAS and it was encountering resistance from management to booking
what was otherwise a proper and appropriate reserve.
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6. Which facts would you consider most relevant if asked to evaluate the
institution of a Rule 102(e) proceeding against Charlie Kist, keeping in
mind the Rule 102(e) standards requiring (1) intentional or knowing
conduct, (2) a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct, or (3)
repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, which results in violations
of applicable professional standards? 
7. Let’s assume you are planning the taking of Charlie Kist’s deposition.
Describe the basic areas you would want to cover in his testimony and
the kinds of questions you would want to ask Kist in order to attempt to
confirm facts that are critical to your case.
Practitioner Response: One way to answer this question is to consider the
facts that support each of the three standards that are described in Rule
102(e). As to knowing or intentional conduct, a Rule 102(e) proceeding is sup-
ported by facts that indicate MSI had agreed to cover loan losses before the
insurance policy issued by Global would be called upon, if Kist knew of this
agreement; that the securitization transaction was completed at the end of
the quarter and is the only way that MSI could have met the Street’s earn-
ings expectations, implying that Kist had to have knowingly facilitated or
assisted in the securitization transaction to reach projected earnings; that
Kist knew of the deteriorating racehorse owners’ loan performance; and that
absent the transaction taking place, MSI’s earnings would have fallen pre-
cipitously. 
As to highly unreasonable conduct, Kist had a responsibility as CFO to
assure that MSI did not materially overstate its earnings, as appears to have
been the case, particularly given the facts that (1) the securitization was a
quarter-end transaction, (2) without the loans having been transferred to the
VIE, the expected rate of loan delinquencies could have negated MSI’s entire
quarterly profit, (3) although a stretch, the size of the B and C tranches in
the securitization, which total 30% of the securitized principal amount,
should have warranted heightened scrutiny of the underlying loans, and (4)
the auditors were evidently not informed of all relevant facts and circum-
stances. Similarly, if the failure to (1) establish an appropriate reserve, (2)
properly account for the securitization, (3) disclose the loan delinquency
rates, (4) disclose the on-going liability of MSI for loan losses, and (5) disclose
the deteriorating loan performance as well as the purpose of the securitiza-
tion to the auditors, are each considered repeat instances of unreasonable
conduct that culminated in the misstatement of income, then these repeated
instances of unreasonable conduct provide a basis for 102(e) claims against
Kist.
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Practitioner Response: Setting aside the obvious questions you’d like to
ask but are unlikely to get a response to (such as, why did you perpetrate
this fraud?), here are some of the basic areas and examples of questions you
would ask. The following list is not meant to be exhaustive, rather repre-
sentative of what areas an investigator would want to cover. 
Accounting
1. What kind of loan loss analysis was performed at December 31 and prior
to the securitization?
2. What means were used to measure and monitor loan performance in each
portfolio (subsidiary and racehorse owners)?
3. How were loan delinquencies monitored? What were historical collection
rates? What criteria were used to determine collectibility in connection
with loan maturity and extensions? 
4. What critical accounting policies and estimates bore on the loan account-
ing? Were these consistently applied? 
5. Who were the borrowers? What collateral analysis had been performed on
the loans? What support in the way of financial statements, guarantees,
security, and UCC filings had been made to protect the interests of MSI
and, later, the VIE? 
Securitization
1. How were the tranches of the securitization differentiated? What per-
formance criteria were associated with the B and C tranches?
2. What assurances did MSI provide any party that the loans were col-
lectible? How were those assurances provided?
3. Did MSI have any on-going or contingent liability with respect to the
loans? What documents bore on this continued liability? Were these doc-
uments made available to MSI’s auditors?
4. What estimates were adopted/used in the accounting for the securitiza-
tion? Did those estimates differ from estimates used by MSI when the
loans were still on its books? 
Management/Board
1. Who from MSI was responsible for negotiating, structuring and closing
the securitization transaction? What accounting personnel were involved
in these activities?
2. What was the board or audit committee’s role in this transaction?
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3. Did the board or audit committee understand the accounting implications
of the securitization? Was there an audit committee financial expert or
did the audit committee have an opportunity to consult with an outside
expert as to the accounting to be accorded the securitization transaction?
Did the auditors discuss the accounting implications of the transaction
with the board or audit committee?
4. Had the board or audit committee reviewed the company’s critical
accounting estimates with management? If so, when? Were loan losses
and reserves discussed? Were any critical accounting policies established
or modified within the last two years (Regulation S-K audited balance
sheet period) that would have had a bearing on the loan accounting? 
5. What was the CEO’s role in the negotiation, structuring, and closing of
the securitization? Which board members signed resolutions authorizing
the execution of agreements prepared in connection with the securitiza-
tion?
6. Did the CEO or you (Kist) have any conversations with investment
bankers from Dynasty or Moss that led you to believe that either firm
understood the negative implications of the securitization transaction
before the filing of the 10-Q?
7. To your knowledge, did the CEO or anyone else employed by the compa-
ny or affiliated as a director sell, pledge, borrow against, or establish
derivative positions with respect to their shareholdings in MSI at anytime
from and after December 31, 2001 and until at least 48 hours after the fil-
ing of the 10-Q? Did you engage in any of these transactions during the
same time period? 
8. Did MSI have a trading policy in place at the time these trades took place?
Did MSI have a code of ethics in place during this period? Who was sub-
ject to it? 
9. Who from the company attended the second conference call when it
attempted to explain that the securitization accounting was proper? Who
prepared and reviewed the press release filed by the company under cover
of the 8-K?
Review
1. What information did the accountants review pertaining to the securiti-
zation?
2. Did the accountants raise any issues with management or the audit com-
mittee at the time of their review? After the review and the filing of the
10-Q?
3. Was a review opinion issued?
4. Did the accountants issue a comfort letter in connection with the securi-
tization?
5. Did the accountants indicate that they disagreed with the accounting
used by the company with respect to the loans outstanding at December
31, 2001 or with respect to the securitization? 
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8. Assume that you accept the proposition that morality cannot be legis-
lated, but that penalties and consequences serve to deter misconduct by
setting examples of wrongdoers. If you wanted to use this case for “max-
imum deterrent” effect, what penalties would you seek against the CEO
and Kist if it is established that they intended to use the securitization
to meet the Street’s earnings expectations? (Hint: think about the
charges that have been lodged against executive officers of companies
such as Adelphia, Enron, Healthsouth, Qwest, Tyco and WorldCom.) 
Practitioner Response: The following are civil charges that likely would
be leveled against officers in the positions of Consigliera and Kist: 
— fraudulent financial reporting; 
— filing of false and misleading disclosure documents with GRA;
— failure to maintain complete and accurate accounting records; 
— making false statements to MSI’s auditors; 
— aiding and abetting filing of false and misleading financial information;
— administrative proceeding to suspend or bar Kist from practicing before
GRA as a certified public accountant;
— administrative actions to bar Consigliera and Kist from serving as officers
or directors of public companies;
— disgorgement of any proceeds of stock trading or bonus compensation
derived from the securitization transaction or the avoidance of any losses
occasioned by that transaction.
Executive officers are also subject to civil monetary penalties that are
fines meant to punish misconduct. Criminal charges against executive offi-
cers who are shown to have participated in fraudulent activities used to be
unheard of, but are becoming much more common as an instrument to pun-
ish wrongdoers and deter misconduct by others. Although criminal cases are
subject to a higher standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt), it remains
a fact that criminal charges are a very real possibility for executives in fraud-
related cases, even if convictions are not assured. 
In January 2003, the Colorado state house of representatives passed a
bill that would reclassify accounting fraud from a class 3 misdemeanor to a
class 3 felony, with penalties on conviction increasing to a period of 4 to 12
years in prison. The bill did not define “accounting fraud” and left this to the
prosecutors’ determination. However, violators of the state accountancy
practice act would be subject to prosecution under this bill. The bill failed for
lack of enforcement appropriations but is indicative of the greater conse-
quences to which auditors are exposed, not to mention chief financial and
accounting officers. 
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SUGGESTED READINGS
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1337, entitled
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Solucorp Industries Ltd., et al,
dated October 31, 2000, is the first civil injunctive action brought against
an auditor for violating the Section 10A reporting requirements. The case
can also be found by referencing Litigation Release No. 16785 issued by the
SEC on October 31, 2000 [see www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr16785.htm]. 
The final rule issued by the Commission “Disclosure in Management’s
Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and
Aggregate Contractual Obligations” [Release No. 33-8182], was adopted
January 28, 2003. The overview and discussion in the final rule of the
amendments to the proposed rule are particularly illuminating as to the
issues considered by the Commission in arriving at disclosure objectives
and thresholds for variable interest entities and off-balance sheet transac-
tions. Any company using off-balance sheet arrangements and its auditors
should be intimately familiar with the disclosure called for by the final rule
as well as the factors cited by the Commission in the rule that may increase
or modify the amount and nature of information to be disclosed. 
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CHAPTER 6
CASE 6—
MEGATRON CORP.: YOU ARE THE
CORPORATE CONTROLLER
The issue of personal exposure for non-disclosure of material information
about one’s employer is now an issue of great concern. The regulatory and
political environments have evolved from treating disclosure failures as
strictly civil matters to a targeted effort to prosecute criminally the “bad
actors” in cases of intentional non-disclosure. This chapter’s case study
highlights issues related to non-disclosure at the corporate level that come
to the attention of non-officer financial managers and controllers, particu-
larly those issues surrounding the discovery, reporting and resolution of
disclosure issues created by the actions of other employees or executive
officers. Given the more frequent involvement of chief executive officers
and chief financial officers in conduct leading to active concealment or non-
disclosure of material information, non-executive financial managers and
controllers will increasingly be called upon to question both judgments and
information that portend personal liability if proper disclosure hasn’t been
made. 
Intimately related to the content, quality, and timeliness of disclosure
documents is the issue of sales of securities by executive officers, directors
and control persons once disclosure has been made publicly available. With
insider stock sales now generally subject to accelerated disclosure require-
ments within two business days of the transaction date, and disclosure now
required for option re-pricings, re-grants and cancellations, insider stock
sales are now scrutinized as never before. Financial officers and managers
must be cognizant of factors such as what constitutes material non-public
information, when and how insider stock transactions must be disclosed,
compliance with trading window and other company policies, and how
(through what route) information should be disclosed that may bear on
insider stock sales or purchases. In those instances where the reporting
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company has in-house counsel or an in-house compliance officer, certain of
these duties may fall to others, but small companies often rely on financial
officers and managers to take some part in monitoring stock sales and dis-
closure. 
FOCUS POINTS
“As we move forward, companies, their management, their directors and
the gatekeepers who serve them must look beyond just conforming to the
letter of the new laws and regulations. They must redefine corporate gov-
ernance with practices that go beyond mere adherence to new rules and
demonstrate ethics, integrity, honesty and transparency.” Speech by SEC
Chairman Donaldson to the National Association for Business Economics,
March 24, 2003. 
“Revelations of corporate mismanagement, malfeasance and/or incom-
petence have undermined the world’s financial markets in a profound way
. . . We need to be mindful of the fact that morality and ethics cannot be
legislated into existence. Government controls alone—too often paternalis-
tic—will never be a solution if individuals and individual firms are not
upholding their own end of simple business ethics through their own effec-
tive compliance. Internal controls and the culture of an organization are
basic structural aspects to reinforce the inherent nature of most people to
do the right thing.” Speech by SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins to the
International Financial Law Review, March 25, 2003. 
In considering the excerpted portions of these speeches, ask yourself
what message you think the Commission is trying to send in these speech-
es. One answer: the Commission is firmly convinced of the role that
organizational structures, governance and regulation play in
defining corporate conduct; however, individual integrity and the
demonstration of appropriate values are ultimately determinative
of organizational behavior. 
Ask yourself: as a financial executive, officer, manager, accountant or
auditor, do I conduct myself (practice with) integrity and do I demonstrate
values that have a positive impact on my company’s or firm’s actions as an
organization? 
REGULATORY ISSUES
Nearly all public companies maintain “trading window” policies. These
policies generally provide that executive officers, directors, financial offi-
cers and managers with access to (or who are aware of) financial and other
material non-public information, together with control shareholders that
are privy to non-public information, cannot buy or sell the company’s secu-
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rities except when the “trading window” is open. The window usually opens
about 72 hours after the company has made its quarterly or annual earn-
ings release, so long as the earnings release provides clear, complete and
customary earnings information. The window closes within 20 days or so of
its opening. This is the case because a later closing would permit stock pur-
chases or sales by insiders to occur at a point during the following quarter
when the insiders would, once again, be potentially exposed to inside infor-
mation concerning the company’s performance. Trading window policies
exist to protect a company from having its insiders appropriate what
belongs to the corporation (the information about its performance) and to
protect insiders from being accused of trading on non-public information at
times when the public typically would not be privy to such information. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined information as being material if
“there is a substantial likelihood that the fact . . . would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” [See Forbes online article “Confusing
Disclosure with Deception” by Dave Simons at www.forbes.com/2002/02/
15/0215simons.html.] The FASB defined materiality in Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information as a fact that, “in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, the magnitude . . . is such that it is probable that the judgment of
a reasonable person . . . would have been changed or influenced by the
inclusion or correction of the item.” SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB)
No. 99 “Materiality” asked reporting companies and their auditors to reject
a 5% threshold or other rules of thumb in favor of testing both quantitative
and qualitative factors when judging whether a financial misstatement is
material. Taken together, you could define material facts as those which,
if known to an investor using reasonable judgment, would have probably
affected his or her investment decision, in light of the quantitative and qual-
itative considerations then existing that relate to such facts. As the case
study which follows illustrates, judgment calls inherent in these situations
Avoid this Pitfall: The mere existence of a trading window
policy cannot, and will not, insulate insiders from liability
for trading on non-public information. The SEC Staff has
reiterated time and again that the overriding question is
whether or not the insiders had information in their posses-
sion or were aware of information that was both material
and non-public, regardless of whether the trading took place
in a trading window. So, the question boils down to what is
material, assuming that the company insiders know infor-
mation that has not been shared with the public.
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are now much more fraught with peril, so non-executive financial officers
and managers are best advised to approach these determinations with a
highly conservative mind set.
Under the Rule, insiders can adopt a written trading plan, enter into
binding contracts, or provide third parties such as brokers with specific
trading instructions, formula-based instructions, or complete discretion to
trade in the company’s securities. So long as the insider is not aware of
non-public information at the time the plan is put into effect, and so long
as any party with delegated authority to trade is not aware of material
non-public information, trades can take place regardless of whether the
insider is aware of material non-public information. Of course, the insider
cannot exercise any discretion over the amount and timing of trades made
under the plan. 
Although the adoption of a Rule 10b5-1 plan provides an excellent
defense against insider trading charges, and may even permit shares to be
sold during the time a trading window is otherwise closed, many compa-
nies have not encouraged insiders to use these plans. Why? Simply put, the
companies recognize that 10b5-1 plans will generally be used to facilitate
selling of shares, and companies that permit the adoption of such plans
may be inviting more pressure on already depressed stock prices. (As an
aside, the adoption of a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan doesn’t allow insiders to
exceed the Rule 144 volume limitations, and doesn’t provide protection if
the trades result in “short-swing” purchases and sales within a six month
period.) 
ETHICAL GUIDES
“Firstly, because our every action has a universal dimension, a poten-
tial impact on others’ happiness, ethics are necessary as a means to
ensure that we do not harm others.” Ethics for a New Millennium, by
the 14th Dalai Lama.
“Good instincts usually tell you what to do long before your head has
figured it out.” Michael Burke.
“There is no pillow so soft as a clear conscience.” French Proverb. 
Practitioner’s Note: Recognizing the potential for ever-expanding liability
for insiders that buy and sell shares even during trading windows, the SEC
Staff adopted Rule 10b5-1 “Trading ‘on the Basis of ’ Material Nonpublic
Information in Insider Trading Cases” in August 2000 to provide an affir-
mative defense to charges against insiders of trading on material non-public
information. [See Final Rule “Selective Dislosure and Insider Trading,”
Release No. 33-7881, at www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P12_1308.]
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“Laws control the lesser man. Right conduct controls the greater one.”
Chinese Proverb.
“The time is always right to do what is right.” Martin Luther King, Jr.
“Never be bullied into silence. Never allow yourself to be made a vic-
tim. Accept no one’s definition of your life; define yourself.” Harvey
Fierstein. 
“The Rules of Professional Conduct are based on the premise that the
public and the business community rely on sound financial reporting
and on professional competence . . . [the] obligations which the Rules
of Professional Conduct are intended to enforce include . . . to main-
tain high standards of personal conduct in all matters affecting fitness
to practice public accounting.” Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct, Section 10:15-39-1(a).
“The Rules of Conduct are intended to have application to all kinds of
professional services performed in the practice of public accountancy
. . . and to apply as well to all licensees, whether or not engaged in the
practice of public accountancy, except where the wording of a Rule
clearly indicates that the applicability is more limited.” Vermont
Office of Professional Regulation Act Rules, Part 10, Section 10.1. 
* * * *
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE CORPORATE
CONTROLLER
This case study highlights issues related to non-disclosure at the corporate
level that come to the attention of non-executive financial managers and
controllers, particularly those issues surrounding the discovery, reporting
and resolution of disclosure issues created by the actions of other employ-
ees or executive officers. You’re the corporate controller in this instance.
How would you respond to this case study’s circumstances? 
Megatron’s Business
Formed initially to manufacture a small line of precision medical devices
including orthopedic screws and surgical staplers in the U.S., Megatron
has evolved into a multinational business that produces precision medical
devices and joint replacement products. As the trend toward production
outsourcing for precision medical devices and joint replacement products
became more pronounced, Megatron found itself receiving orders from
many of the largest healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical device com-
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panies in the U.S. and Europe. In the last few years, Megatron has made
a concerted effort to penetrate markets in the Far East, and in 2002 opened
a contract manufacturing facility in Singapore to serve its customers. This
facility is now being operated through a wholly-owned Singapore sub-
sidiary, Megatron Manufacturing Pte. Ltd. Megatron’s U.S. facilities are
registered in accordance with Good Manufacturing Practices established
by the FDA, and its international facilities, including Megatron
Manufacturing Pte., are ISO 9001 certified as meeting strict requirements
for quality assurance in design, development, production, installation and
servicing. 
By early 2003, Megatron Manufacturing Pte. had begun development
of a new line of titanium hip, knee and other joint replacements that prom-
ised significant weight savings for patients needing knee, hip and other
joint replacements. As weight savings translated into reduced time for
rehabilitation, word quickly spread among Megatron’s Far East customers
and the hospitals they served about how Megatron Manufacturing’s new
technology represented a real advance in joint replacement and repair, not
to mention rehabilitation time. After favorable reviews of Megatron
Manufacturing’s titanium joint replacements appeared in several
Japanese, Korean and Chinese medical journals, a number of medical
device marketing companies and hospital chains began ordering titanium
knee and hip replacements. 
Just as demand for these products was hitting its stride, a doctor in
China reported to Megatron and the Chinese government that one of his
patients had developed a severe immune response following a hip replace-
ment. In essence, the patient’s body had begun rejecting the titanium hip
that had been used to replace an ailing hip, and the doctor had been forced
to perform another surgery in which a non-metallic hip made of composite
materials was substituted for the titanium Megatron Manufacturing hip.
Megatron’s senior management in the U.S. and at its Singapore subsidiary
hired highly respected orthopedic surgeons to review all of the available
data on the patient’s rejection of the titanium hip replacement, and asked
for assistance from specialists in infectious disease and immune response
to evaluate the underlying causes of the rejection. Despite these efforts, no
definitive reason was found for the patient’s immune response, and
demand for Megatron Manufacturing’s titanium joint replacements con-
tinued to rise at a record pace. By the end of 2003, Megatron
Manufacturing’s facility in Singapore was running near capacity, and the
management, sales and marketing departments had received bonus pool
allocations that exceeded nearly all other international bonus pools paid by
Megatron. 
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In February 2004, the Chinese Health Ministry sent the following
memorandum by fax to Megatron’s U.S. headquarters and to Megatron
Manufacturing’s facility in Singapore: 
CHINESE HEALTH MINISTRY
Beijing, China
TO MEGATRON: ADVISE YOU THAT DR. THOMAS YAU OF BEIJING
UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL HAS NOTIFIED THE MINISTRY OF FOUR
PATIENTS WITH SYMPTOMS OF IMMUNE REJECTION WHO HAVE
RECEIVED KNEE REPLACEMENTS USING YOUR TITANIUM PROD-
UCT. MINISTRY OFFICIALS ARE INVESTIGATING. SYMPTOMS
APPEAR TO BE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF PATIENT WHO REJECTED
HIP REPLACEMENT LAST YEAR. SUGGEST YOU CONTACT DR. YAU
TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER AND ADVISE HOSPITALS OF ISSUE.
CAUSE CURRENTLY UNDETERMINED, BUT WILL NOTIFY YOU
WHEN FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE. CHM by MINISTER
CHANG 
The Storm Arrives 
The chief executive officer of Megatron U.S., Gareth Davis, is immediately
informed of the fax from the Chinese health ministry and takes action to
notify the medical committee of the board, the advisory board, and asks
several physicians from the U.S. and Europe to immediately proceed to
Beijing to meet with Dr. Yau. Within 24 hours, Megatron has four doctors
on the ground, a team of researchers conducting comprehensive lab tests,
and an intensive review underway of all clinical and other data available
to the Chinese Health Ministry. Within 48 hours, Megatron personnel have
taken action to advise the FDA, SEC and the stock exchange on which its
shares are listed of the Chinese inquiry, and of the four new cases of
patients’ immune systems rejecting the titanium joint replacements. 
Even before Megatron can provide a full report to the FDA, the media
begins to pick up rumors of some issue with the Megatron joint replace-
ment products and tries to contact senior executives and a spokesperson at
Megatron. The company issues no comment in response to the first call. By
the time the second phone call is received from the media asking questions
about rumored difficulties with its products, Megatron takes action to
request a trading halt in its shares and issues a full press release that
describes the contact from the Chinese Health Ministry, the fact that an
intensive review of all available medical data is underway, and advising
that it will provide updates via press releases that will also be posted on its
web site and filed with the SEC under cover of Form 8-K as soon as infor-
mation becomes available. Later that day, Megatron advises the market in
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a press release that it will be holding daily conference calls to update
investors and the medical community on its investigation and soliciting
information from any other physicians who may have encountered similar
patient reactions to the titanium joint replacement products. The following
day, Megatron is contacted by two more doctors from South Africa who
indicate they had patients who experienced moderate rejection reactions
that were overcome by use of a suite of anti-immune drugs. Megatron
makes immediate disclosure of this information and offers to retain the
services of these physicians to assist in the investigation underway in
China. 
As can be expected, Megatron’s stock price is hit hard in the first few
days following its disclosure of this information. Down as much as 41%, the
market eventually begins to stabilize with a loss in value of about 30%
from the pre-disclosure time frame. Megatron’s CEO is unfazed, however,
noting in the following conference calls that the company is going to do
everything in its power to (1) assure the safety of patients, and (2) provide
updated and complete disclosure of whatever facts the investigation devel-
ops. The CEO also undertakes to share all of the information developed in
the course of the investigation with the FDA, the Chinese Health Ministry,
South African regulators, and the healthcare community. Although bar-
raged by media questions and investor calls, Megatron’s investor relations
department and its senior executives continue to hold daily conference
calls and to provide regular updates on the investigation. 
Avoid this Pitfall: When faced with a crisis in confidence,
many senior executives resort to the “ostrich” approach of
burying their heads in the sand. Adopting a bunker mental-
ity is generally not the best way to handle a crisis, particu-
larly if the company is accountable to outside third parties
such as industry regulators. The example given above is not
atypical; stock price declines often result from questions
about product performance, product recalls, and similar
events, and the company frequently learns of this type of
information in a third-hand fashion. It is the way in which
the company responds to this information that is the key. If
investors, regulators and the media believe that the compa-
ny is being candid, forthcoming and providing full disclo-
sure, presumably because the company is doing so, the com-
pany will often (not always, however) receive the benefit of
the doubt. On the other hand, if executives clam up and
offer repeated “no comment” responses, and if internal com-
pany information is not shared with regulators, it is almost
inevitable that the company will be vilified by the media
and other constituencies. 
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In the meantime, Megatron Manufacturing has suspended shipments
of its titanium products and is conducting its own investigation of the
plant, quality control records, and production information relating to the
time when the titanium joint replacements were produced. Although minor
discrepancies are found in the course of this review, no facts come out that
would explain or relate to patients’ rejection of the products. 
After two weeks of continued uncertainty, the Chinese Health
Ministry, Megatron medical staff and the doctors from South Africa
announce their findings. To the great relief of Megatron employees, the
announcement of findings indicates that the suite of anti-immune drugs
used by the Chinese doctors had varied slightly from the drug combination
used in South Africa. The doctors attending the announcement indicated
their belief that the use of the specific combination of anti-immune drugs
in South Africa had in fact prevented the type of rejection experienced in
China, and the Chinese doctors present stated that they intended to con-
tinue using Megatron’s joint replacement products with the South African
anti-immune drug combination. 
The next day, Megatron’s stock climbed 15% and, after conducting
additional quality control checks and a thorough plant review, Megatron
Manufacturing re-started production of its joint replacement products.
Amid the uncertainty, however, some customer orders had been cancelled
and new orders began to materialize at a much slower rate than before the
announcement of the Chinese investigation. By the last two weeks of the
March 2004 quarter, sales appeared to be headed for a 20% decline over
the previous quarter, instead of the 20% increase that was previously
expected. 
At this point, the president of Megatron Manufacturing Singapore
called his executive vice president of sales and marketing and instructed
him to inform the sales force that all efforts were to be used to secure sales
before the end of the quarter so as to limit the extent of sales declines. A
week later, but a full week before the end of the quarter, Megatron
Manufacturing received an order from a Hong-Kong based hospital chain,
KaeLoo Health, for joint replacement products. KaeLoo Health was given
generous payment terms, but agreed to purchase and took delivery of suf-
ficient products that the sales decline for Megatron Manufacturing for the
March 31 quarter was only 10%, rather than the projected 20% decline.
Megatron U.S. internal auditors reviewed the sale documentation and its
terms, after which Megatron Manufacturing was congratulated on making
a remarkable comeback by its U.S. parent. 
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You Get the Call—Now What? 
Back in the U.S., you have witnessed these events from your comfortable
position as corporate controller in charge of international operations.
Having received the report from the internal audit team that the March 31
numbers were verified for Megatron Manufacturing Pte. and the other
international operations that are consolidated in your reporting segment,
you assemble information from the other reporting segments and begin
compiling the March 31 10-Q for a review by your boss, Chief Financial
Officer Maggie Snowdon, and the auditors. Megatron is just a few days
from filing when you get a phone call from one of your good friends in
Singapore who used to work with you in the U.S. and who is still employed
by Megatron. 
“Tad, how are things back there in the old U.S.of A? Are you still work-
ing your way up the corporate ladder so you’ll be running Megatron soon?”
“Now listen here, Linda, you may think you can get away with talking
to me like that just because you’re in marketing now instead of finance, but
just remember who still signs those paychecks,” you reply. “Besides, I’m
not over 40 yet, so I don’t think I’ll have to take over anytime soon, not
unless both Maggie and Gareth keel over from heart attacks—although I
suppose that’s possible given their work schedules!” 
“Well,” Linda said, “What I have to pass along might qualify you for
the heart attack, not to say that Maggie and Gareth won’t have one too.”
Taking a long breath, you glance at the clock. “I guess it must be
important for you to call at this hour—isn’t it about midnight over there
now?”
“Yeah, but I’m calling from home, ‘cause I wasn’t sure I wanted to talk
to you from the office. You’ve been following what’s up over here, haven’t
you?”
“I sure have,” you reply. “Like everybody else over here, my work
schedule just started to return to the normal 60 hour week from what
seemed like 80 or 100 hours a week. All we’ve been doing is dealing with
the fallout from the titanium joint replacement products for the last
month, but we were happy to see things starting to take a turn for the bet-
ter. You’re not going to tell me that we’ve had a patient rejection there in
Singapore, are you?” you ask tentatively. 
“No, Tad, we haven’t had any patient problems that I know of.” Linda
pauses and remarks, “Maybe I shouldn’t have called you about this . . . I
don’t know, maybe I’m just sticking my nose where it doesn’t belong.”
“Linda, why don’t you let me decide that,” you respond. “If there is
something on your mind, I think you’d feel better sharing it, and I’ll feel
better knowing that I helped out, if I can.” 
There was silence on the phone line for a moment. “That’s just it, Tad,
I don’t know if you can help, or if you should, but I hear what you’re say-
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ing. Do you remember when Maggie and you came in and talked to the
international sales force about accounting for sales, how sales had to be
final, and all that stuff?” 
“Yeah, I remember, Linda. More than anything else, I remember how
many comments we got about how nobody could believe how much the
auditors and the SEC are cracking down on what constitutes a sale.”
“I remember too, Tad, and that’s the problem. Late this afternoon, I
walked into Eric Rogers office, you remember him, don’t you? He’s the exec
vp in charge of marketing for Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and China.
I was just dropping off a contract that I had to get him to sign, which I nor-
mally wouldn’t do since we get all of that done electronically, but I was in
the office anyway and thought I’d talk with him about a new prospect.
When I got to his office, he wasn’t there, so I just threw the contract on his
chair with a note I wrote on one of those sticky-notes. But while I was writ-
ing out the note to him, I glanced down and saw a letter that was sticking
out from under his calendar. I noticed the address that was on the bottom
of the letter, which is what was sticking out, and I just knew that address.
I guess my curiosity got the better of me, and I was thinking about taking
a quick look, when I realized that the address on the bottom of the letter
was for KaeLoo Health, which is one of my accounts in HK. At that point,
I thought maybe I’d better look at it, just in case . . .”
You interject, “You mean, just in case it said something about you?” 
“I guess so. When I read the letter, though, I didn’t know what to do.
See, the letter was addressed to Johnny Cookston, the president of KaeLoo,
and it was from Eric. When I saw it was signed by Eric, I kind of got scared,
because I thought maybe Eric was trying to go over my head, or maybe that
KaeLoo had complained about my handling of their account. But when I
read the letter, that’s when I decided I’d better call you.” 
You wait for Linda to go on, wondering what’s next. 
“I feel a little like a tattletale, Tad, but the letter said that Eric would
personally see to it that any joint replacement products that KaeLoo pur-
chased before March 31 would be resold to another customer if we were
notified of any more patient rejections before the end of the year attribut-
able to the joint replacement products. It also referred to a conversation
that Eric had evidently already had with Johnny on this subject, but when
I got the order, it didn’t have any qualifications or “subject to’s” and I had-
n’t even talked to Johnny about the order.”
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Thinking quickly, you grasp at alternatives. “Are you sure the letter
didn’t predate your order, Linda, or is it possible that there was a contract
addendum? I can’t recall the internal audit team mentioning it, but maybe
Eric already has the alternative customer and was merely trying to accom-
modate KaeLoo since we’ve been trying to get them as a customer for so
long.” 
Avoid this Pitfall: Just as revenue recognition tops the list
of SEC enforcement matters, improper timing of revenue
recognition is the single greatest reason for improper rev-
enue recognition, topping even fictitious revenue and
improper valuations. The SEC’s “Report Pursuant to
Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” (available at
www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox704report.pdf) found that side
letter accounting fraud cases were responsible for 25 cases
out of 126 enforcement matters that involved improper rev-
enue recognition. The most recent enforcement cases that
cited use of side letter agreements that modified contact
terms were Xerox, Sunbeam Corporation and McKesson
HBOC Inc. This is an issue not easily found out or
addressed, but one that requires consideration by manage-
ment, particularly where motive and opportunity are pres-
ent. 
Avoid this Pitfall: Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 99, adopted October 15, 2002, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, AU sec. 316) points out that fraud risks are
increased in circumstances where there are incentives and
pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations. As this was a
quarter-end, rather than year-end, the outside auditors are
not implicated in the case study, although there may be
some question about the appropriate scope of review proce-
dures given these circumstances. Appendix A to SAS No. 99
and the excerpt published under the title “Management
Antifraud Programs and Controls” give considerable guid-
ance about what auditors and management should look for
when evaluating the risk of fraud. Among those that apply
here are:
— financial stability or profitability is threatened; 
— compensation in the form of bonuses may be threatened; 
— transactions close to “period-end;” 
— an “unusual transaction” in the sense that the purchase
was a sizeable one from a new customer. 
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“I am so sorry, Tad, but I’m afraid not. I already thought about the
addendum or the alternative customer, but orders have been dropping so
fast since the patient rejections that there’s no way Eric could have found
another customer to take that dollar amount of products. Just to be sure, I
checked the file, but there are no addendums and, I’m sorry to say, there
isn’t a copy of Eric’s letter in the file either. And Eric’s letter was dated two
days after the day I got the order. Eric never discussed this letter with me
and when I confirmed the sale with our audit staff there was never any dis-
cussion about a right of return, or, about a letter being attached to the con-
tract. If I hadn’t remembered you and Maggie’s educating us about what
constitutes a sale, I might have just blown it off, but as I thought about it,
I just knew that something seemed wrong.”
You are silent, trying to catch your breath as you contemplate what
this means. Linda speaks up, “Tad, is there something we should do? Do
you think I should have gone to Eric with this? What does this mean for
Megatron?” 
The tone of Linda’s voice echoes the fear you are feeling at the
moment, but you maintain a semblance of control. “Did you happen to pick
up a copy of the letter, Linda?” 
“No, I didn’t know where to go get an electronic copy, and it would
have looked funny if someone had caught me walking out of his office with
something signed by Eric that wasn’t even addressed to me. But I swear,
Tad, I read the letter over two or three times and I know what I read.” 
“Linda, I don’t doubt you,” you say. “This is a difficult situation,
though, and I need to think about the right way to deal with it before tak-
ing any action. If you had the letter, it would’ve made things easier, but in
spite of that, we can’t simply ignore this, since if we did and it later came
out, Megatron would be really exposed. Let me think about this tonight
and I’ll give you a call in the morning, your time, to let you know how I
think things should go from here. Don’t worry, though, I will let you know
before I pass this along to anyone else, just in case you get a phone call
from Eric—but remember, since he doesn’t know you saw the letter, I think
the best thing for me to do is to relay the information without identifying
any source, for your protection.” 
Linda expresses her relief and gratitude for your help, at which point
you hang up the phone and begin to process your thoughts. Before you get
too far, however, you are struck by two issues. First, you realize that with
the 10-Q about to be filed, the company’s trading window policy will allow
insiders to begin selling in a few days, and that the recovery by Megatron’s
stock may well result in several of the officers and directors wanting to sell
some shares. You also realize that the KaeLoo contract is certainly imma-
terial to Megatron as a consolidated entity, but may be material to the
Singapore subsidiary and the joint replacement business. You begin to
wonder about these issues and where to go from here as you pick up the
phone to call for help.
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Situational Analysis
1. Assuming you were asked to recommend new internal controls and mon-
itoring activities designed to expose this type of fraud before it took
place, what means would you suggest Megatron use to help identify this
problem?
(a) Review operating results of each significant subsidiary at the parent
level on at least a quarterly basis
(b) Place any product classes experiencing significant sales fluctuations,
order cancellations, regulatory scrutiny or media attention in a spe-
cial review category
(c) Assign additional internal audit staff to review sales and reporting
activities in high-risk areas, particularly those that are within prod-
uct special review categories and that occur within two weeks of
period-end
(d) Require the sales staff to certify that no side letters or any other con-
tract modifications exist as to sales made by them
(e) All of the above
2. Set forth below are several factors that appear to have contributed to the
intent of Eric Rogers to commit fraud (if he did so) at the Singapore sub-
sidiary. Rank these factors in order of importance based on your judg-
ment of the risk of fraud that each presents. 
(a) the phone call from the president of the subsidiary asking Rogers to
tell the sales force to use all efforts possible to secure sales before the
end of the quarter (Rank___) 
(b) the decline in sales attributable to the regulatory and media atten-
tion focused on the joint replacement products (Rank___)
Practitioner Response: In a large organization such as Megatron, it is pos-
sible that some or all of the measures listed in the answers above are being
used, but your recommendation for preventive action would almost assuredly
be directed at implementing all of the measures listed, meaning that the cor-
rect answer is (e). An on-going periodic review by upper management such as
that described in answer (a) would presumably act both to deter wrongful con-
duct at significant subsidiaries and to surface troublesome areas sooner
rather than later. Answer (b) is clearly designed to focus detection resources
on those areas of the business that are most susceptible to fraud based on
changes in the business, regulatory, political, and media environments. Given
the importance of significant changes in these areas, a special review catego-
ry would again tend to surface potential problems early in the review process.
Answer (c) is merely an extension of answer (b), since the assignment of inter-
nal audit staff would be a natural adjunct to special reviews for high risk
areas and for a closer examination of transactions that took place near peri-
od-end.  Answer (d) would only expose a fraud if a salesperson responded
truthfully, but is nonetheless a good procedure to promote accountability.
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(c) an expected decline in the bonus pool at the Singapore subsidiary
following record bonus payments (Rank____) 
(d) the resumption of shipping at the Singapore subsidiary shortly
before quarter-end (Rank___) 
3. What facts in the case study would you cite in favor of the argument that
Megatron is (generally) a highly ethical organization? 
(a) The example set by the chief executive officer in responding quickly
and in a concentrated fashion to the situation once he received the
notification from the Chinese Health Ministry
(b) Megatron’s decision to respond with no comment to the first call
from the media after word leaked about the problems with the joint
replacement products
(c) The announced decision of the CEO to share information about the
medical investigation with the FDA, the Chinese Health Ministry,
the South African regulators and the healthcare community
(d) The fact that the internal audit staff reviewed the documentation
surrounding the sale to KaeLoo
(e) Answers (a), (c) and (d)
(f) All of the above
Practitioner Response: While susceptible to different responses, this
question is designed to get at the three tier hierarchy of fraud risks that are
outlined in SAS No. 99: incentives and pressures, opportunities, and ration-
alizations. Viewed within this context, answer (c) would appear to offer the
greatest incentive for Mr. Rogers to commit fraud, as a reduction in the
bonus pool will have a direct impact on his pocketbook. Answer (a) would
appear to rank next, as the phone call from the president of the subsidiary
would likely create the kind of pressure that would be hard to resist, partic-
ularly given his statement about “using all efforts” to secure sales. The next
factor, at least in the author’s opinion, would be the resumption of produc-
tion shortly before quarter end, answer (d). As Mr. Rogers was not responsi-
ble for manufacturing and might have been able to point to the delayed
resumption of production as a factor that contributed to customer order can-
cellations before the end of the quarter, you can argue that this factor is less
important. Conversely, if inventory levels were low and the resumption in
shipping before quarter-end gave Eric Rogers an even more compressed time
frame to finalize sales and “save the quarter,” you could argue that this fac-
tor may deserve a higher rank. Answer (b) would appear to deserve the low-
est rank since, if anything, this factor justifies a considerable reduction in
sales and, to some extent, provides Eric Rogers with a very good explanation
for why sales fell below expectations. The fact that business and other con-
ditions are unfavorable is, however, one of the indicators of heightened fraud
risk, so it cannot be ignored. 
Chapter 6: Case 6—Megatron Corp. 117
07-Chapter 06.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 117
Practitioner Response: The correct answer to this question is (e), and your
analysis should have begun by focusing on the greatest factor of all: the chief
executive “setting the tone at the top” by creating an example of the type of
behavior that he (and the organization) stood for. Thus, answer (a) is correct
and of the utmost importance in arguing that Megatron is generally a high-
ly ethical organization. Answer (b) is incorrect, due to the fact that a “no com-
ment” response is somewhat inconsistent with the image of Megatron that is
otherwise portrayed by the facts. It is important to note, however, that while
Megatron might have been reluctant to comment on an isolated instance of
a reporter having heard a rumor of this kind, Megatron took prompt and
appropriate action to inform its investors and the public once it was clear
that more than one media source had heard rumors of problems with the
joint replacement products. As a result, Megatron “leveled the playing field”
for investors and the public by ensuring that information reached all market
participants simultaneously (as required by Regulation FD) and that the dis-
closure was timely. 
As to answer (c), the willingness of the chief executive officer to open up
the information channel to both Megatron’s regulatory constituency as well
as the entire healthcare community, in spite of criticism that may have been
forthcoming based on that information, says volumes about the integrity of
the “man at the top.” Too often, companies caught in similar circumstances
clam up and offer up information grudgingly, leaving the inevitable impres-
sion they are hiding something, even if that is not so. Answer (d) is also cor-
rect, even if the internal audit staff might have taken one or two additional
steps to check the sale terms, such as through contacting the customer.
Setting aside the issue of whether the internal audit staff might have done
more, though, the fact remains that either someone asked the internal audit
staff to look into the sale, or Megatron’s internal control and monitoring pro-
cedures were such that a review resulted. In either case, it is clear that
Megatron’s internal control procedures were good enough to focus attention
on the sale, which is something not every company would be able or willing
to do. A few other facts are indicative of the generally good ethical makeup
of Megatron: 
— the fact that Linda was willing to contact you about her having seen the
letter, and seemed genuinely concerned about the company which, given
your conduct and that of almost all of the other employees, indicates that
the employees have a positive feeling about the company; 
— the willingness of the CEO and the entire company to open up the chan-
nels of communication through daily conference calls, press releases and
web site postings; and 
— the fact that Megatron conducted its own internal investigation of the
plant and has gone to great lengths to try and identify the source of the
patient rejections, even at the risk of the company appearing incompetent
or worse.
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers118
07-Chapter 06.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 118
4. After concluding your phone call with Linda, what steps would you take
to address the situation given your position in the company? 
(a) I would send an e-mail to Eric Rogers asking him to confirm the exis-
tence of the letter
(b) I would contact the outside auditors and ask them to review the
transaction
(c) I would circulate an e-mail to the audit committee and Maggie, my
boss, outlining the facts as I know them
(d) I would contact the CEO and the board members and ask them to
fire Eric Rogers
(e) I would contact Maggie but not the audit committee
Practitioner Response: The key to this question lies in your position with
the company, as whatever action you take should be consistent with your
responsibilities and with the chain of command. The best answer here is (c),
because of the fact that you are keeping your direct superior informed at the
same time that you are discharging your responsibility to the audit committee
members by informing them of information that, at a minimum, may impact the
financial statements and the company's reported (or about to be reported) oper-
ating results. 
Answer (a) suffers from several deficiencies, not the least of which is the
fact that giving Rogers advance notice of your knowledge could actually hinder
an internal investigation or permit him to“cover his tracks.” This, in turn, could
actually make it appear to an outside investigator that you were complicit or
even assisting Rogers by putting him on notice that someone had uncovered
what he had done. If you answered with (b), you would certainly get an  “A” for
effort but might get fired as a result. Since the auditors have, based on the facts,
not yet been given a copy of the 10-Q to review, it seems premature to go to them
without raising the issues with your immediate superior and the audit commit-
tee. 
Likewise, answer (d) is aggressive and certainly has to be respected for
seeking the right result, but the failure to go through proper channels seems
obvious here. Moreover, by asking the board to fire Rogers, you are staking out
a position that seems somewhat risky in view of the lack of proof and corrobo-
rating information. If instead you only state the facts to those you are account-
able to, and let them determine the appropriate course of action, you are con-
ducting yourself in a responsible, but prudent, fashion.
Finally, answer (e) may be a good choice to foster relations with Maggie,
but may end up posing a dilemma if Maggie didn’t promptly inform the audit
committee. Based on the audit committee’s duties and the obligations you owe
to it, answer (c) still appears preferable.
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5. Assume that you consult with Maggie, the CFO, about this situation,
and the two of you turn this over to the audit committee. The audit com-
mittee examines the paperwork that is available (no letter surfaces from
Rogers to KaeLoo) and interviews Rogers and Linda. Ultimately, the
committee decides there is insufficient evidence to fire Rogers, but they
continue to suspect that something about the sale is not right, even
though the evidence is thin. Before the 10-Q is filed, you and Maggie rec-
ommend: 
(a) Commencing an internal investigation
(b) Suspending Rogers with pay
(c) Reversing the sale from the March 31 quarter
(d) Informing the entire board of these facts
(e) All of the above
Practitioner Response: This question is best answered with answer (e),
which recommends that the audit committee take a number of actions, each
of which individually is a good idea, but that together offer the best chance
of protecting the company. Answer (a) is clearly a correct response, since the
question assumes that the audit committee has only looked at the paperwork
and conducted two interviews. The lingering suspicion may be put to rest by
the internal investigation, which could use counsel and a forensic investiga-
tor to conduct a more intensive review of documents and conduct additional
interviews. Based on the lingering suspicion, it may be appropriate to sus-
pend Rogers with pay as described in answer (b), since the suspension would
protect the company from a charge of letting “a bad apple stay on the tree” if
it turns out that Rogers was engaged in wrongdoing. And, by suspending
him with pay, the company is indicating that it has not reached a conclusion
about his conduct, which may help forestall a wrongful termination suit that
might otherwise be filed if Rogers was fired. 
Answer (c) is more problematical, but if the amount of the sale is imma-
terial to Megatron as a whole, then the conservative approach would be to
reverse the sale pending the receipt of the results of the internal investiga-
tion. This also has the advantage of letting the auditors know that the com-
pany has approached the issue in a prudent and conservative way, rather
than trying to “push the envelope” and book sales that may be questionable.
Answer (d) is generally a good course of action, particularly since the filing
of the 10-Q and the opening of the trading window might result in unin-
formed directors seeking to sell shares at a time when they should not be
doing so. While the directors could potentially fall back on the materiality
argument, the possibility that Rogers may have engaged in other fraudulent
acts that could later come to light must be considered. In that event, the
board members should all be apprised of the risks inherent in selling at a
time when their actions could later by questioned with the benefit of 20/20
hindsight.
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers120
07-Chapter 06.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 120
6. If you were designing a training program for Megatron’s marketing and
sales staff that was supposed to sensitize these personnel to ethics and
a code of conduct consistent with the values demonstrated by the CEO,
what points would you want the program to cover—and why?
7. Reflect for a moment on the qualitative factors that the SEC asked audi-
tors to consider in conducting a materiality analysis under SAB No. 99.
What qualitative factors would you want to consider if a materiality
analysis was being done on the KaeLoo sale, regardless of whether it
was immaterial to Megatron as a whole? 
Practitioner Response: While this question gives plenty of room for a
wide-ranging response, the following commentary gives you some ideas to
consider. Keep in mind that the question asks you to focus, at least in part,
on the values demonstrated by the CEO. 
— the company stands for the proposition that open communication both
inside the company and with outside constituencies is essential to foster-
ing a healthy organizational culture; 
— the company maintains channels of communication to support open com-
munication inside the organization; 
— the company expects its employees to conduct themselves in the best
interests of society as a whole, as well as the industry in which the com-
pany operates and the organization itself;
— the company is committed to being the type of corporate citizen that is
best exemplified by the honest and ethical conduct of its employees; 
— the company will appropriately enforce its code of conduct and both
accountability and discipline are part of this enforcement regimen; 
— the company will comply with laws, rules and regulations applicable to it,
and employees are expected to facilitate such compliance above all else; 
— the company will promptly inform investors, regulatory agencies, and oth-
ers to which it is accountable of all material information that may bear on
the company, its operations and its financial condition;
— the company will maintain such records and data that permit the accu-
rate and timely reporting, monitoring, and testing of information upon
which management, investors and regulators depend;
— the company will reward employees in appropriate and responsible ways
for their efforts, taking into account performance and the demonstration
of values such as honesty, integrity, transparency, individual initiative
and accountability, and support of appropriate organizational values; and
— the company will apply appropriate resources to the training necessary to
instill and support values among its employees that are consistent with
its objectives as a good corporate citizen. 
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8. Assume that after the 10-Q is filed, Maggie advises you that one of the
directors has told her that he is going to go ahead and sell some stock in
the public market. There hasn’t yet been a full resolution of the situa-
tion with KaeLoo, but the sale was not booked in the March 31 quarter.
If you and Maggie had a chance to talk the director out of proceeding
with the sale, what points would you want to make in order to try to dis-
suade the director from going ahead?
Practitioner Response: This is a question open to some creative respons-
es, but the following points might be among those you would want to make: 
— this information is not public; we don’t yet know the extent to which other
sales are or may become questionable; 
— if you go ahead and sell stock, regulators could interpret the sale as hav-
ing been made to avoid losses that you otherwise might have taken in the
value of your stock if additional wrongdoing is found; 
— consider how your trade will look with 20/20 hindsight if it turns out that
Rogers has created a bigger problem by issuing other side letters;
— the sale of stock now may create the appearance, even if this is not reali-
ty, that your conduct fell short of the corporate ethics we stand for; 
— even though Megatron didn’t book the sale to KaeLoo in this quarter, you
can’t assume that each other sale is good given Rogers actions; allowing
time for investigation may let the company give you reasonable assur-
ances that you aren’t opening yourself up to regulatory and market
scrutiny.
Practitioner Response: The types of qualitative factors that you would
want to consider might include: 
— the impact on meeting already reduced sales or earnings expectations; 
— the impact on Megatron Manufacturing’s share of the company bonus
pool; 
— the impact on sales trends for joint replacement products; 
— the impact on the overall results of Megatron Manufacturing or its seg-
ment; 
— the possible effect on patients or hospitals if exposed to risk as a result of
such sale; and
— whether the misstatement of the financial statements that may result
would be considered intentional.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
SAS No. 99 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards, AU sec. 316) is a critical “must-read” for
financial officers, managers and auditors that are dedicated to developing
effective internal controls and the means to detect and deter fraud.
Appendix A to this SAS also catalogues fraud risk factors arising from
financial reporting and misappropriation of assets, with examples of fac-
tors that enhance the risk of fraud in the areas of incentives, pressures,
opportunities and rationalizations. SAS No. 99 also outlines the efforts
required of the audit team and audit committee, including how audit plans
should be developed with a view toward potential fraud, discussions with
management and the audit committee about fraud risks, use of unpre-
dictable audit tests and procedures to test for overrides of controls.
On June 5, 2003, the SEC issued its final rule pursuant to Section 404
of Sarbanes-Oxley entitled, “Management’s Reports on Internal Controls
Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports” (available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm). The
rule specifies the required content of management’s report on a company’s
internal controls, the required filing of the independent auditor’s attesta-
tion report on internal controls, and any changes in internal controls that
may likely or will materially affect the financial reporting. In addition, the
rule changed the filing requirements for Section 302 and Section 906 cer-
tifications which will in the future be filed as exhibits to the periodic
reports to which the certifications relate.
While not effective for accelerated filers until after June 15, 2004 or
until April 15, 2005 for all other filers, early compliance is encouraged. The
Section 404 certifications and the attestation report can be expected to dra-
matically impact both management and independent accounting firms as
they come to grips with this new internal control regimen.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE 7—
AA&C LLP.: YOU ARE A
MEMBER OF THE PRACTICE
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
This chapter’s case study takes you away from the more serious and trou-
bling aspects of improper behavior in the accounting and auditing envi-
ronment, and instead asks you to consider how to proactively deal with eth-
ical issues raised by joint marketing arrangements. These types of rela-
tionships are of course becoming more common as practitioners look for
ways to expand their service offerings and enhance client satisfaction
levels.
Although not a “joint marketing arrangement” per se, consider the
April 2003 announcement by an accounting and auditing firm in Alabama
that began offering new mortgage-related services to its clients. The firm
indicated that it is now gathering required financial data, filling out the
paperwork and shopping mortgage applications for its clients. Rather than
billing the client for these activities, the accounting firm provides this serv-
ice free of charge. The accounting firm is not providing the services as a
loss leader, however. The firm employs a licensed mortgage broker to
process paperwork and deal with prospective lenders and the accounting
firm receives from the lender the brokerage fee paid to any introducing
mortgage broker. If you were on the practice development committee for
this accounting firm, what disclosure would you provide to your client
about the commission received for brokering the mortgage? Would you ask
the client to sign an acknowledgment of the firm’s compensation arrange-
ment? What if one lender decided it would pay a higher commission than
another, but its rates were higher? Do you see how the interests of the
accounting firm and the client may diverge? How would you police the
08-Chapter 07.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 125
potential conflicts that might arise out of offering services that are com-
pensated by a non-client? Many of the ethical issues that can arise in this
situation are similar to those presented in joint marketing relationships,
as you’ll see in the material which follows.
FOCUS POINTS
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct permits firms to render account-
ing and auditing services to clients and customers obtained by the efforts
of third parties. However, “the member has the responsibility to ascertain
that all promotional efforts are within the bounds of the Rules of
Conduct . . . [because] the members must not do through others what they
are prohibited from doing themselves. . .” [See ET sec. 502.06 “502-5—
Engagements Obtained Through Efforts of Third Parties”] 
False, misleading and deceptive advertising is conduct prohibited to
members of the profession. Among other things, advertising of this nature
is defined as that which:
— “creates false or unjustified expectations of favorable results;” [ET sec.
502.03]
— implies the ability to influence a court, regulatory agency or similar
body;
— refers to a stated fee for services that when quoted were likely to be sub-
stantially increased and the client was not apprised of the likely result;
and
— are other representations likely to cause misunderstanding or decep-
tion.
Rule 501.82 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct contains a
more expansive definition of false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive
statements or claims, including the types of advertising described above as
well as facts that:
— are misrepresented or are not fully disclosed;
— imply unsupportable education, professional achievements or licensing; 
— consist of self-laudatory statements not based on fact;
— make untrue comparisons with others; and
— are testimonials or endorsements not based on fact.
(Note: the complete rules can be found at www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/rule
main.htm.)
The Texas Rules also include a preamble that refers to the First
Amendment rights of members and the public, and states that the Rules
are not designed to restrict the availability of accounting services. As is the
case with most attempts to regulate the ethical conduct of professionals,
the Texas Rules represent a balancing of the rights of the licensed
professional to publicly seek out clients, promote the professional’s
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expertise, and cite qualifications and achievements, with the rights of
the public and other practitioners to be protected from unethical
behavior engaged in by professionals who have lost their moral compass or
the ability to distinguish truth from fiction.
When considering joint marketing and similar arrangements, some of
the following ethics rulings from the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct
may apply to the activities of the member firm and its partner(s):
• Two CPA’s who are not partners cannot use letterhead showing the
names of the two accountants where a partnership does not exist [ET
sec. 591.267];
• A member who has a partnership with a non-CPA is ethically responsi-
ble for all acts of the partnership and is accountable for the non-CPA’s
violations of the Code of Professional Conduct [ET sec. 591.281];
• A member who accepts or pays a referral fee for recommending or refer-
ring the services of a CPA or to obtain a client must disclose the accept-
ance or payment to the client [ET sec. 503.01C]. If the member received
the referral fee over time and was later engaged to perform an audit,
review, or compilation reasonably likely to be used by a third party, or
examination of projections, the continued receipt of the referral fee
would violate the Code [ET sec. 591.376].
• A member may purchase a product from a third party and resell it to a
client without violating the Code, and the profit from the sale is not con-
sidered a commission or referral fee. This ethics ruling specifically cites
the taking of title to the product, and the associated risks of ownership,
as differentiating a purchase from a commissioned transaction [ET sec.
591.370].
In contrast to the AICPA Rules on the issue of commissions or refer-
ral fees, consider the following excerpt from the Missouri Professional
Ethics Rules of Conduct:
Avoid this Pitfall: How would you look at a transaction
where a member firm had a stock of marketing materials on
hand, used those materials to sell a piece of hardware or
software to a client, and then had the product “drop-
shipped” from the manufacturer direct to the client, but the
invoice came to the member firm?  Did the member firm
assume the associated risks of ownership if it never had the
hardware or software in inventory? Is this functionally dif-
ferent from having the piece of hardware or software in
stock at the firm? You can see why the ethical issues in this
area can be interpreted in ways that are legally correct, but
perhaps on morally unstable ground.
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No licensee . . . shall pay a commission to a third party to obtain a
client . . . [nor] accept a commission for a referral to a client of prod-
ucts or services of others unless . . . the licensee discloses to the client
in writing the fact and the amount of any such commission. The term
commission shall include, but not be limited to, any fee, profit, or
other thing of value required or received for referring a client to the
products or services of others or any fee, profit or other thing of val-
ued paid to obtain a client. [4 CSR 10-3.060(11)]
It is clear that in Missouri and several other states, the fact that a
member firm took title and assumed the risk of ownership of products sold
to a non-attest client would not be enough to insulate the firm from claims
that it violated the ethical rules unless it made full written disclosure to
the client.
REGULATORY ISSUES
On January 28, 2003, as corrected on March 26, 2003, the SEC adopted the
final rule concerning “Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence,” [Release No. 33-8183] which became
effective May 6, 2003. Among other things, the Rule:
• prohibits accounting firms from setting an audit partner’s compensation
or allocation of partnership units based on sale of non-audit services to
the partner’s audit clients;
• other than with respect to “specialty partners” (partners such as tax or
valuation specialists that consult with the audit engagement team),
provides that an accountant is not independent if during the audit and
professional engagement period, any audit partner earns or receives
compensation based on selling services other than audit, review and
attest services.
Avoid this Pitfall: Besides underlining the importance of
familiarizing yourself with the state rules of conduct in the
state or states in which you practice, the Missouri Rule
points out the importance of basic definitions to an ethical
construct. By encompassing any profit within the definition
of a commission, Missouri has significantly broadened the
application of its prohibition on commissions without full
written disclosure. If your firm is selling, or intends to sell,
products or services to non-attest clients, you should ensure
that the committee or partner responsible for risk manage-
ment and outside business initiatives has a good command
of the applicable issues, definitions and ethical prohibitions
that apply to such activities.
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The rule is effective for payments received or earned after the account-
ing firm’s fiscal year that includes May 6, 2003, and there is an exemption
for audit firms with fewer than ten partners and fewer than five audit
(public company reporting) clients.
ETHICAL GUIDES
On April 18, 2003, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) issued Release No. 2003-006, which among other things estab-
lished interim professional ethics and independence standards under the
authority granted the PCAOB pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The release designated Rule 101 “Independence” of the AICPA’s Code of
Professional Conduct and the rulings and interpretations thereunder as
each existed on April 16, 2003 as interim ethics standards. The PCAOB
indicated that the interim ethics standards, referred to as Rule 3500T, will
continue to have authority unless and until the PCAOB supercedes them.
Firms that are required to register by the mandatory registration date,
together with their associated persons, must comply with Rule 3500T as if
they were registered public accounting firms and associated persons. Rule
3500T and the adopting release do not indicate when, if ever, the interim
ethics standards adopted under Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Conduct may be superceded. Accordingly, continued compliance with Rule
101 and applicable state ethics codes is both required and necessary.
“When I do good, I feel good. When I do bad, I feel bad. That’s my reli-
gion.” Abraham Lincoln.
“Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what’s right.”
Isaac Asimov.
“Live in such a way that you would not be ashamed to sell your parrot
to the town gossip.” Will Rogers.
“Before I can live with other folks I’ve got to live with myself. The
one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s conscience.”
Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird.
“Be who you are and say what you feel, because those who mind don’t
matter and those who matter don’t mind.” Dr. Seuss.
Is ethical corporate behavior its own reward—or are there also more
tangible returns?
Are companies that provide better disclosure rewarded in some way
for their candid assessment of their business and operations? Or, is an eth-
ical organization perhaps penalized for its willingness to provide full and
accurate disclosure to investors? Three studies conducted from 1993 to
1997 reached the following conclusions:
Chapter 7: Case 7—AA&C LLP 129
08-Chapter 07.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 129
• Better disclosure allowed analysts to reach more accurate forecasts of
the company’s future performance,1 resulting in greater agreement
among analysts. This led to a more accurate consensus of the company’s
value, which in turn resulted in the company’s cost of capital being
below that of companies with less effective disclosure practices.
• Companies with higher returns on equity have a pattern of providing
better disclosure;2 companies issuing equity, which could be expected to
have a greater focus on disclosure, generally provide investors with
more and better quality disclosure.
• Small companies not covered by analysts that provide better disclosure
than their peers enjoyed a lower cost of capital3 than their less-forth-
coming brethren.
While ethical behavior is indeed its own reward, the conclusions
reached by these studies show that both large and small companies derive
tangible benefits from implementing disclosure practices that are above
the norm.
“Any CPA or CPA firm licensed or registered by the Colorado board
and offering to or performing professional services via the Internet shall
include the following information on the Internet:
1. Name of individual CPA or CPA firm licensed by the Colorado State
Board of Accountancy;
2. Principal place of business;
3. Business telephone number; and
4. Colorado certificate number and/or Colorado firm registration number.”
Rule 7.13 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct issued by the
Colorado State Accountancy Board. 
“An individual entering into an engagement to provide professional
services via a web site, pursuant to practice privileges granted by Idaho,
shall disclose, via their web site, their principle state of licensure, license
number and address. A firm offering or rendering professional services to
Idaho businesses or residents via a web site shall provide, in the web site’s
homepage, a means for regulators and the public to contact a responsible
licensee in charge at the firm regarding complaints, questions, or regula-
tory compliance.” IDAPA 01.01.01 §302.03, Idaho Accountancy Rules. 
* * * *
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers130
1 M. Lang and R. Lundholm, “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analysts Behavior,” The
Accounting Review, 467 (October 1996).
2 M. Lang and R. Lundholm, “Cross Sectional Determinants of Analysts Ratings of Corporate
Disclosure,” Journal of Accounting Research, 246 (1993).
3 C. Botosan, “Disclosure Levels and Cost of Equity Capital,” The Accounting Review, 323 (July
1997).
08-Chapter 07.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 130
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE
PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE
This case study asks you, a member of your firm’s practice development
committee, to consider how to proactively deal with ethical issues raised by
joint marketing arrangements. How would you respond to the circum-
stances presented in this study?
AA&C LLP and the Practice Development Committee
It is a beautiful spring morning, just a hint in the air of the hot summer
weather lurking around the corner, when you are headed to work on the
metro for the next meeting of your firm’s practice development committee.
As one of the younger members of this committee, your opinions and those
of Shauna Morris, another junior partner in the audit and attest depart-
ment, are often sought out, as AA&C considers itself to be a “firm of the
future” with a real commitment to technology, growth and changing with
the times. The practice development committee is considered something of
a plum assignment at the firm, a progressive and dynamic group who are
helping lead AA&C into its next 20 years of service. AA&C prides itself on
using leading edge technologies in planning and executing audits, a com-
mitment to professionalism, and keeping abreast of regulatory, accounting
and auditing trends that can affect its business and that of its clients.
As you read through the agenda for that morning’s committee meet-
ing, your mind wandered back to the discussion you and Shauna had before
the weekend about a proposal she has on the agenda. She had come into
your office, an excited look on her face that told you something big was up,
and began to fill you in.
“Neal, you remember I told you about that valuation firm that’s head-
quartered in D.C.? The one with the e-business model that has made a spe-
cialty out of valuing patents and intellectual property?” You nod, dimly
recollecting such a conversation.
“Well, I’ve been working with them on the sale of Cryogenx, you know,
having them do the valuation work on the allocation of the sale price.
When I talked to the partner the other day in the D.C. office, she started
asking me a few questions about our firm, the clients, how we were posi-
tioning ourselves in the market, you know, that kind of stuff—and it sure
seemed to me like she’d already done her homework on us, you know what
I mean?” Nodding again, you began to wonder where this was headed as
your thoughts turned to the stack of workpapers sitting on your desk for
review.
Shauna must have sensed your drifting attention and got to the point.
“Here’s the thing, Neal. The partner, Marybeth Tate, told me that e-
Valuations was exploring the possibility of putting together some strategic
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partnerships with audit firms like ours so that we can cross-market each
other’s services. She said that our firm was a natural for them, with our
locations and clientele, and she said that e-Valuations was getting refer-
rals for accounting and auditing work that isn’t their cup of tea. She said
that what they had done in a few other situations like this with attorneys
was to hyper-link their web site to the attorneys’. When visitors to their
site asked about getting legal advice about intellectual property, they were
sent to the attorneys’ web site, and when clients of the law firms asked
about valuation, they were linked to e-Valuations site. She said that e-
Valuations has seen a 10% increase in its business from these hyperlinks,
and she thought that linking with us would result in an even bigger jump
in business than their ‘legal’ links.”
You held up your hand to slow Shauna down for a moment. “Wait a
second here, lady, hold on a minute—what do we know about those guys,
other than they are on the web and seem like good folks? Where’s our due
diligence? How many times have we worked with them?”
Smiling, Shauna piped up with a quick retort. “I had a feeling you
were gonna’ say something like that, and I’ll have you know I’ve already
beaten you to the punch. I got a complete list of their law firm strategic
partners—which includes some pretty prestigious names—and I had
Marybeth send me down a representative list of clients and transactions
that they’ve completed over the past year. Not only that, but I pulled up
the engagements we’ve worked with them over the last two years, and
found a total of seven. A majority of those were originated by us, but there
were three that came from them—and Marybeth said that was just the tip
of the iceberg in terms of the business they can send our way!”
“I’m glad that’s just the tip of the iceberg, Shauna, ‘cause three
engagements seems like a lot to get so excited about,” you reply dryly.
Avoid this Pitfall: If your firm is considering a joint
arrangement of any kind, but particularly with non-CPAs,
due diligence must be a part of the equation. Joint market-
ing arrangements have the potential to backfire, particular -
ly if one party to the arrangement gives the client shoddy
services or an invoice that far exceeds the client’s expecta-
tions. In rare instances, professional service firms have even
been sued under a theory of making a “negligent” referral by
sending the client to a third party that is incompetent or
itself negligent. Rather than losing a client due to someone
else’s actions or even getting dragged into a lawsuit, it is
important to carefully investigate prospective partners,
their other partners, and to understand all that you can
about your prospective marketing partner.
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“Aaahhh, that’s only part of the story, Neal. Now we get to the really
good part—not only can we expect to see 20 or 30 new clients a year out of
this, but here’s the kicker—e-Valuations will pay us a referral fee of 9% of
every dollar they get from new clients for a year that come through our
hyperlink. I mean, think about it, if we helped them land 10 valuation
assignments a year, and they averaged $10,000 each, we would get $9
grand—and if we sent them a few big ones, say $25,000 each, we could be
looking at increasing our cash flow by $20 or $30 thousand a year! And at
virtually no cost—we could have a link like that up and running in no time
—and they provide us the tracking software for free so we can tell what
traffic is coming our way from them!”
Shauna’s animated pitch was definitely appealing, and the two of you
parted ways that afternoon looking forward to discussing the concept with
the committee at the next week’s meeting. As you thought more about it,
you figured that it was hard to see any downside—associating the firm
with a well-regarded valuation company, generating client referrals with
no effort, and being paid for it; well, you thought to yourself, life couldn’t
get much better than that. You were forced to admit to yourself that not
only was this a great plan, but potentially might form the template for sim-
ilar strategic partnerships that AA&C might enter into.
The Meeting of the Practice Development Committee
When the meeting convenes, a few housekeeping items are cleared out of
the way, and Shauna is then called on to make her presentation about the
e-Valuations agenda item. True to form, she is passionate and convincing
about what the strategic relationship could mean to the firm, and you
chime in with an endorsement of how the firm might use this as a model to
follow in setting up other hyper-links with law firms, financial institutions,
and perhaps other valuation firms. It is only when Shauna gets to the issue
of the referral fees that one of the tax partners pointedly interrupts.
“Shauna, I don’t want to throw cold water on this, especially as hyper-
links among service providers like us and e-Valuations are the wave of the
future, but don’t we have a disclosure obligation to our clients about the
referral fees? And what about independence—if one of our audit clients
uses e-Valuations and we are hyper-linked to them, and paid by them, are
we at risk of impairing our independence?”
Shauna gave you a sideways glance that told you she was a little out
of her element, but bravely plowed ahead. “Don, I know we’ll be required
to disclose the fee arrangement to our client, which I understand from
Marybeth can be done with an e-acknowledgment form that the client has
to complete as part of e-Valuations’ engagement process. On the independ-
ence issue, I guess I’d say that our firm isn’t performing the valuation serv-
ices, so it’s not as if we will have violated that rule, although I could see
Chapter 7: Case 7—AA&C LLP 133
08-Chapter 07.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 133
where we might need to revisit this issue if an audit client, rather than a
tax client, used e-Valuations for some work.”
A lively discussion followed among the committee members about the
state code of ethics requirements, independence, and whether or not AA&C
was compromising its professional focus by getting too “tangled up” with e-
Valuations by getting into the “referral” business, rather than the audit-
ing, accounting and tax advice business. Before the meeting broke apart
into a completely disjointed series of one-on-one debates, the committee
chair held up her hand and asked for quiet.
“Listen, guys, I think we all know that Shauna’s idea has a lot of prom-
ise and that we shouldn’t ignore it. However, we also know that the firm
won’t vote in favor of proceeding down this road without knowing all the
implications for this type of marketing relationship. Are we all on the same
page on that at least?”
Heads nodded around the table in agreement.
“Good. So here’s what I’d like to suggest. Why don’t Shauna and Neal
research the code of ethics, independence, e-marketing and compensation
issues and come back to us with a report two weeks from now? If you all
agree, I’d also ask them to offer alternative structures for strategic part-
nerships like this if they find that AA&C can’t proceed with e-Valuations
under the current proposal. But, Shauna, you and Neal will need to give us
chapter and verse for what may create issues for the firm, and how we
should resolve those issues. That way, when we elevate this to the firm for
a vote, we’ll be able to reassure the partners that the committee has con-
sidered all the pluses and minuses of whatever arrangement we end up
with. Do we all concur?”
Avoid this Pitfall: One of the “lurking” issues about com-
missions and referral fees is the requirement of most states
that the disclosure about the fees be made to the client
before the recommendation or referral of the product or
service takes place. Likewise, most states require that the
accounting firm disclose the payment of a referral fee before
the firm is actually retained. Merely placing the disclosure
of such fees on the web site may not be enough to insulate
the firm from questions about whether it made the disclo-
sure on a timely basis. This may be particularly true if the
firm uses hyper-links to make the “referral” and there is no
disclosure of the commission or referral fee until after the
client has already gone to the other web site. Again, best
practices would appear to require the firm to include promi-
nent disclosure on the relevant pages of its web site and as
an “opening page” to every hyper-linked site.
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers134
08-Chapter 07.qxd  10/16/2002  9:25 AM  Page 134
Again, heads nodded around the table. Shauna peeked over at you
with a somewhat guilty look, aware that you had been dragooned into help-
ing her without having much of a choice. On the way out the door, though,
you assure her you’ll lend a hand, within limits.
“Shauna, since it looks like I’m going to end up working on this proj-
ect, I’ll volunteer to do the research, but I’m gonna’ leave the writing to
you. You’re a better writer than me anyway, and I’d rather just track down
the info for you to write up, if you don’t mind. I’ve got two 10-K’s on exten-
sion right now that need some work on MD&A, and it’s all I can do to help
the CFO’s get those done before the filing deadline. I’ll tell you what—you
help me review the MD&A for one of those, and I’ll promise to have the
research done on this by next week. Deal?”
Shauna’s head bobs up and down in relief. “You betcha’. I don’t think
I’ve had to spend time on the ethics code since the CPA exam, and I can’t
say I’m real knowledgeable about the ethical implications of doing business
over the web. I do recall that referral fees can be received by firms like
ours, but I don’t recollect what restrictions apply to our payment of those.
Let me know when you’re done, though, and I’ll write it up!” You give
Shauna a questionable look and get a chuckle in response as you turn down
the hall toward the information center to begin your research.
Situational Analysis
1. Assume for a moment that you were in Shauna’s position and decided
you wanted to do more due diligence on e-Valuations before recom-
mending them as a marketing partner for AA&C. What steps would you
take?
(a) Pull a credit report/D&B (Dun & Bradstreet) report on them
(b) Call several of the law firms that are linked to their web site
and talk to the partners in charge about their experiences with
e-Valuations
(c) Ask Marybeth for permission to talk to some of e-Valuations clients
on its representative client list, and then talk with those clients
about their assessment of the work performed by e-Valuations
(d) Contact any trade or professional organizations of which e-Valuations
is a member and obtain any information they have on e-Valuations
(e) All of the above
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2. Let’s say that AA&C concluded a marketing partnership with e-
Valuations, and e-Valuations put on its web site the following introduc-
tion to AA&C: “We have a strategic partnership with AA&C LLP, one of
the leading accounting and auditing firms in the Northeast United
States. AA&C has a roster of partners experienced in audit, tax and con-
sulting practices who are unequaled in their ability to provide practical
financial solutions to complex problems, and who can help you formulate
tax planning strategies that will maximize your company’s tax savings
within the bounds of what’s acceptable to the IRS.”  Do you believe that
this introduction violates any provisions of the Code of Professional
Conduct (refer to the information prior to the case study if needed)?
(a) No, the fact that e-Valuations has put this introduction on its web
site does not affect AA&C
(b) No, the language is merely sales “puffing” and does not violate the
Code
(c) Yes, it violates the Code by creating false expectations or unjustified
expectations of favorable results
Practitioner Response: In a situation like the one the case study describes
where you are putting your firm’s reputation “on the line” by effectively
entering into a joint venture with e-Valuations, you can never do enough due
diligence. The correct answer, based on that proposition, is of course answer
(e). Each of the other answers are steps that, if Shauna hadn’t taken them
beforehand, should be done as a matter of course. A credit or D&B report will
address payment histories, financial status, ownership, and other financial
data that can reveal a lot about the nature of e-Valuation’s business. Dun &
Bradstreet and a number of web-based search engines also provide fee-based
services allowing you to search criminal and civil litigation, judgment and
tax liens nationwide. Moreover, and not to be forgotten even though not in
the answers provided: a search of regulatory filings with federal, state and
local regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, State Securities Divisions, and
State Accountancy Boards. 
The type of due diligence discussed in answers (b) and (c) is often
invaluable, but sometimes overlooked. Discussions with existing partners
and clients can say a lot about a firm’s performance and client satisfaction
(or lack thereof), can reveal patterns of disagreements, and even produce
information about how effective a firm’s marketing partnerships have been.
Even holding these types of discussions with former partners can be instruc-
tive in helping identify areas where the prospective partner may have previ-
ously failed to live up to expectations, and why. Answer (d) is also a good
idea, even if less effective than other ways of checking out the prospective
partner, since you never know what filings, complaints, kudos, or other infor-
mation might materialize out of contacting professional and trade organiza-
tions.
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(d) Yes, it violates the Code because AA&C could not make these claims
itself, and can’t allow e-Valuations to do so for it
(e) Yes, because of answers (c) and (d) above
(f) No, because of answers (a) and (b) above
3. If AA&C was practicing in Texas, which of the prohibitions of Rule
501.82 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct on page 126 would be
violated if e-Valuations used the language in question 2 above when
introducing web site visitors to AA&C?
(a) Prohibitions on facts that imply unsupported licensing
(b) Prohibitions on self-laudatory statements not based on fact
(c) Prohibitions on unsupportable education qualifications
Practitioner Response: This chapter began by introducing some relevant
provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct, including what is defined as
false, misleading and deceptive advertising. Additionally, the first para-
graph under “Focus Points” pointed out that (1) it is the member firm that is
responsible for ensuring that promotional efforts are within the bounds of
the Rules of Conduct, and (2) the member firm cannot do through others that
which it is prohibited from doing itself. Neither answers (a) nor (b) are good
choices since the location of the introduction is irrelevant for purposes of
ascertaining if AA&C is in compliance with the Code, and sales “puffing” lan-
guage is actually what the Code is intended to address if it is false, mislead-
ing or deceptive. Since AA&C cannot permit e-Valuations to place language
on its web site that AA&C can’t put on its own, or risks violating the Code
by letting e-Valuations do so, you must evaluate the language used if you are
to reach the right conclusion.
It could be argued that the reference to AA&C being one of the “lead-
ing” firms in the Northeast U.S. may be permissible if this statement was
somehow supportable through use of statistics, rankings or other means that
would demonstrate a factual basis for the claim. Without more facts, it is
hard to say that this claim alone would be enough to mislead or deceive
someone who read it. The language which follows, however, is much more
problematic. A reference to the partners as being “unequaled” in their capa-
bilities would clearly seem to overstate the partners’ qualifications, while the
reference to the ability to maximize tax savings would clearly seem to create
an “unjustified expectation of favorable results.” Furthermore, the reference
to maximizing the tax benefits “within the bounds of what’s acceptable to the
IRS” comes dangerously close to representing some type of special knowledge
or relationship with the IRS. The net effect of these statements would clear-
ly seem to constitute false or misleading advertising that AA&C would be
prohibited from doing on its own behalf, and that e-Valuations likewise can-
not do.
For the reasons given, Answer (e) is the correct answer, as both answers
(c) and (d) are correct, and answers (a), (b) and (f) are all incorrect.
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(d) Prohibitions on endorsements not based on fact
(e) Prohibitions on testimonials not based on fact
(f) Answers (a), (c) and (d)
(g) Answers (b) and (d)
4. One of the issues raised by the tax partner on the practice development
committee was whether or not the hyperlink and receipt of a referral fee
would impair AA&C’s independence with respect to an audit client of
the firm. Assume that on June 1, 2003, the hyper-link to e-Valuations is
established and that you are the engagement partner and Shauna is the
concurring partner on an audit engagement. Also, assume that the audit
client uses e-Valuations later in 2003 to perform a valuation as a result
of linking from AA&C’s web site to e-Valuations’ web site, and that you
and Shauna stand to get a percentage of the referral fee in 2004. Has
AA&C’s independence been impaired by the link and/or the payment?
Practitioner Response: The correct answer is (g). Although the other pro-
hibitions listed are included within the Texas rules, this question is designed
to get you to review the language that e-Valuations used and to make a judg-
ment of where they’ve gone wrong. In the case of answer (a), the statement
in the introduction does not claim that AA&C’s personnel have any unsup-
portable licensing. Likewise, the reference to education qualifications in
answer (c) is not directly implicated in the statements made by e-Valuations.
Since (a) and (c) are incorrect, you can also eliminate answer (f), since it
incorporates answers (a) and (c). Answer (d) is a closer question, however.
The dictionary definition of endorsement is to “express approval in a public
and definitive manner.” Since the web site posting is public, the only real
question is whether what e-Valuations placed on the web site is “express
approval of AA&C.” The “sales” type of language that’s used, as well as the
laudatory terms that e-Valuations included, would seem to give an implicit,
if not explicit, endorsement of AA&C. Moreover, to the extent answer (d)
deals with an endorsement, the case study and the prior question don’t real-
ly give you facts on which e-Valuation could have based its own endorse-
ment. That is to say, maybe a client of e-Valuations which had worked with
AA&C could have given such an endorsement, but there doesn’t appear to be
a basis for e-Valuations to have given one like this.
The answer given in (b) is also a close question. To the extent that you
consider AA&C to be responsible for what e-Valuations has said on its web
site about AA&C, you may have interpreted those statements as, in effect,
“self laudatory” statements. If so, you would be correct if you chose answer
(g) as the correct answer to the problem. If you believe that AA&C may be
responsible for the statements made about it, but that the statements are
not “self-laudatory” because they were made by a third party, you may have
concluded that the correct answer to this question is (d). Ultimately, the
issue of whether the correct answer is (d) alone or (g) may be a question that
would only be solved when the state accountancy board took up the issue.
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(a) The link and the payment impair independence
(b) Neither the link nor the payment impair independence
(c) The link impairs independence, but the payment does not if dis-
closed
(d) The payment impairs independence, but the link does not
Practitioner Response: This question requires you to consider a number
of facts and how these interact to affect independence. Let’s begin our analy-
sis by taking a closer look at a few of the facts. First, under ET sec. 503.01,
the receipt of the referral fee during a time when AA&C is engaged to per-
form an audit, review, or compilation of a client’s financial statements, or an
examination of projections, is prohibited. Even though this is the case, how-
ever, the question is not asking whether or not the payment is permitted;
rather, it asks you to consider the implications for independence. With a cau-
tionary reminder about ET sec. 503.01, now let’s focus on independence.
There is nothing in the Code or in state codes of ethics that restricts the
ability of a member firm to link to a non-member’s web site. Much like the
Texas Code’s preamble that refers to the First Amendment, it would seem
unlikely that the mere creation of a link, without more, would create an inde-
pendence impairment for a member firm. The firm might be responsible, eth-
ically or perhaps legally, for what appears on the linked website, but it is
hard to see where the link itself would constitute an independence impair-
ment. Given this fact, answers (a) and (c) are not your best choices.
(Moreover, keep in mind that disclosure of the payment, as described in
answer (c), does not in any way cure an independence impairment, if one has
been created. This should also serve as a tip-off to you that answer (c) is not
the right choice.)
On the other side of the coin, it is clear under the SEC’s initiative dis-
cussed at the beginning of this chapter under “Regulatory Issues” that
AA&C’s independence will be impaired after the effective date of May 6,
2003 (subject to the SEC’s statement that such payments will not impair
independence if received during the fiscal year including May 6, 2003) if you
and Shauna stand to receive compensation based on the selling of the non-
audit services through e-Valuations. As you and she are identified as the
engagement and concurring partners, and both of you will receive a percent-
age of the referral fee after the 2003 fiscal year as disclosed in the problem,
it is clear that AA&C’s independence can be considered impaired by the
receipt of this compensation for “selling” non-audit services. For all of these
reasons, the correct answer to this problem is answer (d).
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5. Which of the following statements best describes the rewards you and
your organization can derive from ethical behavior?
(a) I and my organization can feel good about ourselves
(b) My organization can get a lower cost of capital than our competitors
who don’t provide disclosure that is as good as ours
(c) I and our other officers can sign required certifications with more
confidence than companies that set the wrong “tone at the top” or
that don’t have an ethical corporate culture
(d) All of the above
(e) There aren’t any rewards for ethical behavior for me or my organi-
zation
6. What would you rank as the most important issues about evaluating,
entering into, and monitoring a referral or commission arrangement
with a third party?
Practitioner Response: If you answered (e) to this question, you need to
start over again at Chapter 1! That said, keep in mind that one of the prin-
cipal objectives of these materials is to remind everyone that ethical behav-
ior has its own rewards, among which are the ability to sleep at night and
feel good about yourself. If an organization has a “corporate culture,” it
seems reasonable that an organization can feel good about itself, meaning
that answer (a) is correct. The tangible benefits were those disclosed in the
results of the studies discussed on page 130 of this chapter, which clearly
demonstrated that ethical organizations are rewarded by the capital mar-
kets through a lower cost of capital. So, answer (b) is also correct, as is
answer (c). 
If your position requires you to sign certifications for auditors, regula-
tors or even for internal purposes, it is easy to understand that your comfort
level in doing so will directly relate to what kind of company or firm you work
for. If you work for a company that pays excessive executive compensation or
has a huge number of related party transactions which benefit the insiders
at the expense of the company, you can see where the culture of the compa-
ny might become “it’s ok to do, since the guys at the top are doing it.” That
sends the wrong message to employees and sets up an easy contrast to the
organization where the right kind of culture is demonstrated by the officers
and directors doing the right thing and putting the company’s interests first.
Ask yourself: which company would you rather sign a certification for? The
answer is pretty plain. Answer (c) is therefore correct, and that of course
makes answer (d) the right answer for the problem.
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Practitioner Response: For ease of discussion, let’s break down the issues
into three categories that track the question. This question asks for the most
important issues, so we’ve presented many of the possible responses below,
ranked in subjective fashion and chronologically.
Evaluation Phase:
1. Due diligence about third party
2. How relationship is proposed to be structured
3. How to limit exposure of member firm for what non-member does
4. How to track audit/non-audit client usage and disclosure/non-disclosure
obligations of member firm
5. How to prevent independence impairments before they happen
6. Impact on client perceptions about the member firm
7. Marketing potential
8. How to gauge effectiveness of arrangement (feedback)
9. How will arrangement be modified; who has control
10. How can member firm exit arrangement gracefully should that be
necessary
Execution Phase:
1. Arrangement must be properly documented
2. Documents must clearly reflect responsibilities for each party
3. Limitations on actions/words of non-CPA party must be clearly spelled
out
4. Assurance of full disclosure and implementation of all necessary systems
and processes necessary to achieve proper disclosure/acknowledgments 
5. Right of member firm to confirm timely disclosure to clients/refuse com-
pensation/or take other remedial action to avoid unintended conse-
quences
6. Right of member firm to terminate arrangement if third party violates
agreement, violates applicable laws, or is convicted of a felony (or princi-
pals are convicted of crime of moral turpitude or felony or if public dis-
closure appears of other actions that reflect poorly on member firm, in its
sole judgment)
7. Economic arrangements must be spelled out
Monitoring Phase:
1. Are the systems and procedures performing as required; any difficulties
with clients or professional obligations
2. Checking on services performed/measuring client satisfaction
3. Can systems be improved to provide more/better feedback
4. Is arrangement benefiting both parties; how are benefits measured
5. Are professional obligations of member firm being fulfilled fully and com-
pletely?
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7. Reflect for a moment on the material in this chapter concerning ethical
prohibitions that apply to joint marketing arrangements. Now, list out
those prohibitions that you feel are most important to the CPA firm in
the context of joint marketing arrangements and give a short summary
as to why.
8. In considering the case study, if you were in Neal’s shoes and were going
to research the ethical, independence, e-marketing and compensation
issues that needed to be considered by the Practice Development
Committee, what resources would you consult?
Practitioner Response: Again, using subjective judgment about which
prohibitions are more important than others, here is a list of the prohibitions
relating to joint marketing arrangements and a short discussion of why they
are important.
1. Prohibition on receipt of commissions or referral fees related to audit,
review, compilation, or review of projections engagement. This is most
important as it can impair independence and can result in civil and/or
regulatory action against the member firm.
2. Prohibition on false, misleading or deceptive advertising. This is critical to
maintaining the firm’s professional standing, reputation, and client rela-
tions.
3. Prohibition on doing through third parties that which the firm cannot do.
This is important for the firm, as it avoids exposing the firm to liability
created by third parties.
4. Prohibition on misrepresenting facts. Where a partnership doesn’t exist,
two CPA’s can’t appear to represent that one does; education, licensing,
testimonials, and endorsements must be factual; where facts are not dis-
closed or represented properly, the firm and the individual can be held
responsible.
5. Timely disclosure of referral fees and commissions to clients. The member
firm has to provide timely disclosure of referral fees and commissions that
are properly paid.
6. The profit on the sale of a non-audit product is not/may be a referral fee
or commission. The Code and state codes may conflict on this point. The
taking of title and associated risks of ownership will be required if state
code permits receipt of profit.
7. Prohibition on audit or concurring partner receiving compensation or
partnership units for sale of non-audit products or services by audit firm.
The future of independence determinations in some joint marketing
arrangements may rest on compliance with this new directive from the
SEC.
8. Mandated disclosure on web sites. Although not technically a prohibition,
the required disclosures by member firms on web sites can also be tied to
joint marketing arrangement disclosure.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
The “Strengthening The Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence” Rule issued in final form by the SEC on January 28, 2003
(Release No. 33-8183, corrected in Release No. 8183A on March 26, 2003)
is both an excellent summary of previously existing independence guidance
and prohibitions, as well as an updated summary of changes that were
called for by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or otherwise deemed neces-
sary by the SEC. [See www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm for the text of
the rule and the later correction.]
Practitioner Response: Here is a compendium of the resources you would
want to review, in no particular order:
— Relevant provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct and accompany-
ing rulings;
— State code of ethics provisions and accompanying rulings;
— Independence rules and guidance issued by the SEC;
— State accountancy board rulings and interpretations on ethical, market-
ing and independence issues.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE 8—
PRECIOUS MINING INC.:
YOU ARE THE AUDIT
COMMITTEE CHAIR
FOCUS POINTS
As Congress, the Justice Department and the SEC began to investigate
corporate scandals at Adelphia, Enron, HealthSouth, Qwest, Sunbeam,
Tyco, Worldcom, Xerox and other well-known public companies, one clear
consensus seemed to emerge: in nearly all of these cases, the board of direc-
tors and the audit committee were apparently “asleep at the switch.”
Allegations ranged from board members profiting from and participating
in the wrongdoing, to simply failing to make diligent inquiry of the audi-
tors and management when presented with questionable facts or account-
ing. Media speculation focused attention on transactions between the com-
pany and its management team, on the one hand, and “independent” direc-
tors who were officers or directors of suppliers, investment bankers, serv-
ice providers, venture capital firms, and other companies with direct or
indirect ties to the company. The clear implication was that the directors
and audit committee members had been inclined to look the other way due
to their financial and friendship ties to management even as revenue,
expenses and earnings were being manipulated in discoverable ways by
corrupt management teams or their members. The resulting crisis in con-
fidence regarding public company financial reporting and consequent job
losses, retirement fund losses, and investor financial losses in the trillions
of dollars combined to set the stage for dramatic change. 
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REGULATORY ISSUES
The adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, the creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the frenzy of rulemaking by the
SEC that followed the events described above have fundamentally altered
the landscape of corporate governance. Board and audit committee service
no longer carry the cachet of building your resume or opportunities to visit
over a leisurely round of golf; rather, members of boards of directors and
audit committees now have responsibilities and significant liability expo-
sure that demands independent, hard-working board members who are
unafraid to challenge management. Just consider how the following rules
have altered the roles and responsibilities of board and audit committee
members, management and independent auditors (dates provided are not
effective dates, but dates of adoption of final rules by the SEC): 
• officers and directors, or persons acting on their behalf, are prohibited
from fraudulently influencing, coercing, manipulating or misleading the
independent auditor for the purpose of rendering the company’s finan-
cial statements materially misleading [See “Improper Influence on
Conduct of Audits,” Release No. 34-47890, May 20, 2003] 
• for all national securities exchanges such as the NYSE, AMEX, Boston,
Chicago, Pacific, and Philadelphia, as well as The NASDAQ Stock
Market, standards for companies listing their securities including,
among other things, audit committee membership requirements,
responsibilities, procedures for handling complaints, authority to
engage advisors, and to require company funding of the expenses of
retaining the outside auditors and advisors; and disclosure require-
ments relating to all of the above [See “Standards Relating to Listed
Company Audit Committees,” Release No. 33-8220, April 9, 2003];
• accelerated disclosure of insider purchases and sales of securities and
website disclosure concerning availability of periodic reports [See
“Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning
Website Access to Reports,” Release No. 33-8128, September 5, 2002,
and “Correction,” Release No. 33-8128A, April 8, 2003];
• prohibitions against any director or executive officer from trading in any
equity security of the issuer during a pension plan blackout period that
temporarily prevents plan participants or beneficiaries from trading
equity securities through their plan accounts [See “Insider Trades
During Pension Fund Blackout Periods,” Release No. 34-47225, January
22, 2003, and “Filing Guidance Related to: Conditions for Use of Non-
GAAP Financial Measures; and Insider Trades During Pension Fund
Blackout Periods” Release No. 33-8216, March 27, 2003];
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• conditions for use of non-GAAP financial measures in periodic reports
and public releases, as well as required reconciliation to GAAP financial
measures and related filing guidance [See “Conditions for Use of Non-
GAAP Financial Measures,” Release No. 33-8176 (Regulation G),
January 22, 2003, “Filing Guidance Related to: Conditions for Use of
Non-GAAP Financial Measures; and Insider Trades During Pension
Fund Blackout Periods,” Release No. 33-8216, March 27, 2003, and
“Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Use of Non-GAAP
Financial Measures,” June 13, 2003, available at www.sec.gov/divi-
sions/corpfin/faqs/nongaapfaq.htm];
• enhanced auditor independence requirements and mandating that the
audit committee approve all non-audit and audit services and requiring
the disclosure of such services and fees related thereto; requiring part-
ner rotation every five or seven years except for exempted small
accounting firms; a 12-month “cooling off” period where a senior execu-
tive officer of the client was formerly employed by the audit firm; and
prohibitions of compensation of the audit partner based on selling non-
audit and non-review services [See “Strengthening the Commission’s
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,” Release No. 33-8183,
January 28, 2003, and “Correction,” Release No. 33-8183A, March 26,
2003]; 
• disclosure of audit committee financial expert(s) or the lack thereof and
adoption of a code of ethics for senior executive officers [See “Disclosure
Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,”
Release No. 33-8177, January 23, 2003, and “Correction,” Release No.
8177a, March 26, 2003];
• disclosure in management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) about off-
balance sheet financing arrangements and contractual obligations con-
sisting of long-term debt, capital and operating leases, purchase obliga-
tions and other long-term liabilities [See “Disclosure in Management’s
Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and
Aggregate Contractual Obligations,” Release No. 33-8182, January 27,
2003];
• retention of workpapers and other financial audit and review records for
seven years after conclusion of the audit or review [See “Retention of
Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews,” Release No. 33-8180, January
24, 2003];
• certification by the CEO and CFO of periodic reports and financial state-
ments, disclosure and financial controls, disclosure to auditors and the
audit committee and any changes in internal controls [See “Certification
of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports,” Release No.
33-8124, August 29, 2002]; and
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• mandated earlier ownership and trading reports by insiders and the
reporting of transactions in derivative securities, swaps, and all
issuances/exercises/cancellations/re-grants and repricings of stock
options [See “Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and
Principal Security Holders,” Release No. 34-46421, August 27, 2002].
The list of final rules above excludes expanded criminal penalties,
fines and asset forfeitures for securities fraud, enhanced whistleblower
protections, a longer statute of limitations for securities fraud, and prohi-
bitions on loans to officers and directors that were included in Sarbanes-
Oxley and became effective immediately. 
Briefly, let’s cover the new standards that audit committee members
must meet under the exchange and NASDAQ listing requirements that the
SEC adopted on April 9, 2003. These standards can be broadly categorized
as follows: (1) who can serve on the audit committee, (2) what the commit-
tee’s duties encompass, (3) what additional disclosure the audit committee
specifically, and the company generally, must provide, and (4) what rights
the audit committee has to use the services of third parties and how such
services are paid for. 
Highlighted below you will find a short summary of the duties of the
audit committee and auditor that were outlined in the final rule on
strengthening independence and the listing standards rules. Each has dif-
fering, albeit equally unacceptable, consequences: if the listing standards
are violated, the company’s securities may be de-listed from an exchange
or NASDAQ; if the prohibitions of the strengthened independence rule are
violated, the results could include civil action by the SEC or civil litigation
by investors seeking recovery for misrepresentation or omission of required
information, or perhaps a Rule102(e) proceeding against financial officers
or auditors. 
Practitioner’s Note: Taken together, it is clear that corpo-
rate governance and the responsibilities of directors, man-
agement and independent auditors have changed dramati-
cally and, to some extent, have entered uncharted territory
as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, the rules implemented by the
SEC, and the creation of the PCAOB.
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1. Audit Committee—Who Can Serve? 
— Each member must be “independent;” defined as non-affiliates (no exec-
utive officers, directors who are employees, or control persons) and per-
sons not receiving any consulting, advisory or other fee from the compa-
ny, excluding fixed retirement plan distributions (also subject to certain
exemptions for companies conducting IPO’s, foreign private issuers,
dual holding companies, and “sister” issuers); and
— Must be a member of the board of directors. 
2. Audit Committee—What Are its Duties? 
— Directly responsible for appointing, compensating, providing oversight
(outside auditor must report directly to the audit committee) and termi-
nating the outside auditor;
— Resolve disagreements between management and the outside auditor on
financial reporting; 
— Must determine that the audit engagement team has the competence to
conduct the engagement in accordance with GAAS; 
— Approve audit engagement fees and terms; and 
— Establish procedures for receipt, retention and addressing of complaints
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing issues,
including confidential and anonymous submissions by employees. 
Avoid this Pitfall: As you will see below in the discussion
of how the strengthened independence rule affected audit
committees and auditors, the audit committee can pre-
approve audit and non-audit services if it establishes
detailed, pre-approved policies and procedures. Auditors
and audit committee members alike should be cautious in
using this mechanism; it is the responsibility of both to
ensure that approval has been given for the rendering of all
audit and non-audit services, except immaterial services
and a few other narrow exceptions. As the SEC has stated
that the audit committee cannot delegate its responsibili-
ties, audit committee members should be meticulous in doc-
umenting all approvals and any pre-approvals given. The
auditors should carefully review any services that are “pre-
approved” and likewise ensure, as the SEC requires, that
the audit committee is informed of all such services. Also, be
aware that any pre-approval processes adopted by the audit
committee must be disclosed in the proxy statement—there-
by drawing even greater attention to any pre-approved serv-
ices. 
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3. Audit Committee—What Are its Disclosure Obligations?
In What Documents?
— If the company uses an exemption (recent IPO, foreign private issuer,
dual holding companies and “sister” issuers) from the independence
standards for its audit committee members, it must disclose that it
relied on the exemption and how this would materially adversely affect
the committee’s ability to act independently and satisfy the other
requirements imposed on the committee; and 
— This information must be disclosed in the proxy or information state-
ment relating to the election of directors, and disclosed in (or incorpo-
rated by reference into) the company’s annual report. 
4. Audit Committee—Can it Use Third Parties; if so,
Who Pays?
— Has authority to engage independent counsel and other advisors in its
discretion; 
— Company must pay compensation as determined by the audit committee
to the outside auditor for audit, review or attest services; 
— Company must pay compensation to other advisors that the audit com-
mittee deems it appropriate to retain; and 
— Company must pay all necessary or appropriate administrative expens-
es for the committee to discharge its duties. 
5. Audit Committee—What Did the Strengthened
Independence Rule Affect? 
— Obligates the audit committee to pre-approve all audit and non-audit
services (subject to very narrow exceptions such as services valued at
less than five percent of total fees paid) rendered to the company by the
outside audit firm, unless:
• detailed pre-approved policies and procedures are established by the
audit committee,
• the audit committee knows of each non-audit service, and 
• the responsibilities of the audit committee are not delegated to man-
agement; 
— Must have its pre-approval policies and procedures relating to non-audit
services, if any, disclosed in its proxy or information statement; 
— Must receive, prior to the filing of the audit report with the SEC, a
report of the audit firm as to: 
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• all critical accounting policies and practices to be used by the com-
pany;
• all alternative treatments under GAAP for policies and practices for
material items, including (i) implication of such alternative treat-
ments, and (ii) treatments preferred by the outside audit firm; and
• all other material written communications with management,
including the management letter and schedule of unadjusted differ-
ences. 
6. Outside Audit Firm—What Did the Strengthened
Independence Rule Affect? 
— Further circumscribed the definition of independence of the outside
auditor in circumstances where a former member of the audit engage-
ment team is now employed in an accounting or financial reporting over-
sight role at the client;
— Stated that permitted non-audit services can be provided only if pre-
approved by the audit committee;
— Expanded the scope of non-audit services that cannot be provided by the
outside auditor; 
— Mandated lead and concurring partner rotation every five years with a
five year time-out, and a seven year rotation deadline and two year
time-out for other partners;
— As we observed in the last case, prohibited compensation of the audit
partner based on sales of non-audit products and services to their audit
clients; 
— Required communication to the audit committee, as described above, of
a report as to
(i) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used by the
company, 
(ii) all alternative treatments under GAAP for policies and prac-
tices for material items, including (x) implications of such alter-
native treatments, and (y) treatments preferred by the outside
audit firm, and 
(iii) all other material written communications with management,
including the management letter and schedule of unadjusted
differences;
— Expanded disclosure of audit and non-audit fees, including:
• four categories of fees, being audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees
and all other, rather than three categories; and
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• disclosure of such fees during the two most recent fiscal years,
rather than one. 
ETHICAL GUIDES
In a speech to the National Economists Club on April 7, 2003, “SEC
Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate Governance,” SEC
Commissioner Cynthia Glassman made the following observations: 
. . . there are three components to achieving good corporate behavior: 
1) an effective corporate governance process; 
2) punishment of bad behavior—by the company, by civil and crimi-
nal law enforcement and the market; and 
3) an ethical corporate culture. 
We cannot legislate the third factor—an ethical corporate culture, so
our efforts have been directed at the first two: rules to incent good pro-
cedures and behavior, and enforcement actions to disincent bad behav-
ior. 
. . . In the current environment, companies have a strong incentive to
adopt rigorous governance procedures because those that fail to do so
will be unable to attract top quality directors and will pay a risk pre-
mium in terms of both director compensation and possibly officer and
director liability insurance. 
. . . the ultimate effectiveness of the new corporate governance rules will
be determined by the “tone at the top.” Adopting a code of ethics
means little if the company’s chief executive officer or its direc-
tors make clear, by conduct or otherwise, that the code’s provi-
sions do not apply to them.
. . . Corporate officers and directors hold the ultimate power
and responsibility for restoring pubic trust by conducting them-
selves in a manner that is worthy of the trust that is placed in
them.
Practitioner’s Note: Professional Standards, AU sec. 380,
“Communications With Audit Committees,” covers many,
although not all, of the other GAAS requirements for com-
munications with audit committees. To the extent not relat-
ed to accounting policies and procedures, GAAS require-
ments other than AU sec. 380 govern the auditor’s respon-
sibilities, disagreements with management, consultations
with other accountants, major issues covered with manage-
ment before a firm’s engagement, and difficulties that arise
during the audit.
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[Note: The full text of Commissioner Glassman’s speech can be found at
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch040703cag.htm.] 
“Wisdom is knowing what to do next; virtue is doing it.” David Star
Jordan.
“Ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for life. That is what gives me
the fundamental principle of morality, namely, that good consists in
maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying,
injuring, and limiting life are evil.” Albert Schweitzer, Civilization
and Ethics, 1949.
“A regulant shall exercise sensitive professional and moral judgment
in all activities . . . a regulant shall act in a way that serves the public
interest, honors the public trust, and demonstrates commitment to
professionalism.” Virginia Standards of Conduct, CPA Certificate
Holders, 18 VAC 5-21-120(A) and (B). 
“An accountant engaged in the practice of public accounting must
observe all of the provisions of the code of ethics . . . An accountant may
be held responsible for compliance with the code of ethics by all persons
associated with the accountant in the practice of public accounting who
are either under the accountant’s supervision, or who are fellow part-
ners or shareholders or owners with the accountant.” North Dakota
Code of Ethics, Chapter 3-04-01-02 and -03. 
* * * *
Avoid this Pitfall: As pointed up by Commissioner
Glassman’s comments, examples of behavior at the top have
a lot to do with building a corporate culture with the right
values. In other words, it is important to put a code of ethics
in place, but “actions mean more than words.” Given a more
common perception today that officers and directors of pub-
lic companies are simply hogs dining at the trough of
investor capital, your own behavior and that of your col-
leagues mean more than ever to rebuilding the trust to
which Commissioner Glassman referred. In other words,
you should first commit yourself to representing the organi-
zational values and ethics that you, and presumably your
company or firm, most aspire to attain. Demonstrate this
commitment with your actions and ask that others in the
organization do the same. 
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CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE AUDIT
COMMITTEE CHAIR
This case study puts you in the decision-making position as the head of the
audit committee of the board of directors of a public company. A former
employee contacts you with disturbing charges about the company alleging
it has been engaging in “round trip” trades of precious metals with a com-
petitor that were done solely to increase reported revenue and profit. What
is your role here? How would you respond to the circumstances presented? 
Precious Mining Inc. and Your Role 
Founded in 1968, Precious Mining is engaged in exploring, developing and
expanding mining properties yielding precious metals such as gold, plat-
inum and silver. Although the company, known as PM among insiders, has
occasionally developed mining properties that have significant deposits of
non-precious minerals such as nickel, cobalt and antimony, production of
these deposits is typically undertaken only when found in conjunction with
the precious minerals that are PM’s prime objective. Capitalizing on the
run-up in gold, platinum and silver prices that took place at various times
since its formation, PM has developed a reputation in the international
mining community for being a savvy minerals trader that is adept at for-
ward hedging its production at times of prevailing high market prices. 
Initially funded through equity contributions and debt from two insti-
tutional investors with extensive resource and mining experience, PM has
been publicly traded on the AMEX since 1996 and recently completed a fol-
low-on offering that raised $85 million for additional development work on
two gold properties in Australia. Code-named Comet and Titan, these two
properties are expected to significantly increase PM’s production of gold as
the mines are expanded to new depths in order to allow removal of several
highly mineralized zones. The Comet property in particular has yielded
high gold concentrations and significant quantities of associated antimony.
When added to alloys, antimony can be used in lead storage batteries, sol-
der, sheet and pipe metal, bearings, and castings, and can also be used as
an additive to paints, ceramics, and fireworks. 
Your involvement with PM began about seven years ago, when your
work as a consultant in mining finance led you to introduce a Canadian
mining service company to PM. The Canadian firm was looking for a joint
venture partner to share in the cost of developing a mineral separation
technology that appeared to be less environmentally damaging than the
traditional cyanide leaching process. While the technology didn’t pan out,
PM ended up with a 20% ownership interest in the Canadian mining serv-
ice company that appreciated nicely when it was sold two years later at a
45% increase in value over PM’s cost. The chairman of PM, duly impressed
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with your introduction and the financial results of the sales, contacted you
five years ago to ask if you would consider joining the board of directors of
PM. Forming a quick friendship with the chairman, an Aussie named Mick
Stamford, you found yourself nominated to the audit committee when your
accounting and finance background surfaced. A year ago, Mick asked you
to assume the chairmanship of the audit committee as the regulatory envi-
ronment made it clear that only those with finance and accounting back-
grounds such as yours were going to be qualified to lead audit committees
in the new, post-Enron world. With a CPA certificate and an intimate
knowledge of accounting in resource and mineral firms, you understand
well the accounting issues that a firm such as PM has to deal with on a
daily basis. 
Your World Gets Turned Upside Down
One afternoon as you are wrapping up a conference call with another one
of your clients, you happen to be flipping through a series of e-mails you
received that morning, but hadn’t had a chance to respond to. While pay-
ing half-hearted attention to the call, you decide that you can afford to read
and trash some of the assorted junk and industry-related e-mails that come
your way every day, most of which aren’t terribly important. As you are in
the midst of this effort, you open up an e-mail entitled “Must Read—
Precious Mining” that you assume came from Mick or one of your co-direc-
tors. After opening up this item, the message you find is enough to make
your blood run cold. This is the content of the e-mail: 
From: Perry Jacobsen Cc: Amanda Hart, CPA
To: Raleigh Valmont
Subject: Must Read—Precious Mining
Message: Dear Mr. Valmont, 
Until a couple of weeks ago, I was the corporate controller of the
Australian mining division of Precious Mining. I was fired for insubordi-
nation by the division CFO, Rex Donnell, after I discovered that PM has
been inflating revenues by transfering antimony to Carbon Blue, a major
player in the worldwide antimony cartel, in exchange for gold produced by
Carbon Blue at a few of its properties. Funny enough, the value of Carbon
Blue’s purchases from us equaled almost to the penny our purchases of
gold from them in the last two quarters. Even funnier, it seems to me that
Carbon Blue overpaid us for our antimony. I don’t think that was an acci-
dent, but was the quid pro quo for our division’s agreement to keep our
antimony off of the world market. I respect Mick, you and the rest of the
team at PM and hope you’ll take action to look into this, because I’d hate
to have to hire a barrister there in the U.S. to sue PM to get my job back.
Chapter 8: Case 8—Precious Mining Inc. 155
09-Chapter 08.qxd  10/16/2002  9:28 AM  Page 155
I’ve copied Amanda Hart at Global Accounting and Auditing, as I think she
needs to know about this too. I wish you all the best and just ask that you’ll
straighten this out by getting rid of Rex Donnell. He is the problem at
Precious Mining. Yours very truly, Perry Jacobsen 
Attempting to digest this flood of unwelcome information, you ring off
the conference call and call Mick, who is then on a call but whose assistant
promises to have Mick contact you as soon as he’s off. A few minutes later,
Mick’s call is announced and you pick up the phone. 
“Top a’ the afternoon, mate. I don’t suppose ya’d be calling about a cer-
tain e-mail from me good friend Perry down under?” 
Taken aback and wondering if Mick was reading your e-mails, you
manage to croak out a reply. “Mick, if this meant to remind me of your
mind reading skills learned in the outback, I’m convinced, ok? Now what
the heck is going on down there?”
“Well, Raleigh, this is the lay of the land. I was just on the horn with
that very nice lady from Global Accounting, who told me rather sternly
that I’d better get me audit committee members hoppin’ like a bunch a’
roos, or she’d have to serve me up for supper at the next stockholder meet-
ing. She sounded about as nervous as one of those scarlet letter types in a
revival meetin’ . . .” Exasperated, you interrupted Mick’s remarks with a
lecture of your own. 
“Mick, whatever Amanda told you, believe it. Stuff like this in today’s
environment is D-E-A-T-H, Mick, first for the company and then for the
auditor! Before you know it, we could have the SEC, the New York
Attorney General, and the Justice Department down our throats and try-
ing to give us a tonsillectomy. I’m telling you, we’re going to have to get to
the bottom of this, double time, or someone will do it for us, and the results
will be a lot less pleasant under those circumstances.”
Mick responded in a correspondingly serious tone. “Raleigh, I’m not
attemptin’ to make light of this and I’m not dismissin’ it, but so far all I’ve
got is a forwarded e-mail that makes a bunch of accusations with not a
shred of support. You know, the first thing I think is, why didn’t this
Jacobsen send the e-mail to me? Maybe ‘cause he’s in league with those
robber barons out of London who want to take over our company, right?
Maybe he figures that if he raises enough cain, he can get me forced out,
and PM becomes an easy takeover target. Before you and Amanda get too
concerned here, let me do some diggin’ and see what I can find out about
Jacobsen and our CFO down under. Who knows, maybe they’ve tussled
before and this was just the sore loser comin’ back for one last bite at the
apple, right?”
“Mick, I understand what you’re saying and you’re right—this may be
just that simple. But now that it’s in Amanda’s hands and the allegations
involve our accounting, we’ve got to respond quickly, and I’ll have to bring
in the audit committee to consider what needs to be done, if anything. Like
I was saying earlier, the price we pay in today’s world is that everyone will
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assume the worst until proven otherwise—so if you can get some prelimi-
nary info on this situation, I’ll call the other audit committee members and
get them up to speed about what’s going on. You better call in our esteemed
counselor as well, since we may need some advice on how to go from here.
Are you with me on this?” Unintentionally, you find yourself holding your
breath, wondering if Mick is going to argue with you about what needs to
be done or if he’s somehow going to try to stonewall. 
Mick’s response is reassuring and instantly puts you more at ease.
“Raleigh, all I can say is, we’ll get to the bottom of this, and we’ll do the
right thing, don’t you worry. I didn’t grow up on roo steak and croc stew
just to get scared off by some cockamamie screwball!” Micks rings off and
you start placing calls to your two fellow audit committee members. 
The Next Day 
The following morning, you hear back from Mick, who has definitely done
some digging around. As he puts it, Jacobsen has gone “off the reef,” and
has a history of problems with Donnell that span at least the last 12
months. Mick has gotten a complete ledger of purchases and sales of anti-
mony and gold that PM has completed with Carbon Blue over the last five
years, and he volunteers to e-mail it over to you and to Amanda at Global
Accounting right away. In the meantime, Mick fills you in on what he’s
learned. 
“You know, Raleigh, there’s never a simple explanation for situations
like this, right? This one is no different. According to Donnell, Jacobsen
hired a barrister several months ago to, as Donnell put it, “threaten”
Donnell and Precious Mining with legal action if Jacobsen lost his job. It
sounds like Jacobsen was just setting us up for a wrongful termination
suit, and had even gone to the extent of contacting U.S. counsel, which in
turn had written our in-house counsel, about his grievances.” 
Avoid this Pitfall: Situations such as this are, unfortu-
nately, more common in today’s litigious world. Oftentimes,
whistleblowers are dismissed by management teams and
even auditors as disgruntled ex-employees looking for
revenge or for a “pay-day.” If so, the new whistleblower pro-
tections enacted under Sarbanes-Oxley, including criminal
penalties for threatening or intimidating whistleblowers,
mean that management and audit committees must tread
very lightly when dealing with situations of this nature.
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“Did Donnell or our in-house people think Jacobsen had a basis for
these accounting allegations?” you ask. 
“It doesn’t sound like it, Raleigh, but Donnell seemed to me to be a lit-
tle concerned when I asked him to send up the Carbon Blue information. I
haven’t had a chance to look it over yet, but maybe you and I can get
together later today to see if there’s anything we should be worried about.
Are you free around 2?”
You agree to meet Mick at 2 and, before you can even contact your
audit committee members to bring them up to speed, the receptionist
announces a call from Amanda at Global Accounting. Picking up the phone,
you notice a distinct change in the tone of Amanda’s voice since your last
call, and her words serve only to increase your apprehension. 
“Raleigh, we received the schedules on the Carbon Blue purchases and
sales this morning from Mick. Have you had a look at them yet?”
“No,” you reply, “I’ve been on the phone most of the morning and was
just about to get to them.”
“We’ve had a chance to look through them in some detail, and we’ve
got some concerns, Raleigh. If you’ve got a few minutes, Ray Travers and I
would like to come down and brief you on our view of things.” Amanda’s
reference to her concurring partner, a supercilious man with a pencil thin
moustache and a penchant for thousand dollar suits, sets you instantly on
edge. “Amanda, I’d be happy to sit down with you all, but give me an hour
or so to get some of the fires put out on my desk first.” 
Finishing the call with a somewhat strained exchange of pleasantries,
you put everything else aside to begin looking at the Carbon Blue sched-
ules of gold purchases and antimony sales. A few things jump out at you
right away—the antimony sales to Carbon Blue, measured in dollars, have
increased every year, but nearly doubled in the last 18 months. The sched-
ule, unfortunately, lacks price data, so you ask your assistant to get you
quarterly highs and lows for gold and antimony over the last three years.
The gold schedule shows a general uptrend in purchases by PM, but
increases at a much slower rate than the antimony sales. Glancing over the
last two quarters and the market price information, you can tell that the
alleged offsetting purchases and sales do appear to be nearly identical in
Given the new requirements that audit committees have
confidential and anonymous means for receiving and deal-
ing with accounting complaints, you might expect account-
ing issues raised by former employees to decline, but the
reality is that the new system for reporting accounting com-
plaints may not eliminate this phenomenon. Auditors
should especially be tuned in to issues that are posed by for-
mer and current employees, and be certain that the audit
committee acts on (or investigates) any issues raised by
these persons.
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dollar amounts, a disturbing fact that tends to lend credence to the allega-
tions made by Jacobsen. Before Amanda and Ray arrive, you put in a quick
call to Mick to seek his reaction to that fact. 
“Mick, Raleigh here. I’ve had a chance to look over the schedules and
it seems to me like Jacobsen may be right at least about one thing—the
nearly equal purchases and sales of gold and antimony in the last two
quarters. Have you had a chance to ask Donnell about that?”
“I did, Raleigh, and he pointed out that Project Comet was single-
handedly responsible for doubling our antimony production in the last 18
months, which is the reason the sale side of the ledger is going up so fast.
He also said that, while our purchases and sales were awfully close in the
last two quarters, we bought gold at spot prices from a number of the anti-
mony cartel members, and it was just coincidence that the numbers were
so close; in fact, he said we have since bought 25,000 ounces from Carbon
Blue and that they’ve only purchased a nominal amount of antimony in the
current quarter. Then I called our VP of production and asked him to get
me the antimony production numbers from Comet. I didn’t like what I
heard, I’ll tell ya’. He said that antimony production has increased only
50% from the Comet property in the last 18 months. I’m still having the
numbers run, Raleigh, but Jacobsen may not be all wet.” Mick’s last words
are spoken in a heavy, sad tone, leaving you with an overwhelming sense
of foreboding as Amanda and Ray’s arrival is announced. You mouth some
reassuring words to Mick and ring off, wishing you felt anything like the
words you had just spoken. 
You make your way to the conference room where Amanda and Ray
await, aware that the office suddenly seems uncomfortably warm. As you
walk in, you paste a smile on your face, trying hard not to let Ray’s preen-
ing appearance or the smug look on his face distract your attention.
Amanda is reasonably pleasant, but launches into the subject matter with-
out delay. 
Avoid this Pitfall: “Round trip” trading has been shown to
be an issue not just among energy traders, but in any indus-
try where competitors (or potential competitors) buy from,
or sell to, each other. One of the tip-offs to round-tripping is
the matching of purchases and sales in particular periods
which may not match to the dollar, but appear suspiciously
close. Alert auditors and audit committee members serving
companies in industries that are susceptible to round-trip-
ping must be sensitive to this issue and should carefully
review relationships with suppliers/customers with which a
company does business. Without implying wrongdoing, clos-
er scrutiny of transactions with suppliers/customers may
reduce the temptation for officers or employees to use
round-tripping to inflate operating results. 
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“Raleigh, I guess what we’d like to do is summarize what we know at
this point and get some input from you about where we, and you all, go
from here. After I got Jacobsen’s e-mail, we talked to Mick, the Australian
CEO and Donnell, the CFO, and pulled copies of the schedules that Mick
sent on to you and us. I would say we understand the fact that Jacobsen
may be just a vindictive ex-employee, but the similarity in the numbers for
purchases and sales of gold and antimony in the last two quarters can’t be
ignored, particularly since “round-tripping” trades are such a hot topic
these days. Of course, we’re not accusing anyone of anything, because if we
were at that point, we’d probably have sent over our resignation letter and
notified the SEC that we have a Section 10A issue.” 
You nod, intent on hearing Amanda out, when Ray interrupts. “I’m not
sure I share my colleague’s more optimistic assessment of the management
team’s integrity at PM, but I’ve assured her I will not rush to judgment
given our long-time relationship. Quite frankly, I’ve harbored my own sus-
picions about PM’s conduct in certain situations, but thus far I’ve been
unable to come up with any tangible evidence of wrongdoing.” Ray leans
forward, almost seeming to relish the chance to rub your nose in the facts,
his moustache quivering like a mouse’s whiskers. “It seems that, at this
point, that tangible evidence may be forthcoming.” 
Before you can unleash a harsh rebuke at Ray, Amanda quickly deliv-
ers a well-timed speech. “We are not going to reach any conclusions,
Raleigh, until we’ve given the audit committee time to conduct an internal
investigation. Our firm has decided that the audit committee should be
given the chance to retain counsel and a forensic team to examine the
transactions with Carbon Blue. We were hoping that you might concur and
agree to share with us any report that results. If we agree on this, our firm
will refrain from taking any action until PM has a chance to fully investi-
gate the facts. We can’t assure you of our continued services once we’ve
seen the report, but our risk management committee has agreed to consid-
er what actions PM takes in response to the internal investigation before
making a final determination of our response. Can we count on the audit
committee to proceed promptly with its inquiry?”
“I haven’t yet discussed an internal investigation with the other audit
committee members, Amanda, but given our new authority to retain coun-
sel and any other professional assistance we need, I would expect that we’ll
want to get to the bottom of this as much as anyone,” you reply. “The one
thing I don’t know is what our sharing the report with you does to our
attorney-client privilege. While I know the SEC usually gets these reports
through voluntary disclosure under Section 21A or by using its subpoena
powers, I’d hate to see any questionable information fall into the hands of
the class action lawyers. If we can work that out, though, I’d say we will
probably be willing to get going on the investigation and share the results
with you.” Amanda, looking somewhat relieved, takes her leave with Ray
before he can interject any further unpleasantness into the conversation.
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When you’ve returned to your office, you pick up a few voice mails,
among which is one from Mick. “Raleigh, I just wanted you to know that
Donnell has left the office and the CEO in Australia says that he won’t be
coming back. It sounds to me like Donnell as much as admitted that he’d
been cooking the books in league with his equal over at Carbon Blue, and
that Jacobsen found out about this and was blackmailing him. Project
Comet’s production and sales numbers were evidently inflated somehow in
order to keep the scheme going and allow us and Carbon Blue to book off-
setting sales amounts. I’m not sure yet if this means we’ve short-changed
Carbon Blue or vice versa, but I guess we’ll be looking into that, as well as
if our production people were somehow involved. I’m sorry to have to relay
this news, but I knew you’d want to know ASAP. Call me once you get this
and we’ll discuss what happens now.” 
Situational Analysis
1. At the end of the first day, before your meeting with the auditors and the
later call and voice mail from Mick, the case study indicates that you
placed calls to your two fellow audit committee members. What would
have been your first priority in these calls to the audit committee mem-
bers?
(a) Have a resolution adopted permitting an internal investigation 
(b) Confer regarding how to deal with Mick’s role in the situation 
(c) Seek their opinions on whether to contact Jacobsen to get further
information
(d) Review the facts as you know them as of that time and lay the
groundwork for action once further facts are known
Practitioner Response: The correct answer is (d). The case study makes it
clear that you need more facts as of that time, and that you can’t really take
any action until more facts are clear. For this reason, having the committee
adopt a resolution as is suggested in answer (a) is not the best course of
action or, at a minimum, is likely premature. Answer (b) is not the best
answer given the facts that are then known, as any role that Mick seems to
be playing in the events at issue is minimal at best. Answer (c) is a red her-
ring, as this answer would take you far outside the role of an audit commit-
tee and, if conversations with Jacobsen did take place, could compromise
Precious Mining’s position in any litigation that followed. Arguably, answer
(c) could be correct if an internal investigation was authorized or if Jacobsen
hadn’t disclosed the basis for his claims, but the case study gives you suffi-
cient facts so as to eliminate those possibilities at this stage. Also, seeking
the opinion of your fellow audit committee members might be comforting,
but on the issue of whether to contact a party likely adverse to the company,
talking to counsel would be a better choice.
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2. If Jacobsen’s e-mail was correct in asserting that Carbon Blue had over-
paid PM for its antimony purchases in order to keep the antimony off of
the world market, did PM do anything illegal or unethical? 
(a) No, PM’s conduct was both legal and within ethical boundaries
(b) No, the fact that Carbon Blue overpaid for the antimony was Carbon
Blue’s choice, and PM isn’t responsible for Carbon’s Blue’s actions
(c) Yes, PM’s actions were both illegal and unethical
(d) Yes, PM’s actions were unethical but were not illegal
3. If Jacobsen’s charges of what was going on were substantiated, what are
the consequences that PM might face for its role in these events?
(a) Its auditors might resign and may submit a Section 10A report to
the SEC
(b) PM’s financial statements might have to be restated 
(c) PM might face penalties for violating the FCPA and antitrust law,
not to mention disclosure requirements
Practitioner Response: Even though you are not rendering legal advice in
your capacity as a member of the audit committee, it should be obvious that
there are some legal issues lurking in the information that Jacobsen passed
along. For example, if the overpayment by Carbon Blue was considered to be
a bribe, commission, fee, or other payment made in violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), PM may well face action by the SEC or pri-
vate litigants. Also, under U.S. antitrust law, payments made to facilitate
anti-competitive behavior or in furtherance of a scheme to dominate or con-
trol a market could be assumed to be illegal. The issue of whether PM knew
what it was being paid for (that is, it had intent to participate in and further
the scheme) is also implied by the facts, since presumably PM was in a posi-
tion to know the prevailing market price at the time it was overpaid for its
antimony. For these reasons alone, answer (a) is not correct. Answer (b) is
attractive on its face, but it forces you to ignore the ethical issues surround-
ing PM’s participation in what took place. While it may be true that PM isn’t
responsible for what Carbon Blue does, PM’s acceptance of a payment over
the market price makes PM responsible for what likely are illegal and ethi-
cally “challenged” transactions. Looking at this another way, an unethical
choice of which you are aware that is made by a third party does not allow
you to look the other way, particularly if you are benefiting by that unethi-
cal choice. Answer (c) is the correct answer, as it acknowledges both the ille-
gal and unethical nature of PM’s conduct and involvement in whatever went
on. Answer (d) requires you to speculate on the nature of PM’s legal respon-
sibility for these events, but if you concluded that PM’s situation likely vio-
lated the FCPA or antitrust laws, you can see that answer (c) was the better
choice.
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(d) Class action lawsuits brought by investors who bought PM’s stock
while the overpayments were occurring
(e) A temporary bar from performing services under government con-
tracts
(f) All of the above
4. Assume that at the end of the first call you had with Mick following
receipt of the e-mail from Jacobsen, instead of Mick saying that “we’ll
get to the bottom of this,” he told you that you were overreacting and
that he would handle this unless and until the auditors said you’d have
to get the audit committee involved. What would you do under those cir-
cumstances? 
(a) Advise Mick that you and the two other committee members would
have to be involved given the responsibilities of the audit committee 
(b) Tell Mick that you would wait to hear from the auditors 
(c) Call the auditors and ask for their assessment of the situation
(d) Tell Mick that he was correct and wait to hear more from him
Practitioner Response: If the answers given above appear to be a litany of
all the horrible things that can happen to a company engaged in round-trip
transactions designed to increase revenues and earnings, there is a reason
why: these answers include many of those potential nasty consequences.
While not an exhaustive list, all of the answers given are possible outcomes
to PM’s involvement in round-tripping. If you were to review the conse-
quences visited on Enron, Williams Energy and Qwest, among others, you
would find that answers (b), (c) and (d) are common results in these situa-
tions. Answer (a) is also correct, since it does not require you to conclude that
the auditor will resign, only that it might. Likewise, this answer doesn’t say
that a Section 10A report will result, only that it may. 
One of the questions about whether or not a 10A report would be
required relates to the issue of whether the involvement of the division’s
CFO (or others at the divisional or subsidiary level) is enough to cause the
auditor to reach a conclusion about management integrity and the commis-
sion of illegal acts at the parent company. Absent some demonstration of
complicity at senior levels of the organization, neither resignation nor a 10A
report would seem to be required, although these remain obvious possibili-
ties. Therefore, the phrasing of both the question and the answer lead you to
accept that answer (a) is also correct. As to answer (e), if PM were found to
be criminally liable for its role in the scheme, either under the FCPA or
antitrust laws, the possibility of a bar from performing work under govern-
ment contracts is also a potential result. Taken together, all of the answers
are consequences that PM might face, meaning that answer (f) is the correct
answer to the problem.
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5. If SEC Commissioner Glassman is correct in stating that you cannot leg-
islate an ethical corporate culture, what are the things you would want
to have in place at Precious Mining to promote ethical behavior? 
(a) ineffective corporate governance 
(b) a comprehensive ethics policy for all employees with consequences
for misbehavior
(c) a wide variety of transactions between PM and Mick 
(d) an audit committee made up of only independent members with a
charter that gives the committee autonomy and power at least equal
to that required by the SEC and exchange listing standards
(e) Answers (a) and (c)
(f) Answers (b) and (d)
Practitioner Response: This question is designed to remind you of the
audit committee’s role as well as its responsibilities. The correct answer is
answer (a), because this acknowledges that the audit committee’s responsi-
bilities rise above whatever position management or the auditors take with
respect to an issue involving financial reporting and a complaint involving
accounting. If you think back to the listing standards highlighted at the
beginning of this Chapter, you’ll recall that the audit committee is responsi-
ble for providing oversight of the outside auditor, for resolving disagree-
ments between management and the outside auditor, and for addressing
complaints concerning accounting, internal controls and audit issues. If you
answered this question by selecting answer (b), this would have placed you
in the position of deferring an issue to the auditors which is clearly within
the purview of the audit committee. Keep in mind that, no matter what the
auditors do, you must still fulfill your responsibilities as an audit committee
member, which means you cannot simply defer difficult issues or complaints
by referring them to the auditor. 
Similarly, answer (c) might be something you would want to do, but
doesn’t really result in the audit committee taking appropriate action given
what has occurred. This is not to say that you wouldn’t want the auditor’s
assessment, rather that getting that assessment does not in and of itself dis-
charge your duty given what’s happened. This is the same reason that
answer (d) is incorrect. Deferring to management, like deferring to the audi-
tor, doesn’t allow the audit committee members to say they’ve discharged
their duty to the company or its stockholders. In this case study, as in life,
you must focus on what your duty is and to whom you owe that duty.
Secondarily, you can take into account the input of others as to what infor-
mation they have that will help you discharge that duty. 
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6. Assume for a moment that you were in the shoes of Amanda, the exter-
nal auditor at Global Accounting. If your firm’s resignation hinged upon
the conclusions reached in the internal investigation to be undertaken
by the audit committee and its representatives, what are the most crit-
ical points you would want addressed before, during and after the inves-
tigation? 
Practitioner Response: Approaching this question in the three stages of
before, during and after the investigation, here are some suggestions for the
most critical points: 
Before
what is the scope of the investigation; limited? If so, by what and by whom?
— what is the budget for the investigation; is it adequate to do the job?
— who will be retained to conduct the investigation? What are their qualifi-
cations?
— to whom will the report be furnished? Will Global get a copy?
— to whom will the investigators report?
— how long will the investigation and report preparation take?
Practitioner Response: The correct answer to this question is (f), meaning
that both answers (b) and (d) are correct. Answer (b) points out that an ethics
policy is always a good idea, but that without consequences, the ethics poli-
cy would lack teeth. For this reason, you would want to have legislated the
ethics policy, but also made sure that everyone knew you would back up the
policy with action where necessary. Answer (d) is also correct, in that it high-
lights the most desirable composition for the audit committee (all independ-
ent members) as well as empowering it with authority that meets or exceeds
today’s legal requirements. While it’s possible to carry a good thing to excess
(at least from management’s point of view), it is difficult to argue today with
an audit committee possessing expanded powers that might exceed those
required by the SEC, stock exchanges and NASDAQ. 
Answer (a) is incorrect because it refers to “ineffective” rather than
“effective” corporate governance. Obviously, ineffective governance is exact-
ly what you don’t want. As to answer (c), it is incorrect because the existence
of a wide variety of related party transactions between the company and the
CEO is more descriptive of a poorly governed corporation, rather than one in
which there are minimal related party transactions. In effect, the presence
of a great number of these transactions is arguably linked to companies in
which management has a compliant board, rather than one where the board
and the audit committee seek to avoid transactions with inherent conflicts of
interest.
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7. As the head of the audit committee at PM and without knowing any
additional facts, what changes in policies or procedures would you rec-
ommend be adopted by management and the audit committee in
response to what evidently took place with Carbon Blue? 
Practitioner Response: Perhaps the overriding issue that this question
should prompt you to consider is whether PM’s internal controls are ade-
quate and, if not, what changes should be made. If PM has a practice of doing
business with other mining companies or mineral trading firms, the possi-
bility clearly exists for “round trip” trading to occur in the future.
Accordingly, as head of the audit committee, you (and the auditors) would
want management to adopt procedures and systems that are designed to
highlight unusual trading patterns, offsetting buys and sales, and variations
from prevailing market prices (collectively referred to as “trading practices”),
to name just a few. Strengthening the company’s ethics policies and the con-
sequences for deviating from these policies when dealing with suppliers and
customers would also seem to be an appropriate response. The audit com-
mittee would also have to examine its procedures for receipt (and action 
During
— what evidence is uncovered of wrongdoing and the company’s response
— thorough use of investigative techniques consistent with investigative
scope and budget
— progress reports—to whom, when, and what will be included
— assurance of independence of investigation and lack of interference with
investigation from management or third parties
— calculation of impact on financial statements, reporting obligations, and
previously filed disclosure
— demonstrated willingness to pursue information unearthed to the fullest
extent
After
— consequences are visited on all responsible parties in proportion to wrong-
doing
— curative actions—what steps are implemented to reduce likelihood of a
repeat performance?
— curative disclosure—what type of disclosure is proposed and filed; what
are responses given by company to regulators’ inquiries
— what penalties are imposed on the company and management by regula-
tors and third parties
— assessment of investigation’s achievement of objectives, future risk
assessment, whether management integrity is implicated
— evaluation of report conclusions, recommendations and factual inquiries
— evaluation of civil versus criminal culpability and evidence of same
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8. The case study ends with you getting Mick’s voice mail that relays the
bad news but which also says you and he need to discuss what happens
next. Let’s assume that in the course of proceeding, management and
the audit committee, in consultation with counsel, decide that they are
going to do everything they can to cooperate with the SEC in order to
lessen PM’s exposure. What are the steps that the audit committee
should recommend be taken to minimize PM’s exposure?
taken in response to) employee complaints to determine if Jacobsen might
have approached the situation differently if another avenue for dealing with
the issue was available. 
Because the audit committee would be under a heightened degree of
scrutiny after the facts in the case study became public, the audit committee
might want to undertake an on-going independent review of reports and
analyses prepared by management with respect to trading practices. In addi-
tion, the audit committee would want to put the issue of trading practices
“front and center” when holding discussions with the outside auditors about
accounting policies, internal controls and significant or unusual transac-
tions. Similarly, meetings with management to discuss compliance with
internal codes of ethics, financial reporting and internal accounting controls
would need to address trading practices, monitoring and reporting. Under its
obligation to oversee the internal audit function, the audit committee would
also want to review the internal audit plan in detail as it related to trading
practices, discuss the internal accounting controls governing trading prac-
tices with the internal audit staff, and discuss efforts to uncover irregulari-
ties in trading practices. The audit committee would then need to follow-up
by reviewing any findings made by the internal audit staff and evaluating
what actions were taken by management in response to the findings. 
Management would want to undertake many of the same actions as the
audit committee that are described above, perhaps only at a greater level of
detail and scrutiny. In other words, Mick and the CFO would want to evalu-
ate, monitor and upgrade internal controls with respect to trading practices,
including how data is generated, evaluated, and aggregated, how trading
operations are supervised, and who is responsible for trading practices over-
sight. The reporting and disclosure function is first and foremost the respon-
sibility of management, so senior executives would have to put policies and
procedures in place for their own protection, much less the protection of the
board, audit committee and outside auditors.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
Guidance for audit committee members in particular, and board members
generally, is available from various on-line and hard copy sources. Among
the more popular sources are the National Association of Corporate
Directors (www.nacdonline.org), Harvard Business School Executive
Education programs (www.exed.hbs.edu) and materials from Financial
Executives International (www.fei.org). In addition, AICPA publishes
materials and offers seminars covering issues related to director and audit
committee matters (www.cpa2biz.com). 
Practitioner Response: The following are the steps that have been cited
by the SEC as demonstrating intent to cooperate when a company is faced
with self-reporting and rectifying illegal conduct: 
• prompt reporting “up the ladder” from internal audit staff, to manage-
ment, to the board and to the audit committee;
• hiring of counsel and/or forensic auditors to conduct a prompt and thor-
ough inquiry; 
• dismissal of responsible employees or officers, including those with over-
sight responsibility;
• prompt disclosure publicly and to the SEC of the need for restatement of
financials; 
• a pledge of complete cooperation with the SEC enforcement staff that is
followed up with action; 
• providing the SEC with a comprehensive internal investigative report,
including detailed notes, transcripts of interviews and other supporting
information;
• determining not to rely on the attorney-client, work product or other priv-
ileges to avoid making full disclosure of facts; 
• strengthening the company’s financial reporting processes and internal
controls to address the conduct that took place, including developing new
processes or controls, adding to internal accounting or auditing staff,
redesigning the internal audit plan, and more intensive supervision of
internal accounting personnel. 
The SEC issued a “Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions” (Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1470, October 23, 2001; see
www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm) which discusses these
factors. This release also discusses the Commission’s determination not to
initiate enforcement action against a parent company that undertook to
cooperate by taking the actions described above when it discovered wrong-
doing in a significant subsidiary.
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The complete exchange and NASDAQ listing requirements related to
audit committees are available in “Standards Relating to Listed Company
Audit Committees,” Release No. 33-8220, April 9, 2003. Audit firms should
refer to these materials as well as SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit
Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 380), as
amended by SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments (AU secs. 310, 333, and 380),
and SAS No. 90 Audit Committee Communications (AU secs. 380 and 722).
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CHAPTER 9
CASE 9—
INCISIVE LASERS CORPORATION:
YOU ARE THE OUTSIDE COUNSEL
This chapter’s case study asks you to put yourself in the position of serving
as outside counsel to a controller of a public company who has been accused
by the SEC of participating in wrongdoing. The case seeks your evaluation
of the controller’s conduct from an outsider’s perspective, and calls for you
to apply your knowledge of applicable professional standards and discipli-
nary outcomes that may come to bear. As you consider the issues, keep in
mind the discussion of Rule 102(e) and state disciplinary rules that are cov-
ered below.
FOCUS POINTS
In January 2003, the Commission released its “Report Pursuant to Section
703 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Study and Report on Violations By
Securities Professionals” (available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703
report.pdf). The report indicates that from 1998 through 2001, there were
a total of 127 actions instituted against securities professionals under Rule
102(e) for violations of Federal securities laws. Rule 102(e) allows the SEC
to bar or suspend a professional from practicing before the Commission for:
• lacking qualifications, character or integrity;
• having engaged in unethical or improper conduct;
• having willfully violated, or aided and abetted the violation, of the
Federal securities laws, or a finding of the same by a court or the SEC;
• having a state license suspended or revoked;
• conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; and
10-Chapter 09.qxd  10/16/2002  9:29 AM  Page 171
• the entry of a permanent injunction from violating or aiding or abetting
violation of the Federal securities laws.
The SEC’s report found that 84 of the 127 actions taken under Rule
102(e) involved willful violations of the Federal securities laws or injunc-
tions against future violations. Although no statistics are given with
respect to the penalties handed out, a review of completed 102(e) proceed-
ings indicates that most conclude with a two year suspension to a lifetime
bar for the professional. Due to the time lag associated with administrative
proceedings, most of the 102(e) bars or suspensions imposed after a trial
before an administrative law judge relate to financial statements prepared
or filed anywhere from two to four years before the 102(e) action is con-
cluded. Unless many of the bad actors in the financial scandals of recent
times agree to consent orders with the SEC, it is reasonable to expect that
a significant number of 102(e) bars or suspensions will be leveled against
financial managers and auditors in the near future.
Rule 102(e) was amended by the SEC in October 1998 in Release No.
33-7593 “Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of
Practice,” to add a definition of “improper professional conduct” by account-
ants. As amended, Rule 102(e) includes a statutory definition of specific
conduct by accountants, as opposed to professionals generally, that will
result in the SEC taking action against members of the profession. The fol-
lowing types of conduct that violate applicable professional standards are
defined as improper professional conduct by accountants:
— intentional, knowing or reckless conduct;
— a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct in circumstances
where the accountant knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny
is warranted; or
— repeated instances of unreasonable conduct that indicate a lack of com-
petence to practice before the SEC.
Although the wording of the definition means that accountants won’t
be subject to discipline for a single act of simple negligence, the SEC did
state its view that even two instances of negligent conduct occurring with-
in one audit could meet the threshold for action under Rule 102(e).
Conversely, an accountant can be disciplined by the SEC if a single act of
negligence is “highly unreasonable” and occurs under circumstances where
the accountant knew or should have known that heightened scrutiny was
called for. Release No. 33-7593 indicated that heightened scrutiny is war-
ranted where “matters are important or material, or when warning signals
or other factors should alert an accountant of a heightened risk . . .”
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REGULATORY ISSUES
Unfortunately, the rash of accounting frauds and restatements that pre-
ceded and accompanied the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley is certain to engen-
der Rule 102(e) penalties for financial officers and managers, engagement
partners, concurring partners and even engagement managers. There are
many lessons to be learned from the misfortunes of others, and perhaps the
most important lesson that can be drawn from recent history is that no one
is above the law. When temptation crosses your path and you give even a
second thought to doing what you know is wrong, remember some of the
following cases, all of which are completed, rather than pending, 102(e) or
injunctive proceedings:
• W. R. Grace—Considered the poster child for earnings management in
the 1990’s, W.R.Grace in 1999 settled an administrative proceeding with
the SEC by agreeing to cease and desist from violating the Exchange Act
and contributing $1 million to programs to increase awareness and edu-
cation related to financial statements and GAAP. As a result of changes
in Medicare reimbursement procedures, Grace’s principal health care
subsidiary experienced a significant increase in revenue and earnings.
When queried about what to do with its “excess” earnings, Grace senior
management instructed the subsidiary to keep the earnings in a reserve.
The reserve was later released to earnings as requested by Grace senior
management, in order to smooth earnings over a period of approximate-
ly four years.  The president and chief executive officer, chief financial
officer, controller, and assistant controller of W.R. Grace, the controller
of the subsidiary and the engagement and concurring partners at
PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) agreed to cease and desist orders and
virtually all of the senior executives involved in the earnings manage-
ment left or were fired by Grace in 1996 and 1997.
• In May 2003, the SEC announced a settlement of an enforcement action
against PwC in connection with its audit of SmarTalk TeleServices. At
the end of 1997, SmarTalk had established a $25 million restructuring
reserve. A portion of the reserve was for costs that were not proper
restructuring costs and SmarTalk had failed to establish a plan of
restructuring at the time the reserve was established. After conducting
a post-audit review of the audit working papers, PwC became aware of
potential issues with the audit and at about the same time, a share-
holder class action lawsuit was filed against SmarTalk. PwC then made
undocumented revisions to its working papers, discarded some working
papers, and added new documents to the working papers. PwC also
deleted and discarded most of its “desk files” during this same time peri-
od. The settlement with the SEC resulted in PwC being censured, agree-
ing to pay $1 million to the SEC, and adopting new document retention
Chapter 9: Case 9—Incisive Lasers 173
10-Chapter 09.qxd  10/16/2002  9:29 AM  Page 173
policies. The engagement partner at PwC was barred from practicing
before the SEC under Rule 102(e) with leave to reapply after one year,
and the CFO of SmarTalk agreed to a cease and desist order, paid
$23,000 in disgorgement and a $50,000 civil penalty.
• In January 2003, Philip Harlow, the engagement partner on the
Sunbeam Corporation audit for Arthur Andersen, was barred from prac-
ticing before the SEC for three years. Harlow proposed certain adjust-
ments that management rejected, and Harlow passed on the adjust-
ments after performing quantitative materiality analysis. This resulted
in Andersen’s audit reports on those financial statements being inaccu-
rate as the financials were not in conformance with GAAP and the audit
was not conducted in accordance with GAAS.
• In December 2002, the SEC barred Betty Vinson, a CPA who served as
the director of management reporting of WorldCom, from appearing
before it. The SEC found that during the third and fourth quarters of
2000, at the direction of WorldCom senior management, Vinson and oth-
ers improperly decreased reserves and line costs by corresponding
amounts to overstate pre-tax earnings by $828 million and at least $407
million in these quarters. Then, from the first quarter 2001 through the
first quarter 2002, at the direction of WorldCom senior management,
Vinson and others improperly capitalized line costs to overstate pre-tax
earnings by approximately $3.8 billion.
• Just to present a contrast to WorldCom and the size of the entries in
question, consider the case against the accounting manager for
Computone Corporation that was settled in September 1999. The
accounting manager had only been with Computone for just over a year,
but while employed there, he recorded three sales as revenues that
Avoid this Pitfall: This case is instructive on two points.
First, Vinson was not a senior executive of WorldCom,
meaning that lower level employees who are CPAs can be
held responsible if they participate in making improper
entries on a company’s financial statements. Second, the
SEC took the position that relying on the instructions of
senior management did not relieve Vinson of the duty to
have proper documentary support for the entries in question
or the duty to ensure that the financial statements con-
formed with GAAP. In other words, a CPA is and will be
held to a higher standard when questionable entries are
made that should cause the CPA to question why the entries
are being made and where the support for the entries can be
found. Reliance on directives from senior officers is not
enough!
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resulted in income being overstated by $186,000. Even though the
accounting manager was not an officer, the SEC held him responsible
because he had signed the accounting representation letter to the audi-
tors and “as the highest ranking certified public accountant in
Computone’s accounting department, he routinely performed the func-
tions of a comptroller.” This situation resulted in the accounting man-
ager agreeing to a cease and desist order with the SEC.
• In November 2002, the SEC took action to bar under Rule 102(e) the
engagement partner, concurring partner and senior manager involved
in the audit of financial statements of MERL Holdings from practicing
before it for various periods. The SEC found numerous audit failures
had been committed by the audit team, including the failure to recom-
mend appropriate adjustments, failure to audit significant (and wildly
overvalued) assets, and failure to question the consolidation of a pur-
ported controlled subsidiary. The SEC concluded that the audit had not
been conducted in accordance with GAAS and had incorrectly stated in
the report that the financial statements were presented in accordance
with GAAP.
In addition to the exposure that outside auditors face under Rule
102(e), the SEC has also made it abundantly clear that it intends to enforce
compliance with Section 10A of the Exchange Act by naming outside audi-
tors as defendants in administrative actions resulting from illegal acts. In
October 2000, the SEC brought it first injunctive case against an auditor
for violating Section 10A. In that case, the SEC alleged that the company,
Solucorp Industries Ltd., had backdated a license agreement and had
given the partner at the audit firm a copy of the backdated agreement.
Even though he concluded that the license had been backdated and he had
pressed the company about its accounting for the license payments, the
SEC alleged that the partner had failed to determine if Solucorp had com-
mitted an illegal act, failed to determine the effect of the illegal act on
Solucorp’s financial statements, and failed to inform management and the
Avoid this Pitfall: Just as in the WorldCom case discussed
above, this case shows that a senior manager on an audit
cannot rely on the engagement or concurring partner to “get
it right.” As in similar Rule 102(e) cases brought against
senior managers, audit failures are often not attributed
solely to the engagement or concurring partners. This
means that managers, seniors and other audit team mem-
bers must bring to the audits to which they are assigned
their own sense of professional skepticism and a willingness
to raise questions. Again, merely relying on the partners
involved in the audit is not enough!
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audit committee of the illegal act. In January 2003, an injunction forbid-
ding the partner from violating Section 10A was entered, and the SEC
thereafter brought a Rule 102(e) proceeding against the partner that
resulted in a two year bar from practicing before the SEC.
Three points are of particular importance in the Solucorp case. First,
the accounting firm in question was a Canadian accounting firm and the
partner was a Chartered Accountant. As it so happens, Canadian GAAP
and U.S. GAAP called for the same accounting treatment of the license
revenues, as the differences between Canadian and U.S. GAAP were
insignificant with respect to this issue. Second, the amount of revenue in
question was approximately $500,000 which, while small, was material to
Solucorp. Lastly, the action against Solucorp and the auditor was based on
the audit firm’s work on financial statements covering a six month transi-
tion period included in a Form 10-KSB filed after Solucorp had changed its
fiscal year end.
ETHICAL GUIDES
Part 29 of the New York Professions Code, Sec. 29.10, specifies that unpro-
fessional conduct in public accountancy includes, “in expressing an opinion
on representations in the financial statements that the public accountant
examined:
i. failing to disclose a material fact known to the licensee which
is not disclosed in the financial statements but disclosure of
which is necessary to make the financial statements not mis-
leading;
ii. failing to report any material misstatement known to the
licensee to appear in the financial statements;
iii. failing to acquire sufficient information to warrant the
expression of an opinion . . .; or
Avoid this Pitfall: Thinking that a company is too small,
an amount is too little, or a period too short to cause regu-
latory interest in your firm’s audit work or in your compa-
ny’s financial statements can be a fatal mistake. Likewise,
national boundaries mean little if a company has securities
registered here in the U.S. under the Exchange Act. The
Solucorp situation shows that auditors that lack sufficient
competent evidence to support their audit opinion and who
become aware of an illegal act must go further with their
audit procedures and their efforts to comply with their
Section 10A reporting requirements, or will face drastic con-
sequences.
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iv. failing to direct attention to any material departure from
GAAP or to disclose any material omission of GAAS applica-
ble in the circumstances.”
The Maryland Code of Professional Conduct states that a
licensee “may not issue a report asserting that financial state-
ments are presented in conformity with . . . [GAAP] if these finan-
cial statements contain any departure from [GAAP] which have a
material effect on the financial statements taken as a whole,
unless the licensee can demonstrate that by reason of unusual cir-
cumstances the financial statements would otherwise have been
misleading. In this case, the licensee’s report shall describe the
departure, the approximate effects thereof, if practicable, and the
reasons why compliance with the principle would result in a mis-
leading statement.” Sec. 09.24.01.06, Maryland Annotated Code
[Emphasis added].
“A member’s agreement to perform professional services implies that
the member has the necessary competence to complete those profes-
sional services according to professional standards . . . but the member
does not assume a responsibility for infallibility of knowledge or judg-
ment. Competence to perform professional services involves both the
technical qualifications of the member and the member’s staff and the
ability to supervise and evaluate the quality of the work performed.”
ET Section 201, Interpretation .02 201/1, Pennsylvania Institute of
Certified Public Accountants Code of Ethics. [Emphasis added].
“Goodness is the only investment that never fails.” Henry David
Thoreau.
“Every human being has . . . an attendant spirit . . . . If it does not
always tell us what to do, it always cautions us what not to do.” Lydia
M. Child.
“You must have control of the authorship of your own destiny. The pen
that writes your life story must be held in your own hand.” Irene C.
Kassoria.
* * * *
CASE STUDY HYPOTHETICAL—YOU ARE THE OUTSIDE
COUNSEL
The following case study places you in the position of outside counsel to a
controller of a public company who has been accused by the SEC of partic-
ipating in wrongdoing. You must now evaluate the controller’s conduct
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from a legal perspective and give advice based on your knowledge of appli-
cable professional standards and the disciplinary outcomes that may
ensue. How would you respond?
You Have a Prospective New Client
As a well known securities defense lawyer in Rochester, New York, you’ve
made a name for yourself as a straight shooter who is a respected adver-
sary of the SEC and state securities administrators. Your practice has
thrived through referrals from other lawyers and CPAs, many of whom
reside in New York City or its more tony environs. You principally repre-
sent in regulatory proceedings brokers, investment bankers, and company
officers accused of trading on non-public information or other wrongdoing.
Recently, you were referred a potential client by a Long Island-based law
firm that indicated it could have a conflict in representing the potential
client and another company officer who has been subpoenaed to give testi-
mony before the SEC. The potential client, Bill Peavey, is coming in to
meet with you for the first time today. Aware that the SEC has some kind
of investigation underway of Incisive Lasers, the company for which Mr.
Peavey is controller, you have pulled up and reviewed a number of Incisive
Lasers’ filings off of the Internet before your meeting.
The available filings tell you a sobering story about Incisive Lasers.
Early last year, the company’s stock hit a 52 week high of $19.25 a share
and it completed a follow-on public offering in March in which it raised $62
million at over $18 per share. Many of the company’s officers also sold
stock in the follow-on offering, including Mr. Peavey, although his sales
totaled only 3,000 shares. In June, Incisive Lasers filed an 8-K that coin-
cided with a 39% drop in its stock price. When you review the 8-K, the rea-
son for the price decline is abundantly clear, as Incisive had reported that
an internal inquiry had revealed that Incisive’s revenues had been over-
stated by approximately $33 million in 2002. Incisive’s subsequent filings
disclosed that a restatement was being prepared for the 2002 numbers and
that the audit committee had engaged a new outside auditor to also review
the 2003 quarterly filings. In the meantime, Incisive’s stock price had con-
tinued its free fall, and was now trading at $2.75 per share. With investor
losses mounting, several class action lawsuits had been filed against the
company as well as its officers and directors, and Incisive had disclosed
that the SEC had commenced a formal investigation of the company’s
accounting. The vice president of sales for Incisive is thus far the only casu-
alty of the pending restatement, having been summarily fired when the 8-
K was filed disclosing the overstated revenues.
Your review of last year’s proxy statement reveals little information
about your prospective client, as he was not an executive officer whose
biography appeared in either the company’s registration statement or in its
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proxy statement. The Form 4’s filed when Mr. Peavey sold stock and
Incisive’s annual report help fill in a little information, revealing that Bill
Peavey is about 56 years old and had been employed at a national account-
ing firm for at least part of his professional career. He appears to have been
employed at Incisive Lasers for about five years, well before the current
difficulties began. You run an on-line check of his background and find that
he is a CPA in good standing in New York, with no history of criminal or
civil litigation. One interesting tidbit surfaces in your background search,
revealing that Mr. Peavey has run in the Boston Marathon several times
and placed sixth in the senior division two years ago.
Your Meeting with Bill Peavey
Having formed a mental impression of your potential client as a vigorous
and intelligent person, you are surprised to greet a man who has obvious-
ly been worn down considerably by the events of the last few months.
Appearing haggard and tired, Bill Peavey has the air of a beaten man,
looking every bit of his 56 years of age. After almost collapsing into a chair
across from your desk, he pulls out a handkerchief and wipes his brow, a
stray line of grey hair falling unnoticed over his forehead. His appearance
notwithstanding, Bill Peavey’s voice is deep and steady, giving you some
comfort that he is not going to expire during the course of your meeting.
Following a series of questions from you about his Boston Marathon expe-
rience designed to give him a chance to get comfortable with his surround-
ings, you lead him to the subject at hand.
“Mr. Peavey, I understand you were referred to me by Lockwood &
Levine, who informed me that they are representing the CFO of Incisive
Lasers, Georgina Mattingly, in the SEC investigation, and who felt they
might have a conflict in representing both you and Ms. Mattingly. Can you
tell me why they felt that a conflict might exist between your interests and
hers?”
Bill Peavey looked down at the floor, an unhappy look crossing his
face. “Yeah, I can tell you why, but the thing is, I think I’m being set up to
be the scapegoat here. See, Georgina was my boss and she micromanaged
me, the financial statements and the SEC filings all along, and now it
seems like she’s got amnesia or something—all of a sudden, she’s forgotten
about how involved she was in the entire financial reporting process and
she wants to pin this situation on me.” Delivered in an angry tone and in
rapid fire cadence, the last sentence was interrupted by you holding up
your hands, motioning for Bill Peavey to stop for a moment.
“Bill, if I may call you that, please understand that I am not here to
pass judgment on you or anyone else. Instead, my job is to gather the facts
and then advise you as to how you might best be defended, given the cir-
cumstances and the evidence, if you become or are a target of the SEC
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investigation. So, if you can tell me, have you received any correspondence
from the SEC about their investigation?”
Bill Peavey reaches in his jacket and pulls out several sheets of paper
that he dutifully hands over to you. “The lawyer for Georgina told me that
the CEO, Georgina, the vice president of sales and me have all received
these letters that say that the SEC is considering us targets of their inves-
tigation. I guess they’ve recommended that charges be brought against all
of us, but we’ve got a chance to respond before they are actually filed. The
thing is, I didn’t do anything wrong—I only did what I was told!” Peavey’s
face turns red as he blurts out this denial, his blood pressure clearly on
the rise.
“Bill, listen, I want you to understand that I’m on your side, and as I
said before, I’m not sitting here in judgment. Before we get to what other
people told you to do, can you just give me some background on how the
restatement came about and what happened around that time?” Used to
having clients under great stress, you adopt a soothing tone and get Bill
Peavey a glass of water in order to give him a chance to gather himself.
“Since you mentioned the restatement, I guess you know about the
accounting problems. The thing is, everything was going great for us at the
beginning of last year. I mean, sales of our lasers into the industrial and
healthcare markets were growing by over 20% a year, and our new Lasit II
machine was getting rave reviews in industry media. That machine was
adaptable for use in removing cancerous skin growths, moles, even
unwanted hair, and we were getting inundated with orders at the time we
decided to raise money in the follow-on offering. That’s the worst part of
this—if we’d just kept on doing good business, we didn’t have any need to
make up orders; heck, we could barely keep up with demand as it was.”
Peavey stopped to take a drink of water and then resumed.
“The funny thing is, when I started with Incisive five years ago, I
never thought we’d become such a big player in our industry. Back then,
we were barely doing $20 million in sales and our technology was kind of
‘me too.’ I was just the assistant controller when I started, and I kind of
thought that working for Incisive would be just a temporary thing until I
found something better. But about four years ago, our growth just took off
when we caught the laser vision correction trend and doctors started put-
ting our lasers in every clinic and office complex they could find. That was
about the time we hired Rory Vanders, the vice president of sales that got
us in all this trouble.” You nod, encouraging Peavey to continue as you
take notes.
“Rory deserves a lot of credit for what he did, but I’ll tell you, he’s also
the main reason why we’re where we are today.” Peavey learns forward,
his body language telling you that he’s come to a critical point in his story.
“It all started to unravel back in April when we were trying to finalize the
10-K for the prior year. Rory and his department had come up with a huge
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number of orders in December, and we kept following up with him on
almost a daily basis in January to try and get all the signed orders before
the auditors came in to do their field work. The pressure to get everything
in line for the audit and for the earnings release was unbelievable, and it
seemed like it was taking Rory a long time to get the orders in.”
“After I called him one afternoon and really lit into him, Georgina
came in my office about a half hour later and told me to cool my jets, that
Rory was doing his best, and that she’d take care of it. The auditors com-
pleted their field work a week later, and I never heard anything more
about it, so I just concluded that she had taken over and gotten Rory to do
his job. I seem to recall that Georgina had made some sales entries during
the course of the audit, but at one point, I remember she came in and told
me she had the documents and it was ok to go ahead and book them, so I
guess I might have done them.”
“The next thing I hear is a rumor that Rory’s going to be fired and I
get a bunch of requests from the auditors and Georgina to dig up copies of
paperwork that are in our files. The only thing is, the copies were placed
in the files by Georgina or somebody else, ‘cause I never was asked to do
anything further on the open orders after Georgina came in my office and
told me to cool it. I sent them the copies of what we had, and the next
thing you know, there are a bunch of meetings with the audit committee
and the auditors are in combing through the books like nobody’s business.
Before I even had a clue, the press release came out and we announced
that the results for last year are going to be restated, and Georgina is
hardly talking to me. Then Rory gets fired, and now it looks like Georgina
Avoid this Pitfall: For controllers, accounting managers
and audit managers, there is grave danger in ignoring or
consciously or unconsciously making a decision not to follow
up on issues that arise in the course of preparing for, or per-
forming, an audit. It is very unwise to do as Bill Peavey did
here, since a subsequent investigation by the SEC or even
an internal investigation may well point out that failing to
get the proper documentation was akin to participating in a
cover-up. The lesson, of course, is to follow up or, if nothing
else, you should create a paper trail that confirms what you
were told by another officer and explicitly pointing out your
assumptions with respect to what they had in their posses-
sion. However, even that is not enough if your reliance on
that officer is not considered to be reasonable or if you have
reason to question what is being done. Bear this in mind if
you find yourself being asked to make, alter or audit entries
that could later become issues.
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is somehow acting like I’m responsible for what happened. What’s wrong
with this picture?”
You pause for a moment, reflecting on what you’ve heard. “Bill, let me
ask you a few questions. First, did Georgina ask you to make the sales
entries in the ledger or did she make those herself after Rory came up with
the orders?”
“Well, I think she did come back and tell me to make the entries once
she had gotten the paperwork from Rory, but I never actually saw the
orders. I mean, what was I supposed to do, question her and ask if she had
received them? Heck, she was my boss, for heaven’s sake. I wasn’t going
to question her when it was clear she had the orders in hand, or that she
had given them to the auditors. Like I said, I might have made the entries,
but I just can’t remember. You know, we were working 18 hour days, week
after week, at that point, so I’m a little fuzzy about what happened.”
“Has Georgina given you any indication that you’re on tenuous ground
with Incisive? Did she threaten you at all or imply that your job was at
stake if the entries weren’t made?”
“Not really, but I guess that I felt like she had taken control of the
situation when she said she was going to deal with Rory.” Peavey looked
down again, troubled. “I’ve worked with Georgina for the entire five
years that I’ve been with Incisive, and now I feel like she’s using me to
cover for what she did. I guess you never know people until the chips are
down, right?”
You nod understandingly, pondering your next question. “This may
seem like a funny question, Bill, but I’d like to know if you all ever had any
Avoid this Pitfall: The difficulties with these statements
by Bill Peavey are obvious, unfortunately. It is not neces-
sarily the job of the controller or accounting manager to
question the boss’s integrity, but it is the job of these
employees to insist on having documentary evidence on
which to rely when making entries in the books. Moreover,
if another officer has given the auditors the paperwork, it is
axiomatic that the controller or accounting manager should
have a copy of what was received by the auditors. Merely
relying on the word of the officer in making the entry is pre-
cisely the step that can place you in jeopardy of losing your
license, career and professional standing. The cautious, but
careful, accounting manager or controller can perform an
invaluable service to the company by standing up and
insisting upon proper support for book entries before a prob-
lem develops.
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formal ethics training or what the corporate culture was like at Incisive.
How would you describe the company’s culture while you were there?”
Looking a little puzzled, Peavey responds, “Well, in the early years it
was pretty conservative and we worked together pretty closely, so I guess
you’d probably say that it was a tight culture, kind of like a family. After
Rory joined us, though, and we began to grow so fast, things kind of became
looser, more like we were running a race and had to come in first every
week. Even though we had good internal controls, it just seemed like we
were always trying to keep up with the sales department, and they were
always trying to meet Wall Street’s expectations. But I still think we did a
darn good job of keeping the sales guys in line until Rory got out of control.”
You take a few more notes and decide to move on to another subject.
“I can read the target letter that you received from the SEC for myself, but
I’m curious if the lawyers at Lockwood & Levine discussed with you the
language of your letter and that of Georgina or anyone else.”
“No, all they said was that it was pretty clear that the SEC was going
after all of us for insider trading—like we knew about the sales issue at the
time of the offering—and that the CEO, Rory, Georgina and I might be
subject to administrative penalties too. They seemed to think that we
might be fighting a 102(e) proceeding, based on the fact that Georgina and
I are both CPAs. You don’t agree with that, do you? I mean, I haven’t prac-
ticed in almost 10 years now. They can’t come after me for under Rule
102(e), can they? And even if they can, you don’t think I’ve got any expo-
sure here, do you?”
You decide to address only a portion of these questions for the
moment. “It’s probably too early in the game for me to give you a mean-
ingful answer to that question, Bill. If you do have any exposure, though,
we’ll need to think through what the SEC’s likely charges will entail and
what defenses are available to you, including the extent to which Incisive
Lasers created or contributed to the creation of a corporate culture that
encouraged and facilitated your reliance on the other officers. I have to tell
you, though, that the SEC can pursue you under Rule 102(e) even if you
haven’t practiced as a CPA during the last 10 years, since you still hold
your license. Even in those cases where a license holder has gone to inac-
tive status, the SEC has sometimes elected to proceed with administrative
actions to prevent a CPA from going into practice after having somehow
participated in actions that the SEC considers to be wrong and with which
an administrative law judge concurs.”
At this, Bill Peavey’s head drops to his chest and he seems to with-
draw into himself. You feel his pain, so to speak, but you also know that
to a great degree, he has called down the wrath of the SEC by his own
actions. Your attention turns for the moment to how you might seek to
defend him, knowing that your job is not going to be a slam-dunk and that
Bill Peavey will likely pay a penalty that will stay with him for the
remainder of his life.
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Situational Analysis
1. What is the single biggest mistake that Bill Peavey made during the
course of the events he outlined to you that went directly to his profes-
sional responsibilities?
(a) Not telling Georgina that he had to follow up with Rory no matter
what she said
(b) Failing to report an illegal act to the auditors
(c) Failing to get for himself the proper documentary support for the
sales entries
(d) Buying into the corporate culture that was permissive and unethical
2. If you had been in Bill Peavey’s shoes and were determined to protect
yourself (and the company) by properly discharging your professional
responsibilities, what action(s) would you have taken in the situation
described in the case study?
Practitioner Response: The correct answer to this question is directly tied
to the professional responsibilities Bill Peavey had as a CPA. Although
answer (a) might appear tempting at first glance, keep in mind that a CPA’s
professional responsibilities do not require him or her to question one’s supe-
rior in a way that almost guarantees your firing. This is not to say that fol-
lowing up with Rory might not have been a good idea, but telling Georgina
this is not a required communication per se. Answer (b) is also incorrect, pri-
marily because it assumes facts that are not apparent in the description of
events that Bill Peavey gave you, but also because Peavey did not have evi-
dence of an illegal act to report. In addition, the reporting obligation as to an
illegal act would undoubtedly be “up the ladder” to the CFO and the audit
committee, well before any reporting obligation would exist to the auditors.
The facts of the case study support an inference of an illegal act or acts, but
Peavey does not appear to have the evidence of such acts within his grasp.
Answer (c) is the correct answer. Much like the Vinson/WorldCom matter
that is discussed at the beginning of this Chapter, the making of the entries
on the books without having received proper documentary support is tanta-
mount to an admission that Bill Peavey failed to live up to his professional
responsibilities. You should remember in particular that reliance on
Georgina does not relieve Bill of his responsibilities, which exist independ-
ent of whatever Georgina says or does. Answer (d) also assumes facts that
are not necessarily ascertainable from the case study. First, there is not
much evidence that Bill Peavey bought into the culture or that, if he did so,
that this was an issue that affected his professional responsibilities.
Additionally, the lack of formal ethics training and the permissive mindset
that seemed to prevail does not support a conclusion that the corporate cul-
ture was necessarily unethical. While not deserving of commendations, the
Incisive Lasers culture was not unethical on its face.
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(a) Insisted on receipt of documentary evidence to back up the sales
entries before they were made
(b) Confirmed by e-mail or in writing the need for this evidence before
making the entries
(c) Carefully reviewed the documentary evidence prior to making the
entries in order to determine if anything unusual or out of place
appeared in the documentation
(d) All of the above
3. What fact(s) in the case study lead you to believe that Bill Peavey will
probably face a Rule 102(e) proceeding before the SEC is finished inves-
tigating Incisive Lasers?
(a) Peavey was on notice and should have been more conscientious in
monitoring the situation after making repeated requests for docu-
ments that were not delivered
(b) Peavey relied on Georgina in circumstances where he should not
have done so
(c) The sales in question appear to have been material to Incisive
Lasers and are suspect due to the end of year timing and delays in
procuring documentation
(d) There were heightened risks associated with these sales that war-
ranted heightened scrutiny by Peavey
(e) Bill Peavey will likely not be facing a Rule 102(e) proceeding
(f) Answers (a), (b), (c) and (d) above
Practitioner Response: The correct answer for this question is clearly (d).
Answer (a) is correct and obvious since, as discussed above, the single
biggest mistake Bill Peavey made was to fail to insist on receipt of docu-
mentary evidence. The confirmation discussed in answer (b) is always a good
step to take, as it creates a record of your request for the information that is
necessary for you to discharge your professional responsibilities. Of course,
asking for this information is not good enough in and of itself; rather, as
described in answer (c), you must carry your inquiry to the next logical step
and undertake a review of the documents to confirm what you’ve been told
or otherwise learned about the sales in question. This step is particularly
important given the fact that the case study makes it clear that you asked
for the information on a number of occasions and it was not forthcoming. In
other words, professional skepticism would almost require you to undertake
a thorough review of these documents, even perhaps to a greater extent than
usual, because of the fact that the documents were so late in being produced
by Rory and his department.
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4. The case study described Bill Peavey as a CPA licensed in the state of
New York. Although the extract from the New York Professions Code on
page 176 of this chapter refers to “expressing an opinion” on the finan-
cials, assume for a moment that the extract simply refers to unprofes-
sional conduct in public accountancy and then lists the four criteria
given. Do you believe Bill Peavey may have violated any of the four
“New York” criteria under the facts given in the case study?
(a) No, it doesn’t seem that he violated any of the criteria
(b) Yes, by failing to acquire sufficient information to warrant the
expression of an opinion
(c) Yes, by failing to report a material misstatement known to him that
appeared in the financial statements
(d) Yes, by failing to direct attention to a material departure from
GAAP
Practitioner Response: This question and the answers that are provided
are intended to focus your attention on two very important points: first, the
facts that will likely support a Rule 102(e) proceeding, and second, the lan-
guage of Rule 102(e) as it relates to improper professional conduct by
accountants. With this introduction, it should be clear that the correct
answer is answer (f). Answers (a) and (b) are facts set forth in the case study
that support the conclusion that Peavey will face a Rule 102(e) proceeding.
Peavey was clearly on notice of unusual delays in the delivery of the sup-
porting documents, and he should not have relied on Georgina when she told
him that she would get the documents and he should not worry about this.
Answers (c) and (d) are also correct and are nearly direct quotes from Rule
102(e) or Release No. 33-7593 that are discussed at the beginning of this
Chapter. The case study discussion of the amount of the sales in question
and the market reaction, even without more evidence, should lead you to the
conclusion that materiality is likely, if not a foregone conclusion. The facts
that accompany the assertion of materiality in answer (c) merely support the
conclusion that warning signals were apparent to someone who was sensi-
tive to their presence. Answer (d) recites the conclusion that the facts dis-
cussed both in the case study and in answers (a), (b) and (c) did in fact war-
rant heightened scrutiny by Peavey.
Answer (e) is difficult, if not impossible, to endorse given the facts in the
case study and the language of Rule 102(e) and Release No. 33-7593.
Without speaking for the SEC in cases with similar circumstances, it is high-
ly likely that a CPA in a situation such as this would find himself or herself
dealing with 102(e) issues.
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5. Assume for this question that you are employed by the SEC and are con-
sidering whether to charge Bill Peavey or his boss, Georgina, or both,
with engaging in improper professional conduct under Rule 102(e).
Select from the options below the most appropriate basis on which
charges under Rule 102(e) might be brought.
(a) Bill: intentional conduct; Georgina: reckless conduct
(b) Bill: knowing conduct; Georgina: unreasonable conduct
(c) Bill: repeated instances of unreasonable conduct; Georgina: single
instance of highly unreasonable conduct
(d) Bill: reckless conduct; Georgina: intentional conduct
Practitioner Response: The correct answer to this question is (d). In ana-
lyzing why, let’s take a look at why the other answers aren’t as good as (d).
Answer (a) actually has reversed the types of conduct in which Bill and
Georgina engaged. That is, it appears that Georgina is the one who engaged
in intentional conduct, and Bill is the one who engaged in reckless conduct.
In particular, Georgina evidently collected the paperwork and must have
either made the entry or instructed someone else to do so. She appeared to
act with intent, while Bill’s conduct was not intentional, but clearly didn’t
meet the professional standards given the facts. For the same reasons,
answer (b) is incorrect, since intent and knowledge are effectively the same
when measuring Bill’s conduct. Answer (c) is also incorrect, since if unrea-
sonable conduct is the standard, it appears that Bill may have only engaged
in one act of highly unreasonable conduct, while Georgina is the one who
likely engaged in multiple instances. Answer (d) is, however, the best choice,
as it points out that Bill was reckless in discharging his duties, while
Georgina appears to have intentionally violated her professional duties.
Practitioner Response: This question is subject to some interpretation
given the potential answers provided. Answer (a) is least likely to be correct,
as it is safe to assume that Peavey engaged in some type of unprofessional
conduct in the course of the events outlined in the case study. Answer (b) is
correct if you assume, for the sake of this answer, that the reference to “an
opinion” does not necessarily mean that Peavey himself is giving the opinion
in question. Based on the assumption in the question that you should disre-
gard “expressing an opinion,” you also might have chosen this answer under
the theory that Peavey had failed to acquire sufficient information so as to
warrant his inclusion of the information in the financial statements. If that
was your rationale, you might have been better off picking answer (c) or
answer (d), as each of those answers goes to Peavey’s obligation to report or
direct attention to the material misstatement known to him or by failing to
note the material departure from GAAP. If you took the position that Peavey
did not actually have knowledge of the misstatement at the time it was orig-
inally made, answer (d) would have been the better choice. While a close call,
answer (d) would appear to be the best choice of the options given.
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6. What aggravating factors are present in this case study that makes this
situation more likely to result in regulatory action against Bill Peavey?
Why?
7. In Section 10A cases brought by the SEC such as the Solucorp action
discussed at the beginning of this Chapter and one filed against the
auditors of AppOnline.com, Inc. in October of 2002, the SEC has stated
and reiterated the steps an auditor must take to comply with Section
10A reporting obligations. What are these key steps and what are the
penalties for failure to comply with such steps?
Practitioner Response: Section 10A(f) defines an illegal act as “an act or
omission that violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of
law.” The key steps that the auditor must take once he or she detects infor-
mation indicating that an illegal act has, or may have, occurred (whether or
not at this stage it may have a material impact on the financial statements)
include: (1) inform management with respect to the illegal act, and (2) inform
the audit committee or the board of directors of the illegal act. The company
must notify the SEC within one business day after the board is informed if
the auditor reasonably expects to resign from the audit engagement or mod-
ify its report due to an uncorrected illegal act that has a material effect on
Practitioner Response: The case study includes at least four factors that
would be considered “aggravating” factors that would increase the likelihood
he would be subject to civil action, at a minimum. First, the fact that Incisive
Lasers raised capital in the public market immediately prior to uncovering
the accounting issues is likely to raise the spectre of the company taking
advantage of the public at a time when it knew or should have known of
these issues. Secondly, the fact that the officers, including Bill Peavey, sold
stock in the offering is also going to be considered an aggravating factor, as
it appears that the officers profited personally from their wrongdoing. Not to
be forgotten, either, is the fact that investors suffered what appear to be
enormous losses as a result of the stock price decline that followed the
announcement of the restatement. Assuming that the amount of investor
losses plays a role in what cases are allocated more resources by the SEC and
state regulators, it’s fair to conclude that the losses suffered by the stock-
holders of Incisive Lasers will cause greater regulatory scrutiny of the com-
pany and all the major players in this debacle. As a final point, the
announcement by the company that it plans a restatement is, if nothing else,
likely to result in the company and its officers getting more regulatory atten-
tion, rather than less. When you add to this the fact that the new auditors
were also asked to examine the quarters in the current year as well, you can
assume that Incisive Lasers and Mr. Peavey will get more than their share
of attention from the SEC.
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8. Given the statements made by Peavey that Incisive Lasers had grown to
the point that it was hard to keep the “sales guys in control” and that
the corporate culture seemed to indicate that there had been little or no
ethics training, what suggestions would you make to the board about
how to go about changing the culture and atmosphere at the company
after the SEC’s investigation and the class action suits are concluded?
Practitioner Response: From the response that Peavey gave in the case
study, which really failed to answer the question about formal ethics train-
ing but from which you can draw some conclusions, here are some ideas that
you might suggest to the board:
• Adopt a formal code of ethics, as required under the SEC’s rules, with all
employees being subject to the code;
• Institute a formal ethics training program, with special emphasis on
training for executive, sales and financial personnel;
• Publicize the consequences of violating ethics policies and the ethics code,
with a special emphasis on accountability for each person and their
actions;
• Convene meetings of departments in order to have senior company offi-
cers explain why Rory was fired and what other actions were taken by
involved personnel that constituted wrongdoing, how they were punished,
and the impact on the company and all employees;
• Instituting more effective internal controls and procedures that will force
accountability within the sales department, with a special emphasis on
procedures to be followed for the proper recording of sales;
the financial statements. If the company does not provide this notification to
the SEC, the audit firm must, by the next business day, give the SEC a copy
of the “illegal acts report” given to the board or documentation of any oral
report it gave to the board. The only exception cited in Section 10A is that
relating to illegal acts that are “clearly inconsequential.”
Section 10A allows the SEC to institute cease and desist proceedings
and obtain civil money penalties (fines) against auditors who fail to comply
with Section 10A reporting requirements. As was the case in Solucorp, the
CPA who violates Section 10A is also likely to be the subject of a Rule 102(e)
proceeding to bar or suspend the CPA from practicing before the SEC. In the
AppOnline, Inc. case, the SEC found that the auditors had become aware of
the fact that the company had filed false financial statements with the SEC.
Even though they became aware of this, the auditors failed to notify man-
agement, the board of directors or the SEC. The two individuals who per-
formed the audits were fined $35,000 and $25,000 and, in November 2002,
were barred from practicing before the SEC for five years.
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SUGGESTED READINGS
In January 2003, the SEC filed a civil fraud injunctive action against
KPMG LLP and four partners, including the head of the firm’s department
of professional practice, seeking injunctions, disgorgement of fees and civil
monetary penalties related to the firm’s audit of Xerox’s financial state-
ments from 1997 through 2000. SEC v. KPMG, LLP, Joseph T. Boyle,
Michael A. Conway, Anthony P. Dolanski and Ronald A. Safran, [SEC
Litigation Release No. 17954, Accounting and Auditing Release No. 1709,
January 29, 2003]. If the SEC prevails in this action, a Rule 102(e) pro-
ceeding against the four partners can be expected to be filed shortly after-
wards.
On April 11, 2003, the New York Stock Exchange issued proposed rule
changes with respect to corporate governance of listed companies [See
“Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Relating to Corporate Governance,” Release No. 34-47672, April 11, 2003,
on the SEC’s Web site]. In addition to proposing to implement the changes
in listed company audit committee standards, the proposed rule contains a
number of expected changes in corporate governance generally, director
appointment, compensation, and responsibilities, the content of business
codes of conduct and ethics, and important policies that each listed compa-
ny should consider implementing. Combined with the release, also in April
2003, of the final rule “Standards for Listed Company Audit Committees,”
[Release No. 33-8220, April 9, 2003], these documents provide an excellent
summary of many corporate governance issues that companies are now, or
will be, required to address or consider in the future.
To review the content of Section 10A in its statutory form updated
through November 2002, go to the SEC web site and the following address:
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/34act/sect10a.htm.
Although the case study did not address the consequences to Georgina,
the CFO, be aware that Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley states that a com-
pany will recover (1) incentive compensation, and (2) profit from stock
sales, from a company’s CFO and CEO that are paid or received in the 12
months preceding a restatement of the financials that is the result of mis-
conduct.
• Demonstrate cooperation with regulatory authorities, stock exchanges
and automated trading services, including evaluating and upgrading the
company’s disclosure practices to the highest standards; and
• Establish a substantial budget for the audit committee and its advisors,
with adequate funding for the use of outside, non-audit CPAs and outside
counsel in order to upgrade the capabilities of the audit committee.
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Section 602 of Sarbanes-Oxley included the language of Rule 102(e)
virtually verbatim, which means that the SEC is no longer relying upon its
Rules of Practice to discipline accountants and auditors. Rather, the SEC
now has statutory authority to suspend or bar practitioners based on
“improper professional conduct” as defined in Section 602 of Sarbanes-
Oxley. Even though this might seem to be a mechanical rather than a sub-
stantive issue, the inclusion of Rule 102(e) language in Sarbanes-Oxley is
indicative of Congress’s intent to elevate the prominence given to profes-
sional discipline and to enhance the SEC’s powers in the area of profes-
sional regulation and responsibilities. We are indeed entering a new era of
accountability for financial managers and auditors.
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APPENDIX A
IMPLEMENTING AN
ETHICS STRATEGY*
Organizations have taken many different approaches to implementing an ethics
strategy. In each of these approaches, the key questions are:
• what behaviors does the organization wish to encourage, reward or prevent?
• how should the organization codify these behaviors as standards and commu-
nicate them to employees?
• how can top management best model its commitment to ethical behavior?
• how can senior managers create and sustain a working environment that sup-
ports ethical behaviors?
• what are the barriers to implementing an ethics strategy and how can they be
overcome?
• how can employees get help when facing difficult questions that involve ethical
dilemmas?
• how can organizations motivate employees to comply with and support ethical
standards, help them resist pressure to violate standards, and reward those
who adhere to the standards?
• should there be penalties for non-compliance and what should they be?
• how can organizations evaluate the effectiveness of their ethics efforts?
* Adapted with permission from Strategic Management Guideline (Management Control Series):
Implementing Ethics Strategies Within Organizations, Copyright © 2000 by AICPA.
Note: The materials presented in this appendix touch on requirements in “Section 406—Code of Ethics for
Senior Financial Officers” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those requirements only cover senior finan-
cial officers (including CEOs), although an organization is free to expand the code to include all employees.
These materials cover a broader ethics program and are intended to aid in the implementation of an over-
all ethics program. For the requirements of section 406, see Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). A copy
of the law can be downloaded at www.loc.gov/law/guide/pl107204.pdf.
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The choice of an approach to ethics in the organization depends in part on the
objectives of management. Any one, or a combination, of the following motives are
common:
• to avoid any behavior, legal or otherwise, that violates company policy and neg-
atively affects its interests; 
• to satisfy the concerns of its constituencies (stakeholders) and thereby capture
the benefits that derive from a reputation for ethical behavior; and/or
• to create a culture in which each employee and manager pursues a set of ethi-
cal and social values to which the company is firmly committed.
While these three objectives are relatively easy to separate in concept, they
are often hard to differentiate when examining a particular organization and its
activities. Many firms initiate an ethics strategy with all three objectives in mind,
though one may be primary. 
The decision to initiate an ethics strategy may follow a careful strategic plan-
ning process or may be made quickly to help the organization recover from an
ethics scandal. Either situation may result in a broader set of objectives than the
three cited above.
The three corresponding approaches for implementing a corporate ethics
strategy, shown here as progressive stages in the development of a values-based
organization, are:
• Stage 1: Managing for Compliance. Organizations see the tremendous damage
that can be done to corporate reputation and momentum by incidents of illegal
or blatantly unethical behavior. To prevent such occurrences, the organization
establishes a program to ensure compliance with both the law and ethical stan-
dards demanded by the public. Such programs include prohibitions against
conflicts of interest, theft of company property, and revealing trade secrets.
• Stage 2: Managing Stakeholder Relations. Organizations become increasingly
sophisticated and see the long-term value to be gained from maintaining good
relations with key stakeholders. Self-interest drives the organization to moni-
tor its reputation among these stakeholders and to initiate programs to address
their ethical concerns.
• Stage 3: Creating a Values-Based Organization. Many organizations have
found it difficult to manage compliance or stakeholder relations without creat-
ing a genuine change in corporate culture. As a result, responses become
instinctive rather than strategic to the breadth of ethical issues held important
by stakeholders. Such organizations define their values and invest consider-
able effort and expense in making those values permeate all aspects of their
work. They find it productive to make decisions consistent with those values
even when short-term payoffs are not apparent.
Of the few organizations that have proceeded directly to Stage 3, many have
a strong founder and a continuing presence of family members in the company.
Others are firms that long ago recognized what management theorists have only
recently articulated—a coherent set of company values can be a critical element
in giving employees direction and a sense of trust in their company. Cummins
Engine and Levi Strauss & Co. are examples of the first, and Nortel, BCE,
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Johnson & Johnson, and Xerox are examples of the second. At Hewlett-Packard
strong leaders articulated a clear set of values as both their legacy and as essen-
tial to bottom-line success.
In some organizations, ethical strategies have been formally adopted but are
not producing the desired results. The effectiveness of an ethics initiative depends
upon the genuine commitment of senior management, as well as the adoption of
specific measures that make the effort real to all employees and render them
accountable for adherence to the organization’s ethical standards.
The three stages of a corporate ethics strategy are illustrated below.
Standard for
Primary Judging Strengths of Weaknesses of
Stages Objective Behavior Approach Approach
Stage 1: Prevent Law, regulation, Clear standards; Few issues
Managing for lawbreaking rights of the Clear penalties addressed;
Compliance and scandals corporation for violations Conflicts with
empowerment;
May imply
company wants
minimal behavior
Stage 2: Create value Stakeholder Clear payoff to Stakeholder
Managing by meeting demands and firm views change
Stakeholder stakeholder expectations Can survey over time and
Relations expectations stakeholders location;
for expectations Some
and attitudes expectations
cannot be met;
No guidance
given on many
issues;
No clear values
behind behaviors
Stage 3: Create an Company’s own Helps create Payoff is longer-
Creating a organization values and beliefs strong corporate term; More
Value-Based that has culture; costly to
Organization enduring value Behavior implement in
becomes short run;
instinctive Empowered
employees may
interpret values
incorrectly
STAGE 1: MANAGING FOR COMPLIANCE
Stage 1 typically includes these actions:
• adopt a code of ethics, practice, or conduct to address specific behaviors;
• ensure board-level and senior management support;
• assign responsibility for the ethics and compliance strategy to an appropriate
function in the organization;
• identify and communicate compliance standards;
Appendix A—Implementing an Ethics Strategy 195
11-Appendix A.qxd  10/16/2002  9:30 AM  Page 195
• train people to use compliance standards;
• establish clear channels of communication; 
• ensure supervision of compliance standards; and
• make periodic reports to senior management and the board of directors.
Adopt a Code of Ethics, Practice, or Conduct to
Address Specific Behaviors
Most organizations publish a document that sets out clear standards of behavior
under such topics as conflicts of interest, theft of company property, protection of
proprietary or confidential data, accuracy of financial reporting and expense
reports, price fixing and other antitrust concerns, and various legal and regula-
tory standards. The most effective documents state the standards, give examples,
and have sample questions and answers regarding the standard.
Ensure Board-Level and Senior Management Support
The decision to address ethics in a particular organization and to adopt a specific
ethics strategy begins with the top management team and/or the board of direc-
tors. The ultimate responsibility clearly lies with the board, charged with protect-
ing the underlying integrity and viability of the organization, as well as its cur-
rent financial performance.
If the ethics initiatives are adopted in times of crisis, management must
make certain the ethics effort is not seen as addressing only the narrow issue
highlighted by the scandal, nor simply as a way to regain public favor. Some
recent U.S.-based ethics initiatives appear insincere and designed primarily to
take advantage of leniency provisions in the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Management must ensure employees understand their strong commitment to the
ethics effort.
Sometimes an organization’s board and/or top management initiates the
ethics strategy. The board either establishes its own accountability committee or
asks the chief executive officer (CEO) and the top management team to design an
ethics strategy. Such a committee continues to monitor the effectiveness of the
strategy and its ultimate adequacy. Once the decision to initiate an ethics strat-
egy has been taken, the public and genuine commitment of the top executive team
and the board is essential to its success. If the strategy is seen as solely a board-
driven effort, it will usually fail.
Assign Responsibility for the Ethics and Compliance Strategy to an
Appropriate Function in the Organization
Responsibility for managing the ethics strategy lies ultimately with the CEO but
is usually assigned to an independent function or to one of the legal, human
resources, audit, or line organization functions.
When the responsibility is assigned to legal, human resources or audit, it is
important to have a single individual identified as the ethics officer. This individ-
ual needs ready access to and support from the CEO.
If the line organization assumes responsibility, then the top manager of each
facility should appoint an individual to be the local ethics officer. These individu-
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als must meet regularly with corporate officers. Also, any employee or local ethics
officer needs access to a central support mechanism for difficult cases, particular-
ly those that might involve local management.
Large organizations usually establish an independent ethics organization.
Nortel has established a vice-president—business ethics. The Ethics Officer
Association, a professional organization, has been established recently in the
United States to help define the profession, discuss policies, strategies, and
dilemmas and provide a structure for sharing practical approaches to specific
issues.
Identify and Communicate Compliance Standards
To enable compliance, the organization must first identify the key standards.
Standards whose violations have serious repercussions for the firm and the indi-
vidual are usually the basis for a compliance audit. Such standards include: 
• anticompetition legislation;
• other antitrust provisions;
• discrimination legislation;
• safety standards;
• pollution and environmental regulations;
• pay and compensation regulations;
• disclosure requirements;
• securities regulations;
• laws governing political contributions and lobbying;
• government procurement regulations; and
• professional association standards.
Standards established by the organization itself include statements regard-
ing the misuse or theft of company property, conflicts of interest, compromise of
company proprietary and/or confidential information, limitations on and disclo-
sure of gifts from suppliers, and truthfulness in expense reports and other organ-
ization recordkeeping.
All organizations must communicate the compliance standards to all employ-
ees. This is most commonly done in the form of a code of ethics, practice, or con-
duct; a statement on standards of business conduct, or a business conduct guide-
line.
Compliance documents typically include:
• a statement of corporate commitment to compliance;
• a statement of the personal responsibility and accountability of every employ-
ee for the compliance standards;
• a statement on disciplinary action;
• a short description of the standards themselves;
• references to detailed treatment of the standards in other organizational poli-
cies; and
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• a list of individuals the employee may contact with questions about the stan-
dards or to report violations of the standards.
Most organizations include in their code of conduct1 a general statement
identifying a firm commitment to obeying the law. Often, this commitment is
embodied in an introductory letter to the code from the CEO. The code is often
introduced with a video of the CEO making this corporate commitment.
The organization accepts the obligation to define and communicate the com-
pliance standards and places the primary responsibility for knowledge of and
adherence to the standards upon the individual employee. Ignorance of compli-
ance standards is specifically ruled out as an excuse for their violation. 
Often, codes will include a section on the responsibilities of the individual
manager and the responsibilities of the employee.
The codes usually refer to severe penalties for violation of compliance stan-
dards and specifically mention termination as one of the penalties. The serious-
ness of the organization’s commitment to the standards and the legal basis for
penalties are thus established.
Many organizations provide annual ethics training to all employees that
includes viewing an ethics video. Annually, employees sign a statement declaring
they have read and will abide by the standards in the code. In a few companies,
employees must also certify that they have abided by the standards during the
past year and/or that they have reported all violations of the standard of which
they are aware. 
Many organizations query how to apply the compliance standards to an over-
seas operation. In this case the code should indicate that employees must obey all
local laws and legal requirements. Most standards will be applicable globally, par-
ticularly those involving the protection of company property and proprietary infor-
mation. An organization weakens its perceived commitment to its code if it has
“lower” local standards that supersede those in the code. Preferably, most codes
should say explicitly that the standards apply worldwide, particularly in areas of
employee and consumer safety.
Responsibility for implementation of a compliance program should be given
to a senior executive with enough organizational influence to follow through on all
decisions made regarding or related to the program. An increasing number of
organizations give this assignment to a corporate ethics officer (as mentioned ear-
lier) or senior line manager. This individual usually manages the compliance pro-
grams, including distribution and updating of the corporate code, design of
employee training programs, employee reporting procedures such as hot lines, and
investigations of compliance violations.
The ethics officers can be selected from inside or outside the organization. An
insider has a thorough understanding of the work and structure of the organiza-
tion but may lack the degree of independence and perspective of an outsider.
Some organizations establish ethics staff in major divisions or at the various
geographic sites. These local ethics officers manage local compliance programs
and training and provide a local resource for employees. For example, General
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Dynamics Corporation appointed its first corporate vice-president—ethics in
1986. The company also appointed ethics officers at each of its more than 30 facil-
ities, though this assignment was usually combined with other duties.
Train People to Use Compliance Standards
Periodic training is widely used to communicate and reinforce the content of com-
pliance standards to all employees, with more specialized briefings on the stan-
dards for employees in marketing and other areas that are particularly vulnera-
ble to violations. In some organizations, modules on compliance standards are
integrated into every standard training program. Without a periodic training
effort, there is a significant danger that the ethics initiative will be seen as a
“paper program” and will be given little credence.
At Nortel, the company maintains a “Business Ethics” hotline for employees
to be able to report concerns or to ask questions regarding ethics policy. (See
www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/community/ethics/practices.html# for an
overview of Nortel’s core values, and further information on their “Ethical
Business Practices” program and their “Code of Business Conduct.”)
McDonnell Douglas Corporation ethics program is overseen by their Ethics
and Business Conduct Committee. (See www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/
ethics/index.htm for an overview of their “Ethics and Business Conduct” pro-
gram.)
Rockwell Automation, a leading industrial automation company with three
major business divisions has developed their business ethics program with a
“Standards of Business Conduct” policy, which features a vigorous compliance
program. (See www.rockwellautomation.com/about_us/ethics.html for more infor-
mation about their business ethics policies and programs.)
The purpose of employee compliance training is to ensure that each individ-
ual learns the standards specified and how to apply them to his/her particular
work environment, accepts personal responsibility for following the standards,
and knows the procedures for getting assistance with difficult compliance prob-
lems and for reporting violations of the standards. The ultimate goal of the train-
ing is for the standards to be internalized so that they guide the day-to-day deci-
sions of all employees.
Establish Clear Channels of Communication
A compliance program needs two clear channels of communication for all employ-
ees. The first provides answers to employees’ questions about standards. This
important resource usually includes an informed local representative who knows
the standards well and can access other organizational resources for interpreta-
tions. Employees often feel more comfortable raising an issue locally so that it will
remain confined to the local operation. 
The second communication channel allows an employee to report a suspect-
ed violation of the organization’s standards. This channel must be constructed to
protect the rights and interests of both the accused and the person reporting the
violation.
On occasion, an employee may feel that the problem lies with local manage-
ment. In those cases a remote anonymous resource is the most useful, allowing an
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employee to raise a question without the knowledge of the local organization.
Typically, both the local and remote resources are identified in the code and other
communications regarding the compliance program.
Any of the help resources identified above should be able to accept a report
of an alleged violation. Employees should be encouraged to take concerns about
violations to their direct supervisor first, but should never be discouraged from
taking an alleged violation to any level of the organization.
Most organizations use the same individuals and channels of communication
for help and for reporting violations. In some organizations there is a special ethics
hotline for violations. The individuals who answer the ethics hotline must be sen-
sitive counselors and investigators. Often, the employee will not know for certain
whether there has been a violation and the compliance officer will have to deter-
mine that by interviewing the caller. Key facts may be missing and the ethics offi-
cer will have to work with the caller to try to secure that information. It is essen-
tial that employees know there will be no reprisals for reporting a suspected vio-
lation in good faith. Occasionally, a caller may attempt to make a false report to
hurt another employee; provisions to protect the alleged violator until charges are
proven are critical. 
The ethics officer remains the primary contact for the employee who report-
ed the violation. When possible the caller’s identity should be protected, and this
must be communicated to the caller. The ethics officer remains responsible for the
disposition of all complaints filed and for reporting to senior management or the
board on the disposition of cases.
The ethics enforcement function must be supported by adequate resources.
The ethics officer may conduct investigations, or assign them to the legal staff or
an outside investigative organization. Internal auditors may be asked to conduct
special audits or to regulate audits to uncover the truth about an alleged violation.
Some small- and medium-sized companies subscribe to outside ethics advice serv-
ices as part of subcontracted employee assistance programs.
Ensure Supervision of Compliance Standards
To ensure that the compliance function is most effective, it is necessary to have
two levels of supervision. As the internal auditor reports to both the management
committee and a committee of the board, so the senior ethics officer should report
not only to senior management but also to the board as a whole or to a committee
of the board composed exclusively of outsiders. This may be the audit committee
or a specially designated committee.
Make Periodic Reports to Senior Management
and the Board of Directors
Among the most effective means of monitoring the compliance function are the fol-
lowing:
• reports to management and the board on 
— the type and frequency of inquiries and reports made respectively to the
organization’s ethics help lines and hotlines; 
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— the type and frequency of employee violations of compliance standards; and
— the penalties imposed on violators of the organization’s compliance stan-
dards;
• reports to management on 
— the results of “ethics surveys” measuring employees’ awareness of compli-
ance standards, understanding of the organization’s commitment to compli-
ance, willingness to ask questions regarding issues they encounter, and con-
fidence in the integrity and follow-up of the system to report violations;
— the results of “ethics audits” and internal audits identifying vulnerabilities
in the business process and possible future compliance issues; and
— new and difficult compliance issues raised by employees and any resolution;
and
• reports to employees on 
— new compliance standards and new interpretations of standards; and
— information summaries covering the first three reports noted above under
the first bullet.
Limitations
The primary limitations of the compliance approach used alone are:
• a compliance program can address only a limited set of business situations and
behaviors—those that can be reduced to simple standards of right and wrong.
The most difficult issues faced by employees often involve new dilemmas
brought on by technologies, new business arrangements, and cases where two
or more obligations conflict;
• a compliance program sets minimum standards for business behavior but does
nothing to define types of behavior which the company wishes to encourage. It
can direct employees not to mistreat customers, but it cannot help them see
how to treat customers well; 
• a compliance program may indicate to employees that they are not trusted,
that the program is designed to control their behavior. This runs directly count-
er to efforts to empower employees to use their judgment in handling the many
situations they face daily; and
• a compliance program may inadvertently give the impression that the com-
pany wants only minimum behavior and that employees will be rewarded for
devoting as little time as possible to addressing ethical concerns.
Organizations recognizing these limitations and seeking ethical initiatives
that go beyond the minimum, can choose between two other standards: the expec-
tations and demands of certain stakeholders (Stage 2) and the imperatives of the
company’s own values and mission (Stage 3).
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STAGE 2: MANAGING STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS
Stage 2 companies set policies corresponding to stakeholders’ concerns or expec-
tations. Some executives use stakeholders’ expectations as a standard in antici-
pation of enhanced profitability and/or effectiveness of the organization. Others
use this standard because they have not defined another or they feel uncomfort-
able establishing any other standard of corporate behavior.
Stage 2 actions typically are:
• define corporate stakeholders;
• evaluate the attitudes and opinions of stakeholder groups;
• design programs to address stakeholder concerns; and
• audit the effectiveness of stakeholder programs.
Define Corporate Stakeholders
To identify the corporate stakeholders is the first task in designing a program to
manage relations with key stakeholders. The most common stakeholders are long-
and short-term shareholders, employees, managers, unions, customers, suppliers,
creditors, business partners, communities, the public, government regulators, and
the organization itself.2
A list of stakeholders may also include professional subgroups among
employees, an organization’s own mission statement, values statement, and cor-
porate goals, specialized customers (industrial, governmental, etc.), distributors,
retailers, franchisees, industry associations, companies within the same industry,
elected officials of government, local neighborhood associations, environmental
and other advocacy groups, the environment itself, institutional shareholders, and
individual shareholders.
Evaluate the Attitudes and Opinions of Stakeholder Groups
An organization managing its stakeholder relations must have the means to eval-
uate the opinions and track the concerns of stakeholder groups in an ongoing
manner. These means include employee attitude or morale surveys, community
opinion surveys, stakeholder surveys, “dialogues” focus groups, and other out-
reach programs. Reputation or satisfaction surveys often track the opinions of sev-
eral stakeholders at once.
Stakeholder attitudes, particularly toward the specific organization, are
measured and tracked over time. Stakeholder concerns and beliefs about corpo-
rate or fiduciary responsibilities are also monitored. Resulting trends give useful
information for stakeholder-relations planners. Stakeholder opinion surveys are
often stated in terms of the degree of trust stakeholders have in the statements or
behavior of the organization. 
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Stakeholder dialogues are useful vehicles for tracking stakeholder attitudes.
Some retailers have consumer advisory panels; other firms have ongoing user
groups to provide feedback on the performance of the company’s products and
services. The groups discuss the general values and views of the stakeholders and
their specific attitudes toward the firm. Stakeholder dialogues may also be con-
vened to address particular issues or conflicts that have arisen.
Design Programs to Address Stakeholder Concerns
Programs may be designed to address the specific concerns of a stakeholder once
its values and attitudes have been determined. Short-term efforts to demonstrate
the company’s sensitivity may be initiated immediately, while long-term efforts to
solve the problem can begin.
Stakeholder programs take many general forms, among them:
• programs that change policy (i.e., changes in the design of products, marketing
practices, human resources policies, etc.);
• programs that demonstrate concern (i.e., corporate contributions to stakehold-
er causes, studies of issues raised by stakeholders, general advocacy attention
to issues, etc.); and
• programs that divert attention from the issue temporarily (i.e., significant pro-
grams of corporate social commitment in areas other than that raised by the
stakeholder but still important to that stakeholder).
Several examples demonstrate a variety of approaches to stakeholder pro-
grams:
• The Body Shop International, a U.K.-based firm with many retail stores in
Canada and the United States, has established an ethical audit process where-
by it surveys its stakeholders for their opinions of the company, conducts reg-
ular stakeholder dialogues with selected groups, and uses stakeholder input to
develop future company policies and programs.
• NCR, a part of AT&T until 1996, developed a stakeholder program in 1988 to
address the concerns of, and manage the relationships with, each of its stake-
holders. The company believed this aided its efforts to work effectively with its
employees, suppliers, and business partners, and to respond to the concerns of
its customers. 
• Gillette, which had suffered criticism for testing some of its products on ani-
mals, invested millions in research on alternative testing methodologies.
• NYNEX, a telecommunications firm, has developed multiple programs to main-
tain its reputation as a values-driven and ethical corporation. This effort was
launched in 1990 following several very public and embarrassing incidents
involving company-sponsored parties in which some employees did not live up
to the company’s standards. The program closely monitors media and other
attitudes toward the company and there is close coordination with customer
and media relations. 
• General Motors and several other blue-chip companies have voluntarily
pledged to follow the CERES Principles, a set of rules for environmentally sen-
sitive operations proposed by a coalition of environmental activist groups.
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Stakeholder programs should not be used by organizations to demonstrate a
concern for the stakeholder that does not truly exist. The public and most stake-
holder groups are increasingly able to see through token programs and other
efforts undertaken solely for their public relations value.
Audit the Effectiveness of Stakeholder Programs
Organizations implementing a stakeholder approach to corporate ethics engage in
extensive monitoring and survey evaluation of the attitudes of stakeholders
toward the organization. These periodic surveys ask stakeholders for their opin-
ions on recent efforts and also pose base questions that can be tracked over time
to see if the organization is rising or falling in stakeholders’ opinions. Some organ-
izations have formalized these surveys, doing them annually and calling them
stakeholder or social audits.
Experience has shown that stakeholder monitoring needs to be done both in
survey (anonymous) form and in face-to-face dialogue or focus group meetings,
where views of selected stakeholders may be explored in depth.
STAGE 3: CREATING A VALUES-BASED ORGANIZATION
Sometimes, the limited effectiveness of the compliance approach leads an organi-
zation directly to the decision to manage by a set of positive values it has estab-
lished for itself, while being sensitive to the needs and demands of stakeholders.
In other cases the limitations of the Stage 2 approach lead to the decision to
create a values-based organization. If the company seeks only to satisfy all the
demands of stakeholders, it is continually faced with the need to separate legiti-
mate and illegitimate expectations, and to explain the reasons for its decisions. 
Sometimes organizations migrate to a Stage 3 values-based organization
from a Stage 1 compliance-based program in times of crisis, immediately follow-
ing an ethical scandal or embarrassing incident.
For example, in 1989, Northrop Corporation and 11 employees were indicted
on 189 counts of fraud and corruption for improperly testing cruise missile parts
three years earlier. In 1990, the Los Angeles aerospace company pleaded guilty
and paid a $17 million fine. Two managers at its Pomona, California, plant were
jailed and the division was barred from government contracting for two years.
Northrop responded to the Pomona debacle by changing its ethics program from
one based on compliance with laws and contracts to a standard based on values
such as customer satisfaction, fair treatment, honesty, fairness, and integrity. The
new stance also recognized that senior executives had to create an ethical culture
by setting an example from the top.
The Stage 3 approach normally uses the term “values” rather than “ethics”
because the company has chosen these norms itself. They may be shaped by the
expectations and demands of stakeholders, by management’s beliefs about what is
ethical, by company founders’ values (present from the beginning), or by a set of
long-standing values established by professional managers.
The actions of Stage 3 strategy often include:
• defining the organization’s values;
• communicating the organization’s values;
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• creating systems that support corporate values;
• establishing an ethics or corporate values function;
• ensuring supervision of corporate values;
• assigning responsibility for interpreting values;
• recruiting and promoting people of strong moral character;
• training people in ethical decision making and application of the values;
• encouraging employees to report behavior inconsistent with the values;
• rewarding managerial and employee behavior consistent with the values; 
• renewing the values; and
• conducting policy and practices reviews.
Defining the Organization’s Values
In order to define a framework for values an organization must answer questions
related to the four fundamental sources of responsibility:
• Purpose. What is the organization’s fundamental reason for being, i.e., its ulti-
mate aims?
• People. Who are the constituencies to whom the company is accountable and on
whom it depends for success? What are their legitimate claims and interests?
• Power. What is the organization’s authority and ability to act?
• Principles. What are the organization’s obligations or duties, as well as its guid-
ing aspirations and ideals?
Some organizations begin defining their values by assessing current prevail-
ing values. This can be done by surveying employees, conducting focus groups, and
interviewing key stakeholders who deal with the company.
As with most changes in organizational culture,3 the establishment of a val-
ues-based organization starts at the top. The CEO must be willing to commit both
the personal effort and the time required to the process, as well as visibly demon-
strate a commitment to the values effort on an ongoing basis. Companies known
for their ethics and social responsibility are led by CEOs who are personally com-
mitted to the mission.
At the Hewlett-Packard Company, the commitment to values began at the
company’s founding in 1939. However, it was the company’s growth beyond the
city of Palo Alto, California, that prompted founders David Packard and Bill
Hewlett to convene a meeting of their senior managers and have them write down
the values in 1956. The general manager who set up the company’s operations
that year in Loveland, Colorado, carried a short document that described the com-
pany’s commitments to each of its stakeholders.
Gun Denhart, CEO of children’s clothing manufacturer Hanna Anderson,
based in Portland, Oregon, believes in participatory management and generous
employee benefits, including child-care allowances. The company is known for its
social activism, especially a program in which customers return used Hanna
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Anderson clothing for a discount on future purchases. Hanna Anderson then
gives the clothes to charity. Starbucks, Ben & Jerry’s, and Patagonia, too, have
leaders with strong social convictions, and they know employees will follow their
examples.
Johnson & Johnson set forth its first credo in 1945 and has revised it sever-
al times. (See www.jnj.com/our_company/our_credo/index.htm for the history of
the credo and its current version.) 
Johnson & Johnson’s reaction in the Tylenol poisoning crisis several years
ago was a public reflection of the credo’s influence on corporate decision making.
The company kept the public fully informed about the incidents, paid $125 million
to completely withdraw the product and introduce a tamper-resistant package,
and quickly regained 94% of its pre-poisoning sales. The company presents the
case internally as an illustration of how its credo requires putting safety first.
The preparation of values statements, variously called credos, or principles,
requires the involvement of a broad group of managers and employees. The best
values statements are typically the outcome of a process of consultation and col-
lective commitment rather than a document imposed from the top. Some organi-
zations have involved hundreds of their own managers and employees—and even
groups of outside stakeholders—in the writing of their values statement.
Special retreats and seminars are useful for starting management-level dis-
cussions to clarify organizational values and principles. After such beliefs have
been articulated and refined, follow-up management meetings and activities focus
on current company systems and practices to ensure they support, rather than
clash with, stated organizational beliefs. For this process to be effective, all
employees must internalize the values, believing them to be their own.
Employees must also have confidence that the values expressed are shared
by top management. If the values (or compliance standards in Stage 1) are
thought to be binding on employees but not top executives, the initiative will fail.
Management must trust employees to implement the values, and employees must
trust management to adhere to the same principles.
The most effective values statements are generally short, perhaps one to five
pages, and state clearly what the company feels are its obligations to each of its
stakeholder groups. Usually these documents are understood better if they are
short; however, many values and commitments must then be addressed in greater
depth elsewhere. 
Communicating the Organization’s Values
The preparation of a values statement is only the first step in communicating the
values of the organization. Other key steps and elements in the communication of
the values include:
• formal approval of the values statement by senior management and the board;
• dissemination of the values statement to all employees;
• executive and managerial behavior and expectations which are consistent with
the values statement;
• promotion of the values statement as a guide to decision making in the organ-
ization;
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• use of language from the values statement in executive speeches and other
communications;
• reference to the values in making key decisions and in announcing them to the
company;
• presentation of the values statement to all new employees in orientation pro-
grams, presentation of the values statement to new suppliers and other busi-
ness partners; and
• use of the values statement as a key organizing concept in employee and man-
agement training at all levels.
The most effective means of communicating the values of the firm is the
behavior of the top management team. Hewlett-Packard Company could function
well without a formal statement of values when every employee worked in Palo
Alto and could observe the day-to-day behavior of Dave Packard and Bill Hewlett.
Conversely, where management is seen to be above the law and able to flout the
values, no words or exhortations will make employees believe the values are real.
An organization must terminate or reassign even top managers for violations of
company standards in order to communicate strongly that the values are to be
observed.
The second most important influence on employees’ perception of the real
values of their company is the behavior of their immediate supervisors.
Creating Systems that Support Corporate Values
While education can highlight the importance of ethics and clarify ways in which
rational business decisions can include ethical considerations, behavioral change
can only come about when the organization as a whole provides both the environ-
ment and systems (both formal and informal) for supporting ethical practices.
Formal systems include performance evaluation procedures, compensation
plans, capital allocation and budgeting procedures, and divisional reviews, among
others. Informal systems broadly address “the way we do things around here” and
may include how assignments are handed out, how employees learn about new
opportunities, how purchase decisions are really made, and how credit is given to
those who do well on projects.
At minimum, systems must not frustrate the implementation of values in the
organization. For example, if the performance evaluation system includes nothing
derived from the values statement of the organization, it will be apparent to all
that the values do not really matter. If a formal evaluation system exists but pro-
motions go to those whose attention is focused only on the bottom line, then that
will weaken any broader values otherwise espoused by the company.
Instead, day-to-day systems must reflect and enhance the organization’s val-
ues. If fairness toward suppliers is a value, then there must be systems in place
to evaluate how suppliers are treated and to set standards for corporate behavior
toward them. If good working conditions for all employees who make the compa-
ny’s products are a value (whether they work directly for the company or for a sup-
plier), then there must be a system to improve and monitor working conditions at
suppliers’ locations as well as in-house.
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Most organizations also create systems to get involved in important social
issues in their communities. These systems include charitable foundations, schol-
arship programs, endowments for the arts, economic development projects for
poorer areas, and so on.
Establishing an Ethics or Corporate Values Function 
As in the compliance approach, it is essential to make a senior manager responsi-
ble for the corporate values strategy and implementation. However, the Stage 3
ethics officer will have broader responsibilities for assisting management in devel-
oping a strategy consistent with the organization’s values. In addition, there must
be a committee or management group with the responsibility and authority to
examine whether proposed decisions are indeed consistent with those values.
Some dilemmas raise questions that are more fundamental and far reaching
in their implications for organizational policy. For example, if a major layoff is
planned, the package of benefits to be offered to those who are laid off should be
handled as a corporate decision. Whether a company seeks “green certification” for
a particular product line from an outside organization may create pressures or a
precedent for other product lines. If a single division agrees to a joint venture with
an international partner of questionable reputation or to certain tax avoidance
schemes, this may involve important choices. 
In most organizations that manage values, management has institutional-
ized the discussion of the most difficult ethical and values questions. Sometimes,
this is the role of a top-management-level ethics committee. At other times, such
discussions are prepared by top management and discussed formally with the
board-level ethics or audit committee. It is crucial to have a forum where difficult
ethical problems can be discussed openly.
Ensuring Supervision of Corporate Values
The ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of the organization’s values, as
well as for its financial strength and survival, lies with the top management and
the board of directors. The organization’s values ought to be key elements in any
strategy and therefore should receive considerable attention in the normal gover-
nance structure.
An effective step for many organizations is the establishment of a board com-
mittee specially charged with the supervision of values questions. Such a com-
mittee reviews the management of company values and receives reports on the
status of the values as well as any social or ethical audit data generated.
Assigning Responsibility for Interpreting Values 
The broadly stated values of the whole organization, often captured in a short
credo or values statement, may not give enough guidance on how the values
should be applied to the work of each particular division or department of the
organization. How the commitments of Johnson & Johnson are translated into
behavior rules for marketing, research, and other departments is a task of every
manager at every level.
In organizations that have implemented Stage 3 most fully, the final and per-
haps most critical step in the communication of the values occurs in the dialogue
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between every group and its manager. They discuss the implications of the values,
usually stated in more general terms, for the work of that particular group. If the
credo or values statement captures values adequately, what do these values mean
when put to work in product development, customer service, or the research lab?
This translation is the job of management at all levels, but particularly at the
level of the work team.
In the case of very large organizations, some divisions or departments may
even develop their own more specific values statement or guidelines that delineate
all the implications of the company’s values for that group. This is particularly
important for divisions and groups with operations in other cultures.
Just as in the compliance and stakeholder stages of managing ethics, the
organization relies on the efforts of every employee to implement the company’s
ethics strategy. All employees are informed about, trained in, and reminded of the
company’s values—and are told explicitly of their responsibility to apply those val-
ues in their day-to-day work.
Recruiting and Promoting People of Strong Moral Character
Organizations can influence their cultures most obviously through the people they
hire. Indeed, in the creation of a value-based organization the hiring decisions
may be the most crucial ones, since there is considerable doubt that deeply held
values can be changed once people have reached early adulthood. Organizations
may seek to attract people with strong moral character.
Organizations such as General Mills and Pepsi-Cola have explicit statements
of values that they publicize, use in briefing executive recruiters, and use as inter-
view questions for prospective candidates. Nortel posts its code of conduct on the
World Wide Web so prospective employees can see what Nortel stands for before
the interview process begins, and perhaps choose not to apply if their values do
not match those of the organization. It is very hard to determine moral character
in an interview. References and interview responses should be carefully scruti-
nized.
Training People in Ethical Decision Making and
Application of the Values
Addressing values explicitly in staff training and development at all levels of the
organization emphasizes senior management’s commitment to a values-based
organization. The purpose of this training is to ensure that employees are aware
of the organization’s values and their content, the application of those values to
the particular work environment of each employee, the employee’s personal
responsibility for following the values, and procedures for getting assistance with
difficult values decisions. This training should enhance the employee’s ability to
see values issues when they arise, to understand the values of those with whom
they work, and to evaluate alternate decisions and courses of action considering
the organization’s values.
Of greater importance is the incorporation of values training into the work of
each operation within the organization. The application of values to manufactur-
ing, financial reporting, marketing, and the research group will be distinctly dif-
ferent. This application must become the focus of training at every level. Every
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standard training program offered must present the values, encouraging discus-
sion about their meaning everywhere in the organization and at different levels of
managerial responsibility.
A less formal approach to training and development is to have managers and
employees together discuss problem solving consistent with organizational values.
The company should facilitate ongoing discussion about dealing with difficult eth-
ical situations in a manner that reflects a commitment to its values. The man-
agers and their employee teams should be directly involved in establishing mech-
anisms to manage pressures felt by all employees to deviate from the organiza-
tion’s values. Often, the use of real-life case histories is particularly effective in
stimulating the needed dialogue.
Some decisions may not involve ethics or values issues. It is important to
help employees and their managers understand when the interests of an internal
or external stakeholder are affected.
Encouraging Employees to Report Behavior
Inconsistent with the Values
As in Stage 1, every employee must feel an obligation to help the organization
achieve its goal of always behaving in a manner consistent with the desired
values.
Help lines and advice lines can be used by employees to get clarification of
the organization’s values. In addition, there must be effective channels of commu-
nication, so that employees can report specific behaviors or decisions that they
believe compromise the organization’s values.
Rewarding Managerial and Employee Behavior
Consistent with the Values
It is essential for employees to know that they will never be penalized for follow-
ing the organization’s values. Indeed, it is important they know that adherence to
these values is necessary for advancement in the organization.
Formal evaluation systems should reflect the values and measure employees’
and managers’ commitments to them. Rewarding someone whose behavior is
inconsistent with the values causes all employees to perceive that the values are
not real.
Renewing the Values
An important feature of an organization’s values program is the renewal of, com-
mitment to, and understanding of its values. In some organizations, renewal is a
distinct event. In others, it is part of an ongoing communication of the values.
Most organizations find that some type of renewal must take place approximate-
ly every three to seven years. Where there has not been a deliberate renewal and
rededication within this period, the values systems are generally observed to be
weaker.
At Hewlett-Packard, the values system has been renewed periodically.
Originally the corporate objectives were rewritten every three years and commu-
nicated anew to the organization. Executives report that the changes were usual-
ly minor, but the thought that went into the rewriting and the effort of represen-
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tation reminded all employees of the values. Some within HP felt that the tradi-
tional company values were challenged in the 1980s by substantial restructuring
of the company and substantial change in the employment contract. For the first
time, employees could not count on a job for life with HP. Divisions were restruc-
tured and phased out. A new group-organizational level took some decisions away
from the traditional product market divisions. HP executives sensed a weakening
in the values structure and launched The HP Way Project to renew the organiza-
tion’s commitment to the values. Among other elements, the project included a
handbook for managers on how to communicate the HP values to their divisions.
Conducting Policy and Practices Reviews
An organization’s policies and practices must be congruent with its espoused val-
ues and beliefs if those values and beliefs are to have any moral force. Yet fre-
quently there is a gap between stated values and various policies and practices.
For example, if an organization espouses values of empowerment, trust and equal-
ity for employees, yet stubbornly maintains executive dining rooms, separate
classes of travel for different levels of executives, and various other perks associ-
ated with office, there will be considerable cynicism when executives and man-
agers give speeches that emphasize these values while their actions belie them. 
There are two kinds of policies and practices that must be regularly
reviewed. First, there are those dealing directly with ethical issues such as pur-
chasing policies, gifts and donations to political parties, payments to foreign
agents, reporting of financial transactions, employment practices, investment
policies, and related-party dealings. Then there are those that do not apparently
deal with ethical issues but that indirectly might be the source of behavior incon-
sistent with the organization’s values. For example, a corporation’s recruitment
policy might favor specific schools and this might result in an unintentional
screening out of minority group applicants. Another company, in selecting people
for permanent employment, might rate summer employment in physical labor,
such as construction work, very highly and in this way might be discriminating
against women, who tend to avoid such jobs while in school.
Much as in the stakeholder-management stage of ethics programs, organiza-
tions in the managing-values stage closely monitor the effectiveness of their
efforts. This monitoring takes the form of stakeholder attitude surveys, and eval-
uations by management and outsiders of the organization’s adherence to its own
values.
Many techniques of ethical and social auditing are being developed to evalu-
ate the adherence of an organization to its values and its sensitivity to stakehold-
er concerns. Environmental auditing focuses on the adherence of the company to
environmental values and standards. Ethical auditing can go beyond attitude
surveys to measure the health of the relationship between the organization and
its various stakeholders, and the willingness of employees to raise and address
ethical concerns.
The following table provides a summary of the three approaches to imple-
menting ethics programs and the corresponding actions.
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Stages Actions
Stage 1: Managing for Adopt a code of ethics, practice or conduct to address
Compliance specific behaviors;
Ensure board-level and senior management support;
Assign responsibility for the ethics and compliance
strategy to an appropriate function in the organization;
Identify and communicate compliance standards;
Train people to use compliance standards;
Establish clear channels of communication;
Ensure supervision of compliance standards; and
Make periodic reports to senior management and the board
of directors.
Stage 2: Managing Define corporate stakeholders;
Stakeholder Relations Evaluate the attitudes and opinions of stakeholder groups;
Design programs to address stakeholder concerns; and
Audit the effectiveness of stakeholder programs.
Stage 3: Creating a Define the organization’s values;
Value-Based Communicate the organization’s values; 
Organization Create systems that support corporate values;
Establish an ethics or corporate values function;
Ensure supervision of corporate values;
Assign responsibility for interpreting values;
Recruit and promote people of strong moral character;
Train people in ethical decision making and application of
the values;
Encourage employees to report behavior inconsistent with
the values;
Reward managerial and employee behavior consistent with
the values;
Renew the values; and 
Conduct policy and practice reviews.
CONCLUSION
The management of ethics has become a mainstream and necessary management
concern over the last decade. The establishment of an ethical culture within an
organization is essential, not only for the achievement of desired business goals,
but also necessry for the proper management of key risks in its business environ-
ment.
Major business scandals have dramatized the reality of the risks involved in
not having an ethical corporate culture, and managements are increasingly con-
vinced of the importance of effective ethics strategies to bottom-line success.
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APPENDIX B
DESIGNING AN ETHICS
TRAINING PROGRAM*
Many organizations choose to design their own ethics training program for the
advantages it provides over other options (consultant-led or purchased program).
Doing so allows the organization to tailor the ethics training program to the indus-
try, market and company-specific factors that exist within the organization and
that exert influence from outside the organization. If your organization chooses to
design its own ethics training program, the key considerations you will face
include the following.
• Define terms. What is an ethics training program?
• Define objectives. What are the objectives of an ethics training program?
• Decide what to include. What makes up an ethics training program?
• Decide where to start. How does the organization implement an ethics training
program?
• Decide on training methods. Who provides ethics training?
• Define your audience. Who is the ethics training program directed to?
• Avoid roadblocks. What issues are commonly encountered in designing ethics
training programs?
• Test its effectiveness. How does an organization evaluate the effectiveness of its
ethics training program? 
• Follow up on training. What follow-up should take place after the ethics train-
ing program is initiated?
* Note: The material presented in this appendix touch on requirements in “Section 406—Code of Ethics for
Senior Financial Officers” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those requirements only cover senior finan-
cial officers (including CEOs), although an organization is free to expand the code to include all employ-
ees. This appendix material is intended to aid in the designing of an overall ethics program. For the
requirements of section 406, see Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). A copy of the law can be down-
loaded at www.loc.gov/law/guide/pl107204.pdf.
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Even if your organization is already a values-based organization that is man-
aging for ethical compliance internally and for good stakeholder relations, adopt-
ing an ethics training program offers the opportunity to enhance the content and
ensure greater influence in the direction and focus points of the training. As ethics
training drives, among other things, the establishment and reinforcement of the
organization’s values and corporate culture, designing an effective ethics training
program to communicate the organization’s ethics strategy pays dividends well
beyond simply encouraging compliance.
WHAT IS AN ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM?
An ethics training program is a systemic framework which identifies, communi-
cates, builds, empowers, and reinforces ethical behavior by the individuals that
comprise an organization. The ethics training program uses resources including
trainers, instruction techniques and materials, policies and procedures, case stud-
ies, and technology to accomplish its objectives. Using a range of means to com-
municate and sensitize participants to ethical dilemmas and increase ethical
awareness recognizes that individuals assimilate information in differing ways
and provides opportunities to reinforce the underlying messages. 
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF AN ETHICS
TRAINING PROGRAM?
A well-designed ethics training program should:
• be based on the corporate ethics strategy, reflect company values, and follow
established codes of conduct;
• facilitate participation by directors, executive officers, managers and line
employees in defining the organization’s culture and values;
• present information about ethical issues to participants using a variety of
resources;
• explore the influences and factors that may affect decision making in ethically
challenging situations;
• illustrate the benefits of ethical decision making;
• demonstrate the negative consequences to individuals and the organization of
unethical decisions or actions;
• guide participants in making ethical decisions when faced with real-life ethical
dilemmas; and
• provide a means of measuring participants’ awareness of corporate values, eth-
ical behavior and personal integrity.
WHAT MAKES UP AN ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM? 
An ethics training program is comprised of a number of distinct elements,
including:
• an organization’s mission statement, vision statement, and codes of conduct
from which the program draws its legitimacy and from which corporate values
and corporate culture derive;
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• legal standards and any other externally imposed standards of conduct (for
example, industry standards or certifications) applicable to the organization;
• necessary training resources (trainers, instruction techniques and materials,
policies and procedures, case studies, and technology);
• training methodologies and training plans used in conjunction with such
resources to impart information to participants;
• participants from all levels of an organization, including those with specific
duties or areas of responsibility that experience, or are likely to encounter, eth-
ical dilemmas, as well as prospective employees;
• supervisory officers or a committee within the organization that reviews, eval-
uates and implements adjustments to the ethics training program based on
testing or exercise results, other feedback, and industry or organizational
developments that highlight the need for emphasis in specific subject areas;
• a budget for implementation that is organizationally appropriate, designed to
accomplish the objectives of the training program, and sufficient to demon-
strate the organization’s commitment to ethical behavior; and
• a program that ultimately places ethics training into an integrated training
environment that allows ethics to assume its rightful place as central to all
types of decision making in the organization.
HOW DOES THE ORGANIZATION IMPLEMENT AN ETHICS
TRAINING PROGRAM?
The steps necessary to implement an ethics training program are: 
1. Review and revise the mission and vision statements; adopt or revise exist-
ing codes of conduct; review and assure that applicable legal and industry
standards are reflected within the codes of conduct.
• Revisions to these statements and to codes of conduct should be handled
similarly; that is, give employees the opportunity to contribute their
thoughts and input into revisions. 
• Encouraging employee participation at all levels of the organization in this
effort will promote the development of a unified, integrated corporate cul-
ture. The involvement of management in this effort is most critical, how-
ever. Common sense would indicate (and past studies confirm) that the
single most important factor in success or failure of an ethics program is
whether or not the employees perceive a genuine commitment to ethical
behavior at the top of the organizational chart.
Practitioner’s Note: As this first step is key to, and forms the base for, the ethics
training program, senior officers, directors and employees should be asked to partic-
ipate in formulating these statements and codes of conduct. This will compel the par-
ticipants at various levels of the organization to “buy into” the corporate values and
culture, and rightly give them a feeling of empowerment and contribution.
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Failure by upper level management to set the proper tone and show a
genuine commitment can doom the ethics program from the start and make
it nothing more than a policy statement. It’s not enough to “say we do this”
in a policy statement. Employees want management to “show we do this” as
part of the day-to-day work culture and environment.
2. Establish a budget that will facilitate the organization:
• putting trainers, instruction techniques and materials, policies and proce-
dures, case studies, and technology in place, all at a level that is organiza-
tionally appropriate and that demonstrates commitment by the organiza-
tion and senior management to ethical behavior; and
• adopting training methodologies and training plans that will accomplish
the objectives of the training program.
3. Decide who will be involved in preparing the curriculum for the ethics train-
ing program. While senior officer involvement is critical, a top-down
approach may not be most effective. For example, should groups of employ-
ees or departments be asked to prepare their own case studies? Should man-
agers of specific departments be asked to solicit input from departmental
employees on issues to be covered, case study examples, and the format for
group discussions? 
4. Evaluate the time necessary to implement the ethics training program and
achieve its objectives. How many hours should be allocated to ethics training
for the trainers themselves and for the participants? What kind of “refresh-
er” program should be offered, and how often? How can the ethics training
program be improved on or updated (for example, including new cases, new
exercises, and new ethical dilemmas) in order to keep the program topical
and interesting? How do the time requirements fit into the budget? Is man-
agement sending the wrong message if ethics training is relegated to the
“back burner” from a time allocation perspective? Will employees be compen-
sated for time spent on ethics training during non-working hours (for exam-
ple, by using e-training programs from home)?
5. Determine a mix of instruction techniques and materials, policies and proce-
dures, case studies and technology that will:
• stimulate participant interest; 
• deliver content through a range of alternative means; 
• enhance the learning experience; 
• facilitate easy integration of the ethics training program into other train-
ing initiatives; 
• promote involvement by all levels of the organization, as well as increased
involvement by senior executives; and
• allow development of special training modules or sub-programs tailored to
the needs of specific parts of the organization (for example, sales, pur-
chasing, accounting, etc.). 
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The follow-up question to this issue is how to decide the proper mix of
instruction techniques and materials, policies and procedures, case studies and
technology that should be used in a particular program. Consider the following
points: 
• Many organizations have developed computer-based ethics training courses
that are accessed by staff through the Internet or made available on company
intranets, or through CD-ROM or other electronic forms of delivery. These pro-
grams generally are (1) interest provoking, (2) interactive and multimedia
based, (3) available on demand, (4) incorporate review and testing at the end of
each module to reinforce specific points and ethical concepts, and (5) easily
edited or revised once completed. Interactive ethics training programs are gen-
erally much more effective in promoting learning and achieving higher recall
rates than traditional instruction. These programs illustrate that:
— In addition to using video, sound, pictures, color and text accents to high-
light and differentiate the information presented, well prepared computer-
based training courses give immediate feedback through multiple choice
questions and case studies. Moreover, some of these programs are formulat-
ed to provide the participant additional questions and case studies if early
results indicate that the participant is having difficulty with particular con-
cepts. 
— Learning can be fun! One large company used a “board game” format in a
computer-based ethics training program to present ethical dilemmas and
offer choices for the participants. This format delivered a compelling and
provocative learning experience, immediate feedback and, best of all, a fun
way of imparting important information to participants. 
— Ethics issues are often “people” issues above all else. This means that use of
computer training programs alone may not be as effective as computer train-
ing accompanied, or followed by, group discussions, instruction, and case
studies. Again, diversity in the learning experience is a good watchword. 
• Organizing subject matter in a logical “step” format that allows the partici-
pants to progress at their own pace but rewards the participants as they pass
designated milestones is important to support the participants’ sense of accom-
plishment. Recognition through the issuance of certificates of completion, cor-
porate awards, and similar public “pats on the back,” if handled in a straight-
forward and serious manner, will also provide the participants with a sense of
achievement. While ethical behavior is its own reward, it is important to
remember that employees in an organization value recognition among their
peers, not just monetary or tangible rewards. 
• Instruction, or straight lecture, is not generally effective in promoting learning.
If instruction is accompanied by class discussion of ethical issues, Powerpoint
slides, case studies, or other training techniques, instruction has at least some
chance of promoting learning. If instruction is to be used as a training tech-
nique, it is important to “mix it up” with other learning experiences to avoid
losing the participants’ attention. 
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• Asking participants to read, memorize or recite policies and procedures is not
as effective as getting the participants to apply policies and procedures through
case studies, problems and hypotheticals. As illustrated in the chapter materi-
als preceding the appendixes, practicing application of policies and procedures
to “real-life” situations reinforces learning and helps build skills necessary to
recognize, and deal with, ethical dilemmas. 
• Using classroom discussion in conjunction with ethics case studies or exercises
is effective in promoting learning. For example, if the training program calls for
the trainer to elicit what the participants feel are the most important aspects
of the company’s code of conduct, the resulting discussion can result in a
thought-provoking list of important ethical considerations. By referring back to
this list and comparing/contrasting the list to the company’s code of conduct,
the trainer can focus on issues that the participants feel are important, while
also working in a discussion of some of the related issues that are important to
convey. 
— Once the list is complete, the trainer can introduce exercises or case studies
dealing with the specific ethical topics that the participants have identified.
Class discussion of different outcomes, including benefits to the organization
and potential harm to the organization and the individual, will increase the
participants’ understanding of why the company’s mission and vision state-
ment, codes of conduct, and applicable laws deserve their attention.
• Developing questions for ethics training and to engender class discussion is not
difficult, but the form and degree of difficulty of the questions must be adjust-
ed to the skill levels of the participants. For example, senior executives and
directors might be asked questions that ask them to judge and differentiate
among relative outcomes, while lower-level employees might be given specific
outcomes and asked to recall specific ethical prohibitions or to recognize the
presence of a specific ethical issue. 
• The use of decision trees, “if-then” tables, checklists and flowcharts can be very
effective means of promoting learning in an ethics training program. For exam-
ple, if an ethical dilemma is presented and the participants are asked who they
would go to in order to report a specific situation, the development of a decision
tree or an “if-then” table will teach the participants how to handle specific
issues. Rather than using instruction, these training aids give the participants
the chance to consider ethical issues and arrive at alternative responses that
will form the basis for group discussion and consideration. 
• Case studies are effective in motivating participants to identify issues, analyze
options, and choose among different courses of action. If you create your own
case studies, any numbers of examples from real-life situations are available in
court decisions, SEC administrative actions, and SEC civil proceedings. These
proceedings are public information and most can be accessed through the SEC’s
web site at www.sec.gov. In putting together a case study, keep in mind the fol-
lowing points. 
— Use job titles, job descriptions and organizational attributes (i.e., divisions,
units or subsidiaries) that are familiar to the participants to help set the
stage. 
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— Make sure that financial and statistical data is consistent with real life
experience; remember, what you are striving for here is a story that will
seem all too familiar to the participants. 
— Use reporting procedures, codes of conduct, and policies that the partici-
pants will find similar or identical to their own.
— Focus on the key ethical issues that are implicated. When beginning to write
the case study, arrange issues into related groups so that the case illustrates
specific points that the participants may face. 
— Outline the objectives of the case, give a reasonable amount of background
information, cover the major events and, where necessary, give the partici-
pants a reference point or points in a code of conduct, applicable law, or
industry standard. Remember, you will be asking them to apply this infor-
mation to the case, so the participants will need some context within which
to act or make decisions. 
— Promote discussion of the case among the group, and remember that it is
important to make each participant feel their thoughts and contributions
are worthwhile.
— Encourage discussions of new points and conclusions only after the partici-
pants have been given ample opportunity to do so previously; and ask the
participants how the case study relates to their own ethically related expe-
riences. 
6. Determine if outside experts, officers or other employees will lead the train-
ing program. Insofar as employees perceive management’s involvement to be
the single most important factor in setting the “tone from the top,” it may be
appropriate to designate a chief ethics officer who will lead the program, even
if outside experts are used as trainers. Some organizations use the “cascade”
theory of ethics training, meaning that senior executives train the next level
down on the organizational chart, and that level trains the following. The dif-
ficulty with this methodology is that senior executives may be perceived as
having little involvement with other levels in the organization, and there
may be some loss in consistency of the message. If you elect to go with this
framework, give some thought to using one officer or expert to coordinate and
oversee the training in a much more hands-on fashion than might otherwise
be the case. 
7. Determine the key ethical issues on which the training program will focus.
This will require you to evaluate the issues most likely to crop up inside your
organization, since time generally won’t permit a full-blown ethics course
covering all conceivable issues. The following focus points should be consid-
ered when selecting key issues to include in training. 
• Explore issues that your company faced in the past. How about your com-
petitors? What about industries similar to yours?
• Develop program modules for specific functions such as sales, purchasing
and accounting, as oftentimes these areas are most prone to encountering
ethical issues.
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• Develop program modules for specific units that may encounter ethical
issues or for other defined groups such as employees in a foreign country.
By tailoring the program to the issues these units or groups may face, you
increase the relevancy of the training and will reinforce the belief that the
company management understands the issues faced at the unit or sub-
sidiary level.
8. When focusing on the participants, consider how your organization can best
be divided into small and mid-sized groups by function, responsibilities and
duties. In effect, you will need to plan how the ethics program will be differ-
entiated for varying levels on the organization chart. Additionally, since
peer-to-peer learning is an important part of an interactive and well-
designed ethics training program, it is essential that participants be grouped
in a manner that will encourage, rather than stifle, participation. 
9. Determine who will be responsible for reviewing feedback, evaluating the
training program, and revising content where necessary. If a committee is
used, it is good practice to involve senior management, but membership in
the committee should be broadly based where possible. Representation of
specific functions on the committee that share a greater likelihood of encoun-
tering ethical issues, such as accounting and purchasing, should be consid-
ered. Furthermore, input and feedback evaluation should not be limited to
participants’ comments or test results; remember, the trainers who are lead-
ing the discussions and facilitating group exchanges are often one of the best
sources for feedback. How will feedback be gathered? Will anonymous com-
ments be accepted and, if so, how can they be submitted? In this regard,
remember that computer scoring of questions and case study issues may be
one form of feedback but, like the means of delivering information to the par-
ticipants, should not be relied on exclusively. 
10. What outside resources will be used/accessed in crafting the ethics training
program? Many professional organizations such as the AICPA, state soci-
eties, consulting firms and ethics centers have considerable resources and
intellectual talent that can be accessed for program review, content review
and for answers to program design questions. 
WHO PROVIDES ETHICS TRAINING?
As discussed above, this question relates to whether the organization uses outside
experts, officers or other employees to lead the training program. Chief ethics offi-
cers may be called for in larger organizations, while smaller companies may have
an existing officer, outside expert or consultant conduct the training program. If
the ethics program fosters a sense of participation and ownership among the
employees, it is likely that participants may emerge over time who will be inter-
ested in facilitating group discussions, writing case studies, or even taking a direct
role in expanding the program. 
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WHO IS THE ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM DIRECTED TO?
Like the old saying goes, “know your audience!” In designing the ethics training
program, you should first decide if an integrated program covering the entire
organization is appropriate, or if you will be preparing parts of the program for
use by certain departments or business units. If one program is prepared, how will
participants at different levels of the organization be directed into the relevant
part of the program so as to avoid wasting their efforts or encountering inappro-
priate subject matter? Also, is the organization going to have an ethics orientation
for new employees or prospective hires and, if so, what form will it take? If you
agree that tailoring the ethics training to the organization will enhance the pro-
gram’s effectiveness, then answering these and other questions in the course of
designing the program will help ensure a more effective result. 
WHAT ISSUES ARE COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED IN
DESIGNING ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAMS? 
Deciding which techniques and methodologies will be used to communicate infor-
mation to the participants is one of the most common issues you will encounter
when designing an ethics training program. If the organization wants to fully inte-
grate ethics training into its other training programs, you will face issues such as
how in-depth the treatment of ethics issues will be in other training modules, how
to achieve an effective integration without losing or repeating content, and how
far you want to carry the integration concept. As feedback comes in concerning
specific elements of the program, you will often begin to see patterns develop
about which trainers, methods and techniques are delivering the best results, and
which of these need improvement. Obviously, implementing changes in a comput-
er program is relatively easy, but changing trainers or focus points and the accom-
panying material in a videotape or written program is an altogether different mat-
ter. The issues we addressed above such as budget, time allocation, trainer desig-
nation, and group organization for effective instruction will also appear in the
design phase for most programs. 
HOW DOES AN ORGANIZATION EVALUATE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM?
Just as designing the program involves a myriad of factors and decisions, there
are any number of ways in which you can evaluate the effectiveness of the ethics
training program. While considering the number of ethical lapses that come to
light might be one way, the purpose of the program is to significantly reduce, if
not eliminate, these events. Hence, evaluation might involve testing of partici-
pants on a periodic basis to determine the rate at which ethics training is
retained, the number of complaints filed with management or the audit commit-
tee (either anonymously or otherwise) relating to ethical issues, e-feedback
received from computer-based programs, and comments surfaced in group meet-
ings relating to the effectiveness of specific aspects of the program or the program
as a whole. In addition, outside evaluations of the program may be commissioned
or the organization might seek outside evaluations from ethics centers or from
universities and colleges with business ethics departments.
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It should be noted that the results of ethics training programs are not gen-
erally susceptible to precise measurement and that most organizations will need
to consider the feedback described above when considering how effective their
program has been. Moreover, if ethics training inside the organization offers any
tangential benefits in behavior outside the organization, these benefits will like-
wise be incapable of measurement. To the extent society benefits from an orga-
nization’s developing an ethical culture and good corporate values, it is arguable
that the organization indirectly receives at least some of that benefit as a corpo-
rate citizen. 
WHAT FOLLOW-UP SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE
ETHICS TRAINING PROGRAM IS INITIATED?
First and foremost, follow-up needs to take place with respect to the feedback that
the organization gathers from various sources. If the chief ethics officer or the
supervising committee receives input on the program but does not follow up,
assign responsibility or take action, the feedback will go unheeded and the pro-
gram will suffer. Participants who become aware of the organization’s neglect of
the ethics training program will be inclined to dismiss the objectives of the pro-
gram as a whole, while those who express dissatisfaction with the program will
feel ignored if their comments are not acted upon. Trainers should be regularly
debriefed by the chief ethics officer or the supervising committee, and an action
plan should be put into place with duties and timelines to assure that feedback
receives appropriate responses. Designers of ethics training programs should
establish feedback/response loops within the program to allow the organization to
take advantage of whatever feedback is forthcoming.
Corporate Ethics for Financial Managers222
12-Appendix B.qxd  10/16/2002  9:32 AM  Page 222
Additional Resources from the AICPA
NEW! Financial Reporting Fraud: A Practical Guide to Detection and Internal Control
By Charles R. Lundelius, Jr., CPA/ABV
AICPA, June 2003
No. 029879
AICPA Member $49.00 Nonmember $61.25
Newly Updated! The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention
By Tedd Avey, CPA, CA, CFE; Ted Baskerville, CA; Alan Brill, CISSP
AICPA, Loose-leaf—supplemented annually
No. 056504
AICPA Member $180.00 Nonmember $225.00
Independence
Author: Michael J. Ramos, CPA Level: Basic
Recommended CPE Credit (based on 50-min. hr.): 8 QAS Credit: 8
Format: CD ROM
AICPA, 2003
No. 739155hs
AICPA Member $109.00 Nonmember $136.25
Selected Topics in Professional Ethics
Author: Michael J. Ramos, CPA Level: Basic
Recommended CPE Credit (based on 50-min. hr.): 3 QAS Credit: 3
Format: CD ROM
AICPA, 2003
No. 738360hs
AICPA Member $79.00 Nonmember $98.75
The Handbook of Process-Based Accounting: Leveraging
Processes to Predict Results
By James A. Brimson
AICPA, March 2002
No. 029876
AICPA Member $49.60 Nonmember $62.00
For more product information or to order,
log onto www.CPA2Biz.com/store
or call 888-777-7077
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